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Abstract 
While the employment rate of women in New Zealand has trended upwards since the 
end of the Second World War, employment is still highly variable by ethnicity, age and 
region.  One of the least engaged categories are young (15-24 years) Māori women.  
They have much lower employment rates than their Pākehā counterparts (42% and 64% 
respectively) and this is not offset by greater involvement in education.  At 33%, Māori 
actually have much lower education rates than Pākehā women (46%). Instead young 
Māori women are more heavily involved in unpaid work.  A very high 44% report 
spending time taking care of a child at home during the week, versus only 21% of their 
Pākehā counterparts.  
Although there is a general awareness of these differences, there has been no systematic 
enquiry into the origins of the low engagement of young Māori women or its 
contemporary manifestations.  This thesis offers an integrated analysis of labour supply 
and time allocation of young Māori women, drawing on insights from economic theory 
and past studies of female Māori labour supply.  It is among the first master‟s thesis to 
utilise unit record data from the New Zealand Census of Population and Dwellings.  
Access to data on individuals and their location is essential if geographers are going to 
be able to join other disciplines in modelling human behaviour.  In this case I use the 
census records on individuals in order to test three hypotheses: Firstly, those young 
Māori women have greater exposure to household compositions which generate 
domestic responsibilities that compete with the devotion of time to paid employment.  
Secondly, that when Māori and Pākehā are both faced with these responsibilities, there 
is a stronger negative effect on the likelihood of a young Māori woman securing 
employment, relative to her Pākehā counterparts.  Finally, that young Māori women are 
more likely to live in geographical areas that adversely affect their likelihood of being 
employed than their Pākehā equivalent. 
Access to the census has the benefit of including as variables the characteristics of the 
household in which young women are living.  In doing so it extends the standard 
empirical models of female labour supply to include elements from the literature on 
child labour, household labour supply models in agricultural settings, as well as the 
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analysis of pluri-activity, all of which model young women‟s behaviour in the context 
of the economic and social structure of the household.  
What I demonstrate is not that young Māori women‟s labour participation is any more 
sensitive than Pākehā to constraints which I take household structure to impose, but 
simply that labour constraining structures are themselves far more prevalent in the case 
of young Māori women.  It is the greater demands such households impose on the need 
for child care, elderly care and help in the community that combine with the lower 
demand for the labour of young Māori women often in non-metropolitan settings which 
combine to generate the much higher market inactivity rates we see particularly among 
Māori women in their early twenties.  Being able to demonstrate this point using 
individual records on virtually the full population of young Māori and Pākehā women is 
the major contribution of this thesis.  
Keywords:  female, employment, education, domestic responsibilities, Māori, youth 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
One of the most striking developments in the New Zealand economy since the end of 
the Second World War has been the constant growth in females‟ engagement within the 
labour force.  One of the most common measures of engagement is the labour force 
participation rate, which calculates the percentage of the population aged over 15 that is 
either unemployed or working for at least one hour per week.  Historical data shows that 
in 1951 only 25% of women were classified as being in the labour force, however this 
gradual increased to 45% in 1986 (Statistics New Zealand, 1993), and 60% in 2001 
(Statistics New Zealand, 2003b).
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Historically, the continual increase in female labour force participation has not been 
even across the various ethnic groups.  Māori women of all ages, in particular, have 
always lagged behind their Pākehā counterparts.  In particular, between 1945 and 1986 
non-Māori have consistently higher female labour force participation rates than Māori, 
although the ethnic difference shrunk from roughly ten percentage points in 1945 to 
about three percentage points in 1986 (Davies & Jackson, 1993).
2
  By 1986 there was 
only a one percentage point difference in the labour force participation rates between 
Māori and Pākehā women.  In 1991 the difference peaked at almost seven percentage 
points, but since then there has been a general downward trend to be less than two 
percentage points in 2007 (Statistics New Zealand, 1997, 2007).  
Differences in female labour force engagement between ethnicities have continued to 
persist through to the present day, and this is most evident for young women.  For 
example in 2006, the labour force participation rate for Pākehā women aged 15-19 and 
20-24 was 64% and 80% respectively, however for Māori women the corresponding 
figures were much lower at 55% and 65%. 
While these present day ethnic differences have attracted the attention of successive 
governments, in the case of Māori, issues of labour force participation need to be 
                                                 
1
 Prior to 1986 the labour force participation rate calculated the percentage of persons over 15 that were 
either unemployed or employed for more than 20 hours per week.  Unfortunately the inconsistency in 
terms of the definition makes it difficult to compare statistics over time.  Nonetheless there seems to be a 
long term upward trend in female labour force participation irrespective of the definition used. 
2
 Unfortunately data is only available on Māori versus non-Māori women so historical ethnic trends can 
only be described in this way. 
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examined within a broader post-colonial economic context, rather than in an isolated 
present day framework.  Even up until 100 years ago the vast majority of Māori were 
located in rural areas where a culture of community subsistence farming and food 
production was prevalent (Metge, 1964).  Meanwhile an increasing proportion of 
immigrants, mainly from the United Kingdom settled in the main centres.  While 85% 
of Māori still remained in rural areas at the beginning of the 20th century (Statistics New 
Zealand, 2005), their involvement in the cash economy slowly increased as schemes to 
help commercialise Māori agriculture were introduced.  Māori women on the other 
hand, continued to be employed mainly in a small number of occupations, including 
farm workers, cooks, domestic servants, maids and teachers (Coleman, Dixon, & Maré, 
2005). 
The rate of urbanisation for Māori, and the associated involvement in both the cash 
economy and formal education, only gained traction around the time of World War II.  
This was when large numbers of young Māori migrated to urban areas to assist the war 
effort, as well as to take advantage of relatively higher wages and better labour market 
conditions.  Not only did this rapid urbanisation result in a gradual inclusion into the 
market economy, but it also caused significant dislocation from customary Māori 
society for two reasons.  Firstly, due to the movement away from a community 
orientated lifestyle towards a more competitive and individualistic lifestyle, and 
secondly because of the continuing shift from agricultural occupations to manufacturing 
and service professions (Metge, 1964). 
While the involvement of Māori in the cash economy increased as a result of 
urbanisation, there was still a high degree of occupational segregation.  In particular, the 
migration of young Māori men to the cities reduced the relative size of the agriculture 
workforce.  While most Māori men became heavily employed in unskilled 
manufacturing jobs, small proportions were also employed in tertiary occupations.  A 
similar trend applied to Māori women, however their involvement in tertiary 
employment was considerably more pronounced due to the availability of low skilled 
service jobs.  Overall Māori women were still significantly overrepresented in 
manufacturing jobs as 36% were employed in the secondary sectors, as opposed to 20% 
of non-Māori (Pool, 1991).   
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Although post-war urbanisation and migration resulted in higher incomes and standards 
of living for Māori, some of these gains were undone by the restructuring in the 1980s 
when there were considerable job losses within the manufacturing sector (Coleman et 
al., 2005; Douglas, 1991; Magee, 1991).  Between 1987 and 1992 the unemployment 
rate increased from 10.5% to 26.5% for Māori men and from 10.8% to 24.4% for Māori 
women (Statistics New Zealand, 1997).  Furthermore, periods of unemployment were 
often prolonged as the low skilled were unable to find employment in an economy that 
was increasingly transforming into a service economy which placed greater emphasis on 
skills and education (Morrison, 1991).   
Overall, Māori women were one of the last identifiable groups to enter the „westernised‟ 
cash economy and there were a number of consequences of this delayed adaptation.  
Firstly, since Māori women typically remained in communal subsistence agriculture 
longer, their entrance into formal education was delayed.  When they did enter the cash 
economy, this was not a initial barrier through to the mid 1970s as there was an 
abundance of manufacturing and service jobs available to them that required little, if 
any, education or prior experience.  However, when these jobs declined in the wake of 
economic restructuring, Māori women did not possess the necessary level of education 
or skills to take advantage of the growing number of skilled employment opportunities 
being created within the tertiary sector. 
Secondly, the higher rates of fertility experienced by Māori prior to World War II 
continued to endure even after the rapid urbanisation of Māori.  In fact, it was not until 
the late 1960s, when the majority of Māori lived in urban areas, that fertility rates began 
to decline (Heenan, 1979; Pool, 1977; 1991).  Consequently the larger family sizes for 
urban Māori in comparison to Pākehā often combined with a shortage of housing to 
produce multi-generational and multiply related family households (Metge, 1964).  As a 
result, not only were urban Māori more likely to have a larger number of young children 
than Pākehā, but they were also more likely to have older relatives also living with 
them.  This was likely to be associated with a greater commitment to in-house caring 
responsibilities for both young and old.  Furthermore, mother and daughters were 
typically responsible for these duties and it was not uncommon for daughters to be kept 
at home in order to provide assistance (Metge, 1964).  The combined effect of the first 
two consequences was not only a greater pressure to apply labour within the home 
through caring responsibilities, but also weaker returns to labour when it was applied 
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outside of the household because of lower educational attainment, higher chances of 
unemployment and lower remunerations. 
Thirdly, much of what we call Māori urbanisation was actually migration to nearby 
smaller urban centres, such as Rotorua and Gisborne, as opposed to the main centres 
such as Auckland or Wellington (Pool, 1991).  Again this is particularly problematic for 
Māori women as demand for service workers was relatively weaker in these smaller 
urban communities.  In essence, while urbanisation presented a number of benefits to 
Māori women, the transition of the New Zealand urban economy away from 
manufacturing towards a more service-based economy, but with differential 
employment opportunities in small and larger centres, placed many Māori women in a 
relatively weaker employment position in comparison to Pākehā women over the same 
period. 
Analytical Implications 
It is against this historical context that we must place the task of modelling the 
contemporary participation of young Māori women.  The conventional economic 
literature typically applies a „westernised‟ individualised model of female labour supply 
that emphasises a nuclear family household structure, where the mother and fathers‟ 
caring responsibilities are limited to children only.  However, given the uneven 
development and the complex household structures that have emerged as a result of the 
historical pattern of Māori urbanisation, such models of female labour supply are likely 
to be quite limited and possibly even misleading. 
Geographers, being less tied to a modelling tradition, have been able to discuss 
contemporary patterns relatively free from the theoretical strictures of neo-classical 
economics, albeit at the cost of analytic power.  Among the areas of female labour force 
participation where human geographers have touched on are the issues of wider 
responsibilities within households raised above.  Hanson and Pratt (1988) for example, 
identify the increasing diversity of household structures in recent years and the 
subsequent demise in the traditional household consisting of a working husband, stay-
at-home mother, and children.  Without specifically referring to contemporary Māori 
households, these US authors argue that the traditional concept of home is inadequate in 
general and two adjustments need to be made.  First, there needs to be more careful 
analysis of intra-household relationships and interactions so that negotiations and 
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strategies affecting the employment decisions of each household member can be better 
understood.   
As their second point, they argue how the surrounding neighbourhood also needs to be 
taken into consideration, and that in addition to recognising that the demand for labour 
varies geographically, neighbourhood characteristics, such as social networks and 
service, can also influence the employment decision of the residents. 
Both these points are relevant to my adaption of the standard model of labour supply to 
incorporate geography in a post-colonial New Zealand context.  Firstly, neo-classical 
economic models are ahistorical in that they fail to recognise the post-colonial history in 
which Māori sit.  As outlined earlier, the delayed entry into formal education and cash 
economy leaves Māori at a competitive disadvantage even to this day because of their 
wider caring responsibilities and lower earning capacity in the formal labour market. 
This historical legacy may not be fully captured simply by including education and job 
experience into equations comparing Māori and Pākehā women.  Secondly, as the 
urbanisation of Māori included significant migration to smaller urban areas where 
economic development, and the associated demand for labour, was restricted, spatial 
development across New Zealand was uneven.   
As such the multiple role of geography in shaping female labour supply and demand 
may have been overlooked in previous literature modelling female labour force 
participation.  Specifically any contemporary modelling has to acknowledge that 
geography can condition the characteristics of the residents living there (poorer families 
and individuals moving to smaller urban centres to reduce housing costs for example), 
and also that geography can condition the type and number of jobs available, as well as 
the remuneration offered to residents.  Any research examining labour supply outcomes 
of women (and men for that matter) therefore needs to incorporate the multiple roles 
that geography can play. 
Houston (2005) also draws our attention to the importance of the underlying geography 
of the labour market, particularly as it applies to lower skilled labour and its historical 
evolution.  Houston argues that the role geography can play in an individual‟s 
employment decision operates at a number of different geographical scales.  Not only is 
the skill mismatch between workers and job opportunities important in understanding 
regional differences in employment outcomes, but there are also a number of 
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relationships between the geographical location of an individual and employment at an 
intra-metropolitan scale.   
For example, spatial effects such as the physical distance between home and job 
opportunities, the cost of commuting, and the availability of public or private 
transportation can inhibit the ability of an individual to seek employment.  On the other 
hand, area effects such as the cost and availability of local childcare, restricted job 
searching ability due to isolation, and exposure to negative social characteristics within 
a neighbourhood may also be important in inhibiting individuals from supplying labour 
in the formal market.  Houston‟s key point is that there is often a spatial mismatch 
between the geographical imperatives of housing (where lower skilled workers can buy 
housing) and employment (where they can secure employment).  Cheaper inner city 
housing often comes at the price of a long commute to outer city jobs.  
The work of geographers Hanson, Pratt and Houston suggest that while both economics 
and geography focus on labour markets, they often take quite different routes to gaining 
insights, the former more deductive, the later inductive.  There is however, a growing 
acknowledgement by both disciplines that spatial and geographic dissimilarities can 
often mould labour markets outcomes.  By combining the human geography and labour 
economic approaches it is possible to turn some of the more general geographical 
notions into testable hypotheses, and subject them to rigorous analysis using labour 
economic techniques.  That is the approach I take in this thesis. 
This section has offered a brief historical and disciplinary context within which to view 
contemporary labour market patterns of young Māori and Pākehā women.  Since the 
turn of the century there has also been considerable emphasis by successive 
governments to improve the economic and workforce position of women, as well as to 
close the historical gap between Māori and Pākehā participation.  Government policies 
and funding initiatives such as „Working for Families3‟ and „Closing the Gaps4‟ have 
combined with a buoyant economy to increase females‟ engagement within the labour 
market in the last decade.  However there still exist substantial ethnic differences in the 
level of labour force engagement within New Zealand‟s female population and it is 
                                                 
3
 „Working for Families‟ provides childcare assistance through pre-school childcare subsidies and free 
early childhood education.  In-work tax credits are also provided for working families. 
4
 Part of „Closing the Gaps‟ overall initiative to reduce social and economic disparities between Pākehā 
and Māori included funding to assist the transition of Māori students into work at the completion of their 
studies, as well as Māori community organisations in creating local job opportunities. 
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helpful to turn specifically to some of these differences as a general background to the 
thesis 
Differences in Employment Rates of Young Māori and Pākehā Women 
As outlined earlier, Māori women have had consistently lower labour force engagement 
than Pākehā women since the end of the Second World War.  By 2007, almost 63% of 
Pākehā, and 61% of Māori women aged over 15 were either employed or unemployed 
and considered to be participating in the labour force.  If instead the employment rate, 
that is the percentage of the population aged over 15 that is employed for at least one 
hour per week, is used as a measure of labour force engagement, then 61% of Pākehā 
women and 56% of Māori women were deemed to be engaged in paid employment 
(Statistics New Zealand, 2007). 
The ethnic differences in engagement rates are even more noticeable once broken down 
by age.  While Pākehā women have consistently higher employment and labour force 
participation rates than Māori women across each of the age groups, these differences 
are greater at younger ages to the point where young Māori women are one of the least 
formally engaged groups in New Zealand.  
That young women (aged 15-24) have lower employment rates in general is to be 
expected given that young people are typically associated with participation in 
education.  These lower employment rates would not be of particular concern if they 
were offset by greater involvement in education.   However this is not the case.  In fact, 
not only do the education rates of young Māori women not offset their lower 
employment rates, they are actually 14 percentage points lower than Pākehā.5   
Unfortunately this is not the end of the story.  The relatively disadvantaged position of 
young Māori women is even more severe than this.  A comparison of the education 
rates for women who are not employed shows that Māori rates are 23 percentage points 
lower than Pākehā, indicating that a greater proportion of young Māori women are 
economically inactive with no engagement in paid work or study.  This is the 
substantive difference and issue that I wish to explore in this thesis.  Specifically, why 
                                                 
5
 The education rate is the percentage of young women attending or studying at school or any other place. 
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do young Māori women continue to have relatively lower employment and education 
participation rates than Pākehā? 
The implicit suggestion in the terminology that young Māori women are more likely to 
be economically inactive, may be quite misleading if much of the time not spent in paid 
work nor in education is in fact absorbed by domestic duties in non-market production.  
Domestic responsibilities that might compete with time spent in employment or 
education can include general housework, caring for ill and disabled family or non-
family members, looking after their own or someone else‟s child, as well as other 
volunteer work.   
One of the central questions I ask is, could one of the reasons for the lower participation 
rates of young Māori women (simply) be a reflection of the greater domestic 
responsibilities placed on them?  That is, has the delayed entrance into the cash 
economy placed young Māori women with less developed labour market skills, more 
exposed to children – both their own and other people‟s – and worse family health 
outcomes than their Pākehā counterparts? 
Associated with this same argument is the possibility that residual differences in social 
and cultural obligations, may mean that these domestic pressures on young Māori 
women are greater than they are for Pākehā, and that wider family and whānau 
connections reduces the ability for young Māori women to resist and shirk these 
responsibilities.  This pressure could be compounded by the history of spatially uneven 
development and partial urbanisation by Māori, resulting in young Māori women being 
disproportionally located in geographical areas in which traditional pressures are 
greater, at the same time that employment opportunities are weaker.  It is these ideas 
that I now take and express as formal hypotheses for empirical testing. 
Hypotheses  
While previous researchers have identified the individual and her family nucleus as the 
influential entity in determining labour supply, I hypothesise that this scope is far too 
narrow when studying young women.  In particular, with a significant proportion of 
households now containing multiple (related) family nuclei it seems the household, 
rather than the family per se, may actually be the dominant labour constraint.  This 
research aims to establish the importance of household composition and wider 
 9 
geographical influences in explaining why young Māori women have consistently lower 
employment and education participation rates than their Pākehā counterparts. 
Three main hypotheses are advanced and tested.  The first hypothesis is that family and 
household responsibilities are wider for young Māori women, and these account for the 
reduced hours devoted elsewhere.  These responsibilities can come in a number of 
different forms and are generated through the household composition in which young 
women live.  In particular, not only do I hypothesise that there are significant caring 
responsibilities associated with children, but there are also domestic responsibilities 
generated by living in households that contain other household members‟ children, as 
well as sick, disabled, injured, and elderly household members.  In essence, I predict 
that these domestic responsibilities will be negatively associated with participation in 
employment (and education), and furthermore, that young Māori women‟s greater 
exposure to these domestic responsibilities can partially explain their lower 
participation rates in employment (and education). 
The second hypothesis suggests that for a number of reasons, these responsibilities will 
have a stronger negative effect for young Māori women relative to Pākehā.  One 
possible reason for this is that many Māori may be more reluctant to seek formal care 
from Pākehā professionals, and therefore more of the care duties are kept within the 
household with a larger share falling to young women carers.  A greater sense of family 
for Māori and a belief it is their duty or responsibility to care for relatives may be a 
second reason.  A third possible reason is that young Māori women‟s relatively low 
earnings potential may result in a shift of domestic duties towards them so that other, 
more employable household members can seek paid employment. 
Finally, the third hypothesis pertains to young women‟s geographical location and how 
it may influence both the supply and demand for labour.  It states that even though 
Māori have experienced rapid urbanisation in the recent past, young Māori women are 
still more likely than Pākehā to live in geographic areas where employment and tertiary 
education opportunities and access are restricted.  Furthermore, these geographical 
influences may differ within a number of scales including at the neighbourhood level, 
and across the rural/urban spectrum.  In essence, I predict that young Māori women are 
more likely to live in geographical areas that are associated with a decline in the 
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probability of participation in employment (and education), and this greater exposure by 
Māori can partially explain their lower participation rates. 
Outline 
In order to empirically test the hypotheses above and fully examine the ethnic difference 
in the employment and education rates of young women, this research is broken into six 
additional chapters.  Chapter 2 motivates the research question by comparing the 
differential employment and education rates of young Māori and Pākehā women.  
Chapter 3 provides a summary of previous New Zealand literature that addressed female 
labour supply, and international literature that specifically focuses on ethnic differences 
in female labour supply. 
Chapter 4 outlines the dataset chosen for the analysis and provides detailed information 
surrounding the variables and their theoretical justification for their inclusion.  The main 
theme emerging from this chapter is that access to unit record data from the 2001 census 
allows young women‟s household and geographic context to be represented in 
considerably more detail than in previous literature.  In particular, the role of geography 
is introduced at a number of scales including the neighbourhood (the level of 
deprivation), the local labour market (the local demand for labour), the degree of Māori 
concentration within each area units, and the level of employment influence and 
proximity of rural and urban areas from the major metropolitan centres.  Whereas 
domestic responsibilities are measured by the number and age of young women‟s 
children, the number and age of other household members‟ children, and the number of 
elderly, sick, ill, and disabled household members. 
Chapter 5 offers a brief summary of the main elaborations of the standard labour supply 
models designed to recognise the activity options and household membership options 
used to characterise female labour supply in a variety of settings.  This chapter also 
reports the three regression models utilised to empirically test the factors contributing to 
ethnic differences.  In particular the first has employment as a binary dependent 
variable, while the second and third employ an education and employment multinomial 
dependent variable.  All three models estimate the probability with which a young 
women „chooses‟ one of the states within the dependent variable, and is modelled as a 
function of a set of arguments including, age, individual characteristics, household 
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composition, unpaid work activities, socioeconomic status, geography and education 
status where appropriate. 
The key findings are discussed in Chapter 6.  The results of estimating what are in effect 
a set of cross-sectional binary and multinomial logit equations, show that while Māori 
are more likely to live in household structures and geographical locations that 
negatively affect young women‟s employment (and educational) outcomes, there is no 
evidence to suggest that Māori are more sensitive to these factors than Pākehā.  In other 
words, young Māori women experience the conditions which lead to higher inactivity 
rates, not because they are any more susceptible to say, domestic illnesses of elderly 
relatives or they are any more likely to stay home to care for their own children than 
Pākehā women.  Instead the reason they show greater inactivity rates is that they are 
much more likely to be exposed to these conditions: more likely to have relatives 
experience illness and to have children of their own among other things.   
The conclusions, presented in Chapter 7, provide an opportunity to restate the main aim 
of the paper and ponder the differential presence, and relative magnitude of the 
domestic constraints on the labour supply and education choices of young indigenous 
women.  In short, the main conclusion drawn from this thesis is that it is the propensity 
of young Māori women to be exposed to the conditions that lead to inactivity rather than 
any difference in their reactions to these conditions.  The policy implications are 
significant as this research implies that many of the conditions we see manifest as 
inactivity actually have their origins, not in any different preferences or proclivities of 
young Māori women, but in objective, measurable conditions to do with employment, 
wages and housing.  Fortunately many of these very conditions are those already 
receiving considerable attention by government and the community.  Hopefully my 
thesis will reinforce the importance of these initiatives. 
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Chapter 2 
Contemporary Differences 
Even though there has been considerable focus by successive governments since the 
turn of the century to improve women‟s economic and workforce position, there still 
exist substantial ethnic differences in the level of labour force engagement within New 
Zealand‟s female population.  Government policies and funding initiatives such as 
„Working for Families6‟ and „Closing the Gaps7‟, have combined with a buoyant 
economy to increase women‟s engagement within the labour market in the last decade.  
Figure 2.1 illustrates the trend for two measures of labour force engagement over time 
for Māori and Pākehā women.  The labour force participation rate calculates the 
percentage of the working age population (aged 15+) that is either employed or 
unemployed, while the employment rate measures the percentage of the working age 
population that is employed.  For both measures there is a pattern of increasing rates for 
Māori and Pākehā women over time, however, the figure also highlights that Māori 
rates are still persistently lower than their Pākehā counterparts over the entire time 
frame. 
These ethnic differences are even more noticeable once broken down into age groups.  
Figure 2.2 below highlights two points of interest.  Firstly, Pākehā women have 
consistently higher employment rates than Māori women in all but one age category.  
Secondly, the ethnic differences are greater at younger ages showing that young Māori 
women are one of the least formally engaged groups in New Zealand.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6
 „Working for Families‟ provides childcare assistance through pre-school childcare subsidies and free 
early childhood education.  In-work tax credits are also provided for working families. 
7
 Part of „Closing the Gaps‟ overall initiative to reduce social and economic disparities between Pākehā 
and Māori included funding to assist the transition of Māori students into work at the completion of their 
studies, as well as Māori community organisations in creating local job opportunities. 
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Figure 2.1: 
Labour Force Participation Rates and Employment Rates of Māori and Pākehā Women, 1996-2007 
 
Source: Statistics New Zealand (2003a; 2007) 
Figure 2.2: 
Employment Rates of Māori and Pākehā Women by Age Group, 2006 
 
Source: New Zealand Census of Population and Dwellings 2006 
The influential role of education at these ages, and the often chaotic nature of young 
people‟s lives may potentially explain why young women have one of the lowest 
employment rates of any identifiable group in the labour force.  Young people‟s lives 
have often been described as „chaotic‟ as these are the years where major changes in 
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their lives generally occur (Blanchflower, 1996).  Youth is a period where attention 
shifts from compulsory education to optional education and/or employment, and as 
such, individuals in their late teens and early twenties may experiment with a variety of 
education and employment options. 
While older age groups are more stable in terms of their employment status, young 
people‟s lives show considerably greater diversity due to the numerous employment and 
education choices available, and the shorter durations of employment and education 
spells (Stillman, 2006).  Several different work or education options may be tried in an 
effort to „test the waters‟ and find a particular pathway worth pursuing.  As Ussher 
(2006) has noted, the traditional transition to tertiary education directly from secondary 
school is becoming less prevalent.  As such, many youths will be vulnerable to being 
out of employment and/or education as they experiment and decide on options open to 
them (Hill, 2003).   
Labour Force Engagement 
Table 2.1 shows the extent to which employment becomes more important to both 
young Māori and Pākehā women as studying becomes less important.  More precisely, 
the employment rate (the percentage of women at each age who work at least one hour 
per week) gradually rises with each year of age.  On the other hand, education rates 
(percent of women at each age attending or studying at school or any other place) 
declines sharply as age increases.   
While Table 2.1 above indicates that employment and education choices can change 
substantially between the ages of 15 and 24, there are also considerable ethnic 
differences between the two groups in the timing and magnitude of these decisions.  
Figure 2.3 illustrates the way employment rates of Māori and Pākehā women change 
between the ages of 15 and 24.  Two main conclusions are: Firstly, employment 
increases with age for both Māori and Pākehā women between the ages of 15 to 24. 
Secondly, Pākehā women have considerably higher employment rates than Māori, and 
this difference grows gradually with age.  For example, the difference is 20 percentage 
points at age 17, but by age 24 the difference increases to 27 percentage points. 
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Table 2.1: 
Employment and Education Rates of Māori and Pākehā Women by Age, 2001 
Age Employment 
Rate (%) 
Education 
Rate (%) 
15 31.3 71.3 
16 45.5 73.1 
17 57.7 61.9 
18 59.9 41.9 
19 60.5 41.3 
20 62.8 39.4 
21 65.4 31.5 
22 67.4 24.5 
23 69.3 21.1 
24 70.4 18.9 
Source: New Zealand Census of Population and Dwellings 2001 
Figure 2.3: 
Employment Rates of Māori and Pākehā Women by Age, 2001 
 
Source: New Zealand Census of Population and Dwellings 2001 
Lower employment rates for young Māori women may not necessarily be undesirable 
since another possible productive use of time for women aged 15 to 24 is involvement 
in education.  However, as Figure 2.4 shows, education rates for Māori women are also 
considerably lower than those of their Pākehā counterparts.8  There is a noticeable drop 
for both ethnicities at ages 17 and 18 as women either graduate or prematurely leave 
high school.  For Pākehā especially, there is a stabilisation in the education rate between 
ages 18 to 20 probably involving the enrolment in tertiary education.  After age 20 
however, there is a second sharp decline in the Pākehā rate and a gradual convergence 
                                                 
8
 Calculating education rates from census data underestimates the true enrolment rate.  See Appendix 6 
for further discussion. 
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to the Māori education rate.  These patterns indicate that not only are young Māori 
women less likely than Pākehā to be employed, but they are also less likely to be in 
education.   
Figure 2.4: 
Education Rates of Māori and Pākehā Women by Age, 2001 
 
Source: New Zealand Census of Population and Dwellings 2001 
Examining the employment rate of young women may not describe the full extent of 
their employment outcomes as this age group is frequently engaged in part-time work.  
Figure 2.5 below illustrates that not only are there vast differences in the employment 
rate between Pākehā and Māori, but there are also differences in the likelihood of 
working full-time versus part-time.  For example, most of the differences in 
employment rates at the youngest ages between Māori and Pākehā women, as illustrated 
in Figure 2.3, are due to a greater proportion of Pākehā women working part-time as 
opposed to any difference in full-time employment.   
Between the ages of 15 and 17 the full-time employment rates between the two 
ethnicities are roughly equal, but the part-time employment rates are considerably 
higher for Pākehā between these ages.  The role of part-time work for Pākehā also 
continues to be prominent between 18 and 21. 
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Figure 2.5: 
Employment Status of Pākehā and Māori Women by Age, 2001 
a) Pākehā 
 
Source: New Zealand Census of Population and Dwellings 2001 
b) Māori 
 
Source: New Zealand Census of Population and Dwellings 2001 
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within each of these two categories.  Figure 2.6 shows the actual hours worked by Māori 
and Pākehā women aged 15 – 19 has very modest differences within both the part-time 
and full-time categories.   
Figures 2.6 and 2.7 show the distribution of women aged 15-19 and 20-24 respectively 
over hours worked.  Comparison of the two graphs highlights three trends.  Firstly, both 
Māori and Pākehā women move away from working a small number of hours per week 
when they are teenagers towards a 40 hour work week in their early twenties.  Secondly, 
of those teenage women in employment, Māori women are more likely to work longer 
hours than their Pākehā counterparts, although the actual disparity is relatively small 
with the difference at any hour bracket never reaching five percentage points.  Therefore 
while Figure 2.3 shows that teenage Pākehā women are more likely to be employed than 
Māori, Figure 2.6 suggests that those teenage Māori women who are employed tend to 
work slightly more hours than their Pākehā counterparts.   
Figure 2.6: 
The Distribution of Māori and Pākehā Women Aged 15-19 Over Hours Worked, 2001 
 
Source: New Zealand Census of Population and Dwellings 2001 
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Figure 2.7: 
The Distribution of Māori and Pākehā Women Aged 20-24 Over Hours Worked, 2001 
 
Source: New Zealand Census of Population and Dwellings 2001 
Thirdly, a higher proportion of Pākehā women aged 20-24 who are employed report 
working longer hours than their Māori counterparts.  As with teenagers, the actual 
percentage point difference between Māori and Pākehā at each hour bracket is relatively 
small.  Again not only are Pākehā women in their early twenties more likely to work, 
but of those who are employed, Pākehā are slightly more likely to work additional 
hours. 
In summary, the main labour supply difference between young Māori and Pākehā 
women is in their propensity to undertake paid work rather than any difference in the 
hours the employed put in.  As the distribution of hours worked for young Māori and 
Pākehā working women is almost identical, there is no significant benefit for including 
an examination of the difference in the amount of work undertaken within this research.  
Instead the chief ethnic difference surrounding the labour supply of young Māori and 
Pākehā women is their decision to work or not.  For this reason my attention will focus 
primarily on the employment decision itself and not the hours of work undertaken. 
Participation and Studying 
Although Māori women have lower levels of labour force engagement, this could reflect 
the fact that young women often combine education and employment.  There are at least 
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four different possibilities at any age; employment only, studying only, both studying 
and employment, and neither studying or employed, identified here as market 
inactivity.
9
 
Figure 2.8 shows the proportion of young Pākehā and Māori women in each 
employment and education state by age.  Due to the variability of employment and 
education options undertaken by young women at various ages, both panels seem to 
support the suggestions made earlier that young people lives are quite volatile by 
activity. 
While there seems to be little difference between the proportion of Pākehā and Māori 
women undertaking study only, there are noteworthy dissimilarities among women who 
are both in employment and education.  In particular, the percentage of Pākehā women 
in both education and employment is far higher than for Māori women and these 
differences are particularly striking between the ages of 15 and 20.  This supports the 
suggestion that many students hold down a part-time job to support themselves through 
tertiary and secondary education, and that Pākehā are more likely to do so than Māori.   
The second major difference in Figure 2.8 concerns women who are employed only.  At 
all ages up until 20, the percentage of Pākehā and Māori women in employment only 
are relatively even.  However after the age of 20, the percentage of Pākehā women who 
are only employed grows at a steady rate, while the percentage of Māori women in 
employment only remains remarkably constant.  
In terms of the inactivity rate, that is those who are not employed or studying, there is a 
clear dissimilarity.  Although the general age trend in inactivity rates are similar, Māori 
inactivity rates are between fifteen and seventeen percentage points higher across all 
ages.  This represents a large proportion of young Māori women who are not committed 
to economically productive activities.  It is this difference which constitutes one of the 
primary motivations for this study.  In the chapters to follow, I seek to understand the 
extent to which domestic responsibilities and geography can account for the ethnic 
differences in the employment rates of young women, as well as the ethnic differences 
in those education/employment choices made. 
                                                 
9
 The terms „inactivity‟ and „inactive‟ have been used in the past, rightly or wrongly, to identify 
individuals who are not in education or employment.  However, I recognise that many market inactive 
individuals devote time to equally important and productive activities, such as child and elderly care.  As 
such I use the terms for the sole purpose of  providing consistency with prior research 
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Figure 2.8: 
Employment and Education Status of Pākehā and Māori Women Aged 15-24, 2001 
a) Pākehā  
 
Source: New Zealand Census of Population and Dwellings 2001 
b) Māori 
 
Source: New Zealand Census of Population and Dwellings 2001 
Domestic Constraints 
While the statistics above imply that because young Māori women have less 
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supply theories have suggested that much of this so called „leisure‟ time is in fact 
absorbed by domestic duties.  Since time devoted to domestic responsibilities is not 
supplied and remunerated in the market place, they are not recognised as being 
economically productive.  Yet recipients of such duties (family members or 
communities for instances) gain an intrinsic benefit from the undertaking of unpaid 
work.  Therefore even though some young women are market inactive, they may still be 
providing essential and productive assistance or care that is not recognised in the formal 
economy.  My hypothesis is that young women who are inactive or have low labour 
market engagement may have their time available for productive activities constrained 
because of significant domestic responsibilities.  As an introduction to this thesis, 
Figure 2.9 graphs the percentage of young Māori and Pākehā women who undertake 
unpaid work activities in six categories. 
Figure 2.9:  
Percentage of Young Māori and Pākehā Women Aged 15-24 Undertaking Unpaid Work Activities, 
2001 
 
Source: New Zealand Census of Population and Dwellings 2001 
While young Māori women have a greater likelihood of involvement in all but one 
activity, ethnic differences in participation rates varies considerably across these six 
unpaid work activities.  The greatest disparities centre on the two childcare activities.   
At 44%, the proportion of young Māori women looking after a child living in the same 
household is roughly twice the corresponding percentage for Pākehā women, whilst the 
proportion of young Māori women caring for non-household member children is 
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roughly ten percentage points greater than Pākehā women.  That domestic constraints, 
specifically childcare, inhibit women‟s labour force participation is well known and 
remains the dominant factor separating men and women‟s engagement in the labour 
market and for the persistent differences in their incomes.  Therefore it is not 
unreasonable to suggest that greater domestic responsibilities for young Māori women 
can potentially explain their lower engagement in paid work and education in 
comparison to young Pākehā women. 
Unfortunately these figures do not summarise the actual level of engagement in unpaid 
work by recording the number of actual hours dedicated to each activity.
10
  Given that 
the six activities are not mutually exclusive, examining the numbers of unpaid work 
activities undertaken may provide a reasonable indicator as to the level of domestic 
responsibility faced by young women.  Figure 2.10 shows that although young Māori 
women are slightly more likely to be doing no unpaid work than Pākehā, they are also 
far more likely to be undertaking multiple unpaid work activities.  More precisely, 
27.1% of Māori carry out at least three of the six unpaid activities, while for Pākehā the 
figure is much lower at 12.6%.   
The inference from Figures 2.9 and 2.10 is that young Māori women face more pressing 
domestic and household responsibilities than their Pākehā counterparts.  Furthermore 
this inference may partially explain why young Māori women are less likely to be 
employed, less likely to study, and more likely to be inactive.  Unfortunately there is an 
inability to determine whether the greater domestic responsibilities for Māori are a 
cause or an effect of their low labour force and educational engagement.  For instance, 
time constraints for Māori resulting from greater domestic duties may cause them to 
withdraw from the labour market and not to seek employment.  It is also plausible that 
the opposite is true.  That is, a failure to acquire employment results in young women 
taking up the domestic duties of a household as their way of contributing to the 
productiveness of the household.  In essence there is a two-way causational relationship 
between domestic duties and employment (and education). 
                                                 
10
 Question 41 of the Individual Census Form (Appendix 2) asks: In the last four weeks, which of these 
have you done without pay?   Therefore responses only refer to whether an individual undertakes any 
unpaid work activities, with no indication of the actual number of hours undertaken.  More detailed 
information regarding actual hours devoted to unpaid work activities is collected in New Zealand‟s Time 
Use Survey 1998/9 although public data broken down by sex, ethnicity and age is not available.  An 
updated survey is planned by Statistic New Zealand in 2008/9. 
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Figure 2.10: 
Number of Unpaid Work Activities Undertaken by Māori and Pākehā Women Aged 15-24, 2001 
 
Source: New Zealand Census of Population and Dwellings 2001 
Geography 
The second possible reason for ethnic differences in labour force engagement relate to 
differences in the young women‟s geography.  Essentially the argument here is that 
young women living in less urban and more rural areas may face a number of 
disadvantages.  For example, there may be fewer job opportunities, poorer quality and 
reduced access to education intuitions, and fewer government services that assist 
participation in training programs or identifying employment opportunities. 
Figure 2.11 traces the employment rate of young Māori and Pākehā women by the 
settlement type in which they live.
11
  While ethnic differences in employment rates are 
again noticeable, there is not a great deal of variability in the employment rates across 
settlement types for both Māori and Pākehā.  For Pākehā, the lowest employment rate of 
59% occurs in rural areas with high urban influence, while the highest (65%) appears in 
independent urban communities.  On the other hand, Māori employment rate are lowest 
(36%) in rural areas with low urban influence and highest in the main centres (42%).  
Nonetheless, the fact that employment rates actually do vary across settlement types 
                                                 
11
 More detailed information regarding settlement type can be found in Chapter 4. 
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suggests that characteristics within a young woman‟s settlement type may be influential 
on their employment outcome. 
Figure 2.11: 
Employment Rates of Māori and Pākehā Women Aged 15-24 by Settlement Type, 2001 
 
Source: New Zealand Census of Population and Dwellings 2001 
Not only does settlement type appear to be related to whether young women work or 
not, it may also be related to their level of labour market engagement.  In essence, the 
availability of full-time and part-time jobs may vary by settlement type.  Figure 2.12 
scrutinises this possibility by again breaking down the employment rate into full-time 
and part-time employment.  There is evidence to support the argument that the type of 
settlement that young women live in is related to their level of engagement in paid work 
for both Māori and Pākehā.  
For Māori, the full-time employment rate is significantly greater in main urban areas, 
satellite urban areas, and highly rural or remote areas.  In the remaining four settlement 
types the probability of a young women being in full-time or part-time employment is 
roughly equal, with individuals living in independent urban communities, rural areas 
with high urban influence and rural areas with low urban influence actually being 
slightly more likely to work in a part-time job than a full-time job.  
Full-time employment rates for Pākehā women vary considerably across the seven 
settlement types, ranging from 40% for young Pākehā women living in highly rural or 
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remote areas down to 28% for those living in rural areas with high urban influence.  
Similarly to Māori, there are clear differences between the part-time and full-time 
employment rates in the majority of settlement types for Pākehā, with the most 
noticeable disparity occurring in highly rural or remote areas. 
Figure 2.12: 
Full-Time and Part-Time Employment Rates of Māori and Pākehā Women Aged 15-24 by 
Settlement Type, 2001 
 
Source: New Zealand Census of Population and Dwellings 2001 
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settlement type that has an effect on the probability of employment, but rather the 
characteristics of the individuals living in those settlement types.  I will use the age of 
individuals as an example to help explain this issue. 
Use of Economic Modelling 
Figure 2.13 below shows the percentage of young Māori and Pākehā women living in 
the main urban areas at each age between 15 and 24.  The fact that older women within 
this age range are more likely to live in the main centres than women aged 15 to 17 
seems to show a pattern of migration, whereby older women within the 15 - 24 age 
bracket move into the main centres.  With that in mind, recall from Figure 2.3 that 
employment rates increased with age for both Pākehā and Māori, and that this was 
probably due to more and more women finishing their education and entering the labour 
market.  Therefore, not only do main urban areas contain a greater proportion of older 
women within the 15-24 age bracket, but these older women are more likely to be 
employed as well.  As such, the higher rates of employment found in main urban areas 
as shown in Figure 2.13, may not actually be due to the characteristics of the main 
centres but instead due to the characteristics (such as age) of the individuals living in 
them. 
Figure 2.13: 
Percentage of Māori and Pākehā Women Living in Main Urban Areas by Age, 2001 
 
Source: New Zealand Census of Population and Dwellings 2001 
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The issue of the interrelationship between two possible factors affecting the probability 
of employment for young women strengthens the argument for moving towards an 
econometric modelling analysis and away from a purely descriptive one.  Using 
econometric methods has two main advantages over descriptive analysis.  Firstly, 
statistical methods allow for interrelationships between potential explanatory factors, 
such as age and settlement mentioned above, to be separated from each other 
statistically. 
Secondly, econometrics allows the previously stated hypothesises to be tested by giving 
a clear indication as to the extent and role that each factor has on the probability of 
employment.  Whereas descriptive analysis can only provide an indication as to the 
potential role that the explanatory factors play.  Furthermore, it has no ability to judge 
the actual extent to which each factor actually alters the probability of employment.  For 
both of these reasons, economic modelling and the subsequent statistical analysis are 
utilised to examine why young Māori women continue to have lower employment rates.  
Greater detail pertaining to the modelling and statistical analysis used is discussed in 
Chapter 5.   
Summary 
To summarise, despite young Māori women having considerably lower employment 
rates than their Pākehā counterparts this is not offset by greater involvement in 
education.  Furthermore, examining the combined employment and education decisions 
by young women further emphasises the fact that Māori are significantly more likely to 
be neither employed nor in education than Pākehā.   
These trends indicate that young Māori women are more likely to be inactive with 
greater leisure hours.  However, one of the suggestions put forward here is that due to 
the greater strain of domestic responsibilities faced by Māori or vice versa, their 
probability of being employed and/or in education is much lower than Pākehā women.  
There is descriptive evidence to support this proposition with young Māori women 
more likely to be undertaking unpaid work in five of the six categories, as well as 
undertaking a higher number of unpaid work activities.  Of course, I do acknowledge 
that other factors may explain these ethnic differences in the probability of being 
employed and/or in education.  In particular this chapter has also highlighted that 
geography – a key area of interest in the research - may also partially explain the ethnic 
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difference illustrated previously.  Furthermore the previous chapter also emphasised that 
there may be a historical dimension in accounting for the ethnic difference in the 
probability of young women being employed, while in Chapter 4 to follow, a number of 
demographic factors are highlighted. 
To assist in identifying potential factors which may explain these ethnic differences, the 
following chapter presents an overview of international studies examining ethnic 
differences in female labour supply, as well as New Zealand literature on female labour 
supply.  Not only will this literature review help to establish other potential factors that 
need to be investigated, but it will also assist in developing a suitable econometric 
model to use by drawing on previous modelling techniques that been implemented. 
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Chapter 3 
Literature Review 
The purpose of this chapter is to present an overview of research that addresses the 
difference in young Māori and Pākehā women‟s labour supply behaviour.  Even though 
the context of this paper is based within New Zealand, internationally there has been 
considerably more work around the topic of female labour supply and labour force 
participation.  Consequently it is important that this literature review begins with an 
examination of relevant literature.   
The first section summarises international literature that estimates ethnic labour supply 
differences.  By doing so, this will assist in employing reliable econometric techniques 
to empirical test for differences between Māori and Pākehā labour supply.  The ensuing 
quantifiable results will form sound conclusions, in which my hypotheses that young 
Māori women are more likely to live in households and geographical locations that 
adversely affect their employment (and education) prospects than their Pākehā 
counterparts, can either be supported or rebuffed. 
The second section will narrow the scope of relevant material to include literature that 
examines female labour supply in New Zealand and will help to identify whether 
similar research has been undertaken or whether there are gaps in New Zealand 
literature that can be filled.  This section will also assist in identifying possible factors 
which may explain ethnic difference in labour supply.  As such, by controlling for other 
potential explanatory factors, the size of the relationship between household 
responsibilities, geography and employment outcomes for young women will be 
understood more precisely.  
A third section, which is relegated to Appendix 1 due to its technical nature, discusses 
literature that develops economic models outlying female and household labour supply 
decisions.  Examining labour supply models will provide a basis to develop or replicate 
an economic model of labour supply for young women. 
Overall, the motivation behind this chapter is to identify relevant literature that will 
assist in developing a clear framework in which to study the employment participation 
of young Māori women. 
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Estimating Ethnic Differences in Female Labour Supply 
Internationally, there has been considerable work examining ethnic differences in 
female labour supply.  Generally speaking, this has been in response to a pattern of 
persistent and sustained difference in labour supply outcomes across ethnicity groups.  
Previous literature commonly seeks to explain the causes of these ethnic differences and 
to comment on the policy implications of their findings. 
The literature on ethnic differences in female labour supply employs one of two 
strategies to identify the effect of ethnicity on participation.  The first is to divide the 
population under question into various subgroups representing the ethnic categories and 
run separate regressions for each ethnic subgroup.  The subsequent coefficient value 
placed on the independent variable demonstrates the effect that each factor has on the 
labour supply outcomes within each ethnic group.  Comparisons of coefficients across 
ethnic groups will identify whether one ethnic group is more or less sensitive to each 
explanatory factor than another ethnic group. 
The second strategy is to combine all ethnic groups into a single sample and include an 
ethnic dummy variable into the regression model.  The coefficient on the ethnic variable 
will indicate whether there is still an „ethnic effect‟ once other explanatory factors are 
controlled for.  Essentially this ethnic effect represents some unexplained difference 
between two ethnic groups that is related to differences in the explanatory factors.  By 
applying this strategy, authors assume that two ethnic groups are as sensitive as each 
other to each explanatory factor.  Some authors extend this strategy by interacting 
explanatory factors with one of the ethnic groups, therefore identifying if one ethnic 
group is more or less sensitive to particular factors. 
According to the theory outlined in Appendix 1, an individual will participate in paid 
employment when the market wage received from working is greater than her 
reservation wage, where an individual‟s reservation wage is the minimum wage she 
requires to entice her to enter the labour market.  The literature first attempts to identify 
factors that determine an individual‟s market and reservation wage, and then ascertains 
the strength of their relationships on the labour force participation decision.  There are 
three main categories of factors that affect female labour supply; the characteristics of 
the women themselves, household and family influences, and spatial effects.   
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I examine each in turn by investigating the results, econometrics applied, theoretical 
model, and the subjects studied of each relevant publication.  The first section includes 
literature that only controls for differences in individual characteristics, the second 
controls for differences in individual characteristics and household influences, while the 
third controls for differences in individual, household and spatial effects.  The intuition 
behind the structure is that it is anticipated that results may vary between studies 
depending on what factors are controlled for.  That is, literature that controls for 
variables in each of the three categories may produce different results for the individual 
characteristics variables than literature that just controls for individual characteristics. 
Individual Characteristics 
It is not surprising that all literature focusing on ethnic differences in labour supply has 
attempted to examine the effect of individual characteristics on creating variations in 
labour supply outcomes for various ethnic groups.  This is especially so for those 
publications specifically focusing on labour force participation, as an individual‟s 
market and reservation wage are typically influenced by their personal characteristics. 
Bound, Schoenbaum and Waidmann (1996) for example, use the 1992/3 Health and 
Retirement Survey to study ethnic differences in labour force attachment with a specific 
focus on the role that poor health plays on this attachment.  While this study only 
samples individuals aged in their 50‟s who live in the state of Florida in the United 
States, it has the advantage of over sampling ethnic minorities and providing a range of 
information on an individual‟s health, employment status and demographic 
characteristics. 
The authors estimate separate models for white and black women that calculate the 
probability of being out of the labour force based on a vector of personal characteristics 
such as age, education, marital status, and a latent variable describing health (created 
from a raft of other detailed health measures).  Predicting the labour force participation 
rate of black women by controlling for the personal characteristics identified above was 
achieved by substituting the coefficients on the control variables for the black sample 
into the white women‟s labour force probability function.  Once the probability of being 
out in the labour force is calculated for each white sample member using the coefficient 
from black women and averaged across the entire white women sample, the resulting 
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value corresponds to the expected likelihood of being out of the labour force for black 
women if they had the same characteristics of white women.  
Results show that prior to controlling for personal characteristics, black and white 
women had precisely the same non-participation rate of 38%.  However when the level 
of education is the sole control variable, black women‟s non-participation rate declines 
to 34%.  Marital status is further added as a control into the model, however this has no 
effect on the predicted non-participation of black women.   
Finally the latent health variable is included to assess whether the level of non-
participation continues to decline for black women.  In fact, this inclusion induces the 
predicted probability to decline significantly further to 26%, which tends to suggests 
that roughly a third of black women current out of the labour force would actually be in 
the labour force if they were faced with the same education level and health status as 
white women.  However in terms of the relationship between health and labour force 
participation, there is a potential for a two-way causation.  That is, either poor health 
prevents black women from working because of their inability to do so, or that not 
working causes poor health outcomes because less income is available to be spent on 
health care services.  Therefore while this paper highlights there is a relationship 
between health and labour force participation, there is an inability to state poor health is 
a cause of lower probability of being in the labour force.   
Bowen and Finegan (1969) devote an entire chapter from their book on labour force 
participation to single women aged between 24 and 54 years.  Whilst they also identify 
that ill health and disability can potentially play an important role in the ethnic 
difference in female labour force participation, the inability to create a health variable 
from the 1960 US census means that they could not test for this effect.  Instead white 
and non-white women‟s labour force participation rates are calculated after controlling 
for only marital status, schooling and age.  Furthermore, recognising that non-labour 
income may be an influential factor in the labour supply decision, the authors also 
control for other income in the regression analysis.  This is not a surprising inclusion 
considering non-labour income is frequently included in labour supply models 
presented in Appendix 1. 
Regressions are run for the control variables listed above to test the effect that each have 
on the labour force participation rates of all single women and black single women.  The 
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use of a 1/1000
th
 sample of the 1960 US census provided insignificant results for 
participation against age and schooling, although in terms of other income, all single 
women and black single women had significantly inverse relationships with 
participation.  Greater non-labour income tended to result in greater withdrawals from 
the labour market for black single women as opposed to all single women.  
Prior to controlling for the explanatory variable discussed above, participation rates for 
white women were almost seven percentage points higher than their non-white 
counterparts, however this difference all but disappears once the controls are 
introduced.  While the difference is almost reduced to zero, the authors do not claim that 
the four variables can explain the entire difference.  Instead they provide four other 
possible differences between black and white women that could maintain the 
differential, but were unable to be examined given the data available.  These include 
poorer health as mentioned above, poorer education quality in prominently black 
neighbourhoods, labour market discrimination for black workers, and a greater 
responsibility for care of younger children for black women. 
Alternatively, the authors present five possible factors that may increase the 
participation of black women in paid employment but are again unable to be tested with 
the data available.  They argue that black women have a stronger historical attachment 
to employment, separated or divorced black women have greater prior work experience, 
black women have smaller financial resources other than labour income to fall back on, 
and ethnic discrimination is less likely to occur in the service worker occupations in 
which black women are predominately located in.  Finally, they propose that black 
women live in potentially beneficial household structures that provide easily accessible 
and free childcare from other relatives living in the same household; a pertinent issue 
relating to the present research. 
This final possible reason suggests that not only are an individual‟s characteristics, such 
as poor health, education and non-labour income, important in influencing their labour 
supply decision, but their household and family context may also influence this 
decision.  These household and family influences are discussed below. 
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Household and Family Influences 
Much of the pioneering work taking into account female‟s household and family 
circumstances in examining ethnic differences has been developed by Bowen and 
Finegan (1969).  Their initial analysis focuses on data provided by a 1/1000
th
 sample of 
the 1960 US Census for married women at a time when black wives‟ participation rates 
were over 12 percentage points greater than white wives‟.  Separate regressions were 
run controlling for education, age, other non-wife family income, the presence and age 
of children, and the employment status of their husband.  While controlling for 
education creates a greater difference in participation rates, differences in age, other 
non-wife income and husband‟s employment status condensed the disparity to roughly 
seven percentage points.  This tends to suggest that black wives are more likely to be 
enticed into the labour market because of lower other family income and worse labour 
force status of their partners.  These results are consistent with the models presented in 
Appendix 1 that assumes income is pooled within a family context. 
The authors provide three possible reasons, other than taste and preferences, which 
explain the left over differences in participation rates between black and white women.  
First, black women face less wage discrimination than their husbands, and hence they 
are drawn into the workforce at higher wages rates as a partial substitute for their 
husband‟s work.  Altonji and Blank (1999) also address the prospect of wage 
discrimination as a determining factor of labour supply in their comprehensive summary 
of previous wage discrimination models.  Second, the high percentage of black multi-
family households permits household responsibilities to be shared over a greater number 
of people, allowing for more time for market work.  Again this is particularly pertinent 
to the current research topic.  Third, greater marital instability of black couples entice 
black wives into the labour force to boost experience and maintain strong labour market 
connections in case of a marital separation. 
Subsequent analysis in their publication studies the interaction between ethnicity and a 
host of other explanatory variables.  In terms of the age and number of children the 
authors again use the same data source but compare participation rates of all women 
against the sub-sample of black wives.  Using the same set of control variables, when 
comparing women who have children of various ages, results generally showed that the 
negative relationship between children and labour force participation was much stronger 
for non-black married women than it was for black married women. 
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A similar method is also applied to examine the effect housing may have on influencing 
labour force participation of married women.  Due to the nature of the dataset, a 
variable describing housing could only be proxied by the number of rooms in a wife‟s 
house.  As the authors point out, more rooms could place a time constraint on women 
through the greater housework required, hence reducing participation.  Alternatively a 
greater number of rooms could induce greater participation because of a greater need for 
monetary income for the assumed greater expenditure required.  The authors did not 
note however, that the reverse could be true where greater participation and the assumed 
greater household income could result in the household being able to afford a bigger 
sized house.  While the proxy variable was replaced later by a house tenure variable 
both returned statistically insignificant results.  This does not necessarily indicate 
housing is not important, but rather the variables available to the authors may have been 
inadequate proxies. 
As noted above, other family income was included in the regression analysis in the 
expectation that there would be a negative relationship with labour force participation.  
Again using the above control variables, significant inverse relationships are found for 
all wives as well as black wives.  However, the sensitivity to greater other income is 
considerably less for the latter.  This indicates the disincentive that higher non-labour 
income has on labour supply is much less for black women. 
Finally, the employment status of a woman‟s husband is tested in a separate model 
using the same procedure.  Results indicate that if a husband is unemployed, as opposed 
to employed, wives are more likely to participate in the labour force to cover the 
husband‟s lost wage, all else being equal.  A slightly greater likelihood of participation 
is found for black women.  However if the husband is out of the workforce as opposed 
to being employed, then black women are less likely to participate in the labour force, 
while all women are more likely to participate.  
Tienda and Glass (1985) specifically examined the household context of women to 
establish the size of the relationship between household structure and female labour 
force participation across a number of ethnicities.  The study uses the March instalment 
of the 1980 Current Population Survey, and because of the richness of the data, control 
variables such as age, education, presence and income of partner, presence of young 
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children, whether the family is above a predetermined poverty level, and whether the 
household includes an extended family member are included in the regression. 
Creating two separate models describing the two types of headship (single and 
partnered), a dummy variable for ethnicity is included to estimate the labour force 
participation of white, black, Mexican and Puerto Rican women.  Evidence suggests 
that, once the explanatory variables are controlled for, black women are 8% less likely 
to participate if they are a single mother but 15% more likely to participate if a spouse is 
present in the household than comparable white single and partnered mothers.   
The effect of living in a household with extended family members on the participation 
of women by ethnicity is generated through the interaction between the two dummy 
variables.  While results for black women are insignificant for both types of headship 
type, partnered Mexican women are 18% more likely to participate than partnered white 
women when they live in an extended household structure.  This is up from 4% more 
likely when there is no extended family living arrangement.  Overall it indicates that the 
presence of other adults may reduce the domestic workload of Mexican women, and in 
turn frees up more possible time for paid employment. 
Further research looking into the effect that living in an extended household has on 
mothers‟ employment is Shapiro and Mott‟s (1979) work on recent mothers.  Their use 
of longitudinal data provided by the National Longitudinal Surveys of Labor Market 
Experience of Young Women enables analysis to take place on labour supply decisions 
in the months before and after the birth of her first child.  Participation in the workforce 
is calculated using multiple classification analysis that holds other variables constant for 
each of the five time periods (three before birth and two after birth).  In particular, the 
usual control variables such as education, age, other non-women income, marital status 
and health are included.  Two defining features of this dataset is the inclusion of 
whether there is another non-partner adult present in the house, and a work preference 
proxy variable that describes whether the respondent believes they will be working at 
the age of 35.   
Unfortunately, the downside of this data source is the number of participants is 
restricted to about 5,000 people, and once non-relevant respondents are eliminated from 
the analysis, about 1,400 young women are studied.  As the sample is broken down into 
black and white mothers, this could well be the reason for many of the results failing to 
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reach statistical significance even at the 10% confidence level.  For example, both the 
health and other adult present variables were insignificant for black and white mothers 
over all time frames.  While the relationship between other family income and 
participation in each time frame is very uncertain, the effect of higher education seems 
to entice both black and white women to stay in paid work for longer while pregnant, 
and to return to worker quicker than less educated women.  In terms of the taste for 
work, white women who believed they would be working at age 35, had significantly 
higher participation rates in the five months after giving birth.  However, for black 
mother the results were again insignificant. 
Studies show that once household and family influences are controlled for, a number of 
relationships are still found to be similar to the previous section.  For example, while the 
positive influence of education and the negative relationship with non-labour income 
remain when household factors are controlled for, husband‟s labour force status is now 
correlated with the female‟s labour force participation.  This section has also identified a 
number of new components to household composition which are also related to labour 
supply.  Specifically, the presence of extended family member, the age of children and 
the labour force status of husbands all seem to be influential, and provide further 
interesting insight into how households allocate time between activities. 
Other authors have proposed spatial environments can also affect the allocation of time 
for women along with family and household influences.  Literature attempting to 
control for, and examine the effect of geographic location is discussed below. 
Spatial Impacts 
While the previous section tended to suggest that an individual‟s family and household 
context play an important role in both their labour supply decisions and explaining 
ethnic differences in labour supply, many authors have also identified an individual‟s 
surrounding environment and location as another influential factor.  In particular most 
authors use a spatial dimension to represent localised demand for labour and labour 
market opportunities for individuals.  Few researchers have identified that geographical 
location may also influence the supply of labour.  For these two reasons, this section is 
dedicated to research looking at the relationship between an individual place of abode 
and ethnic differences in labour supply. 
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Although many papers attempt to take account of location in their analysis, the extent to 
which location is controlled for varies immensely.  For example, looking again at the 
return to employment by recent mothers, Yoon and Waite‟s (1994) study is similar to 
that of Shapiro and Mott‟s (1979), but now the United State‟s National Longitudinal 
Survey of Youth is used to include whether the individual lives in an urban area in their 
model. 
The over sampling of ethnic minorities in this dataset allows the authors to run separate 
logistic regressions for each ethnicity, with the dependent variable being whether a 
women has returned to work within one year of giving birth.  Usual explanatory factors 
are included, such as ethnicity, education, other family income, marital status, urban 
residence and previous work experiences.  However factors not typically explored by 
other literature such as work preferences, gender role attributes, whether a grandmother 
is present, whether the mother is a student and the age at first birth are also 
incorporated. 
For black mothers, the positive effect of higher levels of education on the return to 
employment is significantly greater than that of white mothers with exactly the same 
level of education.  More precisely, black mothers with at least some college education 
are significantly more likely to return to employment than if she had high school 
education.  For white mothers however, this positive effect of higher education is much 
less significant.  Not surprisingly, if a mother was in full-time work prior to giving birth 
then there was a greater probability they would return to work, with the effect being 
significantly greater for black mothers.   
Of the other explanatory variables provided, only other family income and urban 
residence were statistically significant for black mother‟s only.  Black mothers were 
considerably less likely to return to work if they lived in urban areas and marginally 
more likely to return with greater family income.  Unfortunately the simple rural/urban 
divide does not provide any indication as to what it is about urban living that influences 
labour supply.  While it might have been hypothesised that having another adult, such 
as a grandparent, present to provide informal childcare and hence increase labour force 
participation on recent mothers, this was not supported for either ethnicity. 
Reimers (1985) also uses an urban dummy variable to describe the spatial context when 
studying how cultural differences such as family size and structure, education, and 
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language explain the difference in black and white wives‟ labour force participation in 
the US. 
Use of the 1976 Survey of Income and Education enabled the inclusion of the relevant 
variables that have been discussed before, such as a woman‟s education, ethnicity, age, 
health status, number and age of children, and her husband‟s employment status.  The 
richness of this dataset permits further explanatory variables that have not been 
discussed previously, to be incorporated.  Instead of injecting other family income as a 
single variable, it is broken down into more precise groups such as, husband‟s income, 
benefit availability, and other non-labour, non-transferred income.  Finally, the 
husband‟s age, and the number of working-aged and elderly people present within the 
dwelling are controlled for. 
The findings show that if black wives had the same average characteristics as white 
wives, then black wives would strengthen their superior participation rates from 7.6 to 
11.8 percentage points difference over that of white wives.  The main catalyst for this 
improvement is the worse education and health outcomes of black wives.  Although not 
as strong, the positive effect on labour force participation that black wives would have 
had if they lived in urban areas to the same degree as white wives indicates that urban 
living has a positive effect on labour force participation.  Presumably, the inclusion of 
urban living as a possible explanatory variable attempts to proxy the local demand for 
labour, however there may be other influences working within this variable.  Therefore 
these results suggest women living in urban areas are more likely to be in the labour 
force because there is a greater abundance of available jobs than in rural areas.  The 
final conclusion made by the author is that current family and personal characteristics 
cannot fully explain the ethnic differences and speculate that historical unobserved 
cultural differences may have caused this pattern.   
Two papers from Australia have attempted to firstly, identify the determinants of labour 
force participation and secondly, to calculate the relative strength of these determinants 
of Australia‟s indigenous people.  While both papers present findings for both men and 
women, only the findings relating to for women are relevant.  The first of these studies 
is Daly‟s (1993) examination of the employment probability of Aboriginal and non-
Aboriginal people.   
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While the normal human capital components, age and education, are included, the 
author‟s prediction that an inability to speak English could also lower employment 
induces the inclusion of a dummy variable for this.  Data from the 1986 Census allow 
the control for differences in marital status, number of dependent children, ethnicity, 
and rural/urban living.  Three separate models are devised to test whether non-
Aboriginal women‟s higher employment probability can be attributed to their 
endowments.  The first estimates the effect of each independent variable on 
employment of all women.  The second uses the interaction between the ethnicity 
dummy variable and other independent variables to understand if Aboriginal women are 
more or less sensitive to certain factors.  The third reruns the second model but 
eliminates any variables from the second model that were insignificant. 
In the first model, the authors found results consistent with other research regarding the 
positive effect of education and the negative effect of children.  They also found that 
women with poor English skills were less likely to be employed.  In terms of the spatial 
differences in demand for labour, results suggest women living in urban areas that are 
not main centres were less likely to be employed when compared to women living in the 
main centres.  This indicates the demand for labour can vary between urban and rural 
areas, but also within the urban category.  While the effect of being Aboriginal was 
strongly negative, the first model estimated that the endowment of Aboriginal women, 
as represented by the explanatory variables given above, can only explain 17% of their 
lower employment probability in comparison to non-Aboriginal women. 
In the final two models referred to above, the effect of being married was the only 
interaction effect to reach significance at the five percent level.  The positive coefficient 
implies that the effect of being married on employment is significantly greater for 
Aboriginal women than for non-Aboriginal women.  However, for all other explanatory 
factors, Aboriginal women were just as sensitive to them as non-Aboriginal women.  It 
was not that Aboriginal women were more sensitive to factors reducing their likelihood 
of being employed, but rather Aboriginal women as a group were more likely to be 
exposed to situations adversely affecting their probability of being employed. 
Instead of using cross sectional data, Gray and Hunter (2002) utilised the 1981, 1986, 
1991 and 1996 Australian Census to construct a synthetic cohort analysis of indigenous 
and non-indigenous determinants of labour force participation.  Controlling for 
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unobserved time invariant characteristics, which are not included in the regression 
model but may vary between cohorts, the authors defined cohorts based on age, gender 
and indigenous status and, unlike Daly (1993), run separate regressions for each of the 
two ethnic groups.  Using this econometric method means the increase (or decrease) of 
a given explanatory variable within a cohort group over time is used to estimate the 
effect of an increase (or decrease) in that particular variable on the likelihood of labour 
force participation. 
Contrary to Daly (1993) results show that there are some differences in sensitivity to 
specific factors.  For non-indigenous women all explanatory variables reached statistical 
significance.  Living outside a major urban area, not speaking English well, being 
divorced, separated or widowed, and leaving schooling before graduation all decreased 
the probability of participating in the labour force, while not being married and having a 
post secondary qualification increased the likelihood.  For indigenous women, while the 
directions in which each variable affects the likelihood on labour force participation are 
the same, the strengths vary considerably.  For example, having a post secondary 
qualification doubled the likelihood for non-indigenous, whereas if an indigenous 
women left school at 15 or 16 years of age the negative effect on participation is twice 
as great as for non-indigenous.  Interestingly, not speaking English did not reach 
statistical significance for indigenous women, which is somewhat surprising given the 
large negative effect for non-indigenous women.  
Although the results presented so far in this section provide some evidence that living in 
an urban areas has a positive effect on labour force participation, other authors have 
continued past the simple urban/rural divide to further investigate the spatial effects on 
participation.  Carliner (1981) for example, models the probability of workforce 
participation by an individual by determining the probability that the market wage is 
greater than the individual‟s reservation wage.  Included in the wage equation is not 
only whether a married woman lives in a metropolitan area or not, but also whether she 
lives in the „South‟ of the United States to represent labour demand in the female labour 
market.  The inclusion of the „South‟ variable represents the speculation that 
employment has grown faster in southern states, so that an individual living in a 
southern state is faced with greater employment opportunities than in other parts of the 
US.  Education, experience, experience squared, and whether she is native born or an 
immigrant are deemed to be determinants of an individual‟s market wage.  In 
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comparison, age, number and age of children and the household‟s other income 
determines the reservation wage, while the model assumes that husband‟s labour supply 
and household‟s fertility decisions are exogenous. 
To counter the problem of unknown market wages for non-participant, two alternative 
methods are used.  Firstly, wage rates for all women are imputed based on estimating 
the wage equation for working women, and secondly, by substituting the reservation 
wage determinants into the participation equation.   
Irrespective of the model used, results support previous research mentioned above with 
a positive effect of education and age, and a negative effect of children and other family 
income on black and white women‟s labour force participation.  Interestingly, living in 
a major metropolitan area was positively correlated with participation of white mothers 
but was negative correlated for black mothers.  While living in the south had a much 
greater positive effect for black women than white women. 
This latter result is not supported in England, Garcia-Beaulieu and Ross‟s (2004) study 
of the number of weeks worked.  Running regressions using data compiled from the 
2001 Current Population Survey Annual Demographic Files, they found black women 
living in the south worked more weeks than equivalent black women living in the 
Midwest.  However, fewer weeks are worked by white women living in the south in 
comparison to equivalent Midwest white women.   
For the first time, a dummy variable for participating in full-time study is also included 
in the regression analysis, with the negative effect on weeks worked being significantly 
greater for black women over white women.  This result tends to justify the inclusion of 
studying as a time allocation category as Skoufias (1993) and Rosenzweig (1981) have 
in Appendix 1.  Finally, over four-fifths of the difference in the number of weeks 
worked between black and white females can be explained by differences in education, 
marital status, husband‟s income, number and age of children, age, region, and years 
since immigrated where appropriate.  However, because there is still some unexplained 
difference the authors state that other factors not included in the regression analysis, 
such as discrimination, inferior quality schooling in predominantly black 
neighbourhoods and fewer accessible jobs opportunities could contribute to explaining 
the left over differences. 
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The overall consensus derived from previous research mentioned above is that 
education and the presence of children are the two greatest influences on labour supply 
of women.  This has led Lehrer (1992) to establish a model that includes a series of 
dummy variables which allows for the interaction between the woman‟s highest 
education and her fertility to be specified.  These dummy variables described different 
combinations for the number of children, the age of the youngest child, and the years of 
schooling of the wife.  Data is gathered from the 1982 National Survey of Family 
Growth Combining in order to run separate multinomial logit equations for each 
ethnicity.  Past labour supply, husband‟s earnings and employment status, wife‟s 
previous marital status, whether they live in the city centre, and if the place of residence 
is in the South are included as controls. 
Although a few coefficients for black wives were statistically insignificant, findings 
suggest the combined effect of fertility and education can have a varying effect on 
labour supply for both ethnicities.  So much so that the author concludes the complex 
pattern of child status and the effect on labour supply is best uncovered by using this 
particular method, as opposed to the conventional method of using two separate 
variables.   
The spatial effect tended to support Carliner‟s (1981) results with a positive relationship 
between both living in the centre city and living in the South, with full-time 
employment for white wives.  The other note of interest is that prior work experience 
had an extremely positive correlation with current full-time employment. Whist this 
particular research uses prior work experience as a proxy for labour market attachment, 
Browne‟s (1997) study of female headed households employs previous marital status 
and long term benefit use as an alternative proxy. 
Disjointedness from local labour markets, as well as a lack of human capital and fewer 
job opportunities, were hypothesised to be the causes for lower participation rates of 
black women headed households in comparison to their white counterparts.  
Multivariate results from the use of the 1989 Panel Study of Income Dynamics show 
that there is no support for the local job opportunities and regional differences theory 
(as proxied by local unemployment rate and area of residences within the US) in 
partially explaining the difference in participation rates of black and white women.  
There is, however, some support for the human capital and disjointedness theories.  In 
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particular, much of the explained gap can be explained by differences in years of 
schooling, the number and age of children, and being a long term welfare user. 
While previous papers have estimated spatial impacts by using place of residence on a 
variety of different levels, others have also inspected the characteristics of an 
individual‟s local neighbourhood as a potential explanatory variable.  Bell‟s (1974) 
study of black and white wives‟ labour force participation controls not only for 
geographic region within the US and living in a major metropolitan city, but also 
whether they live in a poor or non-poor area of the central city. 
Running separate regressions for black and white wives with participation rates as the 
dependent variable, more support for the positive effect of education and the negative 
effect of having young children, greater other family income and a greater number of 
children is presented.  However, in contrast to every other result presented previously, 
age of the wife is negatively correlated with labour force participation for both black 
and white women.   
While results on the spatial impacts for white wives were statistically insignificant, 
estimations for black wives produce interesting results.  The strong positive effect of 
living in the south reinforces Carliner‟s (1981) outcomes, even though many other 
papers could not find statistically significant results for black women.  Furthermore, 
living in a non-poor area of a central city has a substantial positive effect for black 
wives on their participation.  However, while this may indicate that neighbourhood and 
peer effects are influential, this correlation could be a result of successful or rich 
families self selecting themselves into living in non-poor areas.  Nonetheless, this paper 
is one of the few to attempt to examine the way in which geographical location is 
related to both the supply and demand of labour.  Most other international literature has 
simply proxied for local labour demand.  
A more in-depth study of neighbourhood characteristics and employment has been 
undertaken by Rivkin (1995).  His research studied ethnic differences in schooling, 
employment and leisure time allocation with a particular emphasis on the degree to 
which academic preparedness, crime, welfare use and labour market opportunities can 
explain differences in time allocation of recent high school graduates.  Combining data 
from four instalments (1980, 1982, 1984, 1986) of the High School and Beyond 
Longitudinal Survey with the 1980 FBI Crime Statistics and 1980 US Census Public 
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Use Microdata A Sample, multinomial regressions were run to estimate the likelihood 
that a young women will either be attending a tertiary education institute, working, or 
non-participation in the labour force.  
In terms of academic preparedness, greater maths and reading scores increased equally 
the probability of attending college rather than working for black and white women, and 
also decreased the probability of non-participation over working, with a greater effect 
for black women.  Furthermore, comparing black and white women with equivalent 
reading and maths test scores, black women were found to be more likely to continue 
onto tertiary education. 
While it was predicted that non-market earnings alternatives such as greater crime rates 
and welfare recipiency, would increase the likelihood of non-participation in the labour 
force, there was no evidence provided in the data to support this claim.  Furthermore, 
the hypotheses that worsening labour force non-participation rates, returns to education, 
and local job opportunities would entice young people into further education or to 
withdrawal from the labour force, is only somewhat supported.  In particular, the 
statistically significant coefficients for white women on the unemployment rate variable 
implies that white women who live in higher unemployment areas have greater non-
participation and education rates than white women living in low unemployment areas.  
They found no statistically significant relationship for black women however. 
As with many other studies presented above, there seems to be some evidence 
suggesting local labour market conditions influence ethnic differences in labour force 
participation.  Some ethnic groups seem to be more susceptible to downturn in the 
economy which is perhaps due to working predominately in less stable industries.  In 
essence, not only is geographic location within a country important, but also whether 
the place of residence is rural or urban.  Furthermore, there is some indication that the 
labour market conditions within rural or urban areas play a role in the level of labour 
force participation.  Unfortunately very few authors have assessed the relationship 
between an individual‟s geography and her labour supply. 
Literature that has attempted to control for spatial impacts have once again confirmed 
that females who are older, better educated, have less non-labour income, and have no 
children are more likely to be in the labour force.  In fact, these relationships seem to be 
very robust regardless of what other explanatory variables are controlled for.  Moreover, 
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the literature covered earlier in this chapter has identified many other individual 
characteristics potentially influencing the labour supply decision of women.  Prior work 
experience and welfare use, whether they are still studying, poor English speaking skills 
and immigrant status can be added to the list of personal characteristics influencing 
labour supply.  In terms of an individual‟s spatial environment, a higher local 
unemployment rate was related to lower participation indicating that females could be 
affected by downturns in the local economy.  Furthermore, living in an urban or major 
metropolitan area where there are more job opportunities and lower monetary and time 
costs of employment, also resulted in higher participation. 
There have been a variety of econometric methods utilised in previous international 
literature, and the choice of method is predominately determined by the type of data 
available to authors.  However, all literature focusing on ethnic differences in labour 
supply utilise one of two strategies.  The first strategy is to separate each ethnic group 
into their own dataset and run separate regressions to determine the size and statistical 
significance of the relationship between each explanatory variables and the labour 
supply of women.  While this strategy clearly indicates how sensitive each ethnic group 
is to every factor, there is an inability to determine how much of the ethnic difference in 
labour supply outcome can be explained through differences in those explanatory 
factors included in the regression model. 
The second strategy pools every ethnic group into one dataset and creates a series of 
dummy variables for each ethnic group.  Running regression analyses using this strategy 
will enable authors to estimate the extent to which differences in endowments between 
ethnic groups can explain the differences in labour supply outcomes.  Furthermore, by 
including ethnic interaction terms with each of the explanatory factors, the sensitivity to 
every explanatory factor can be calculated for each ethnic group.  Combining one of 
these strategies with an appropriate econometric method in the chapters to follow will 
enable the examination of young Māori and Pākehā women‟s employment and 
educational choices. 
While the international literature produces results show some consistency with many of 
the theoretical models presented in Appendix 1, I now turn to the New Zealand 
literature on female labour supply to see if this is indeed the case in a New Zealand 
context. 
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New Zealand Female Labour Supply Literature 
Considerably less literature has examined ethnic differences in female supply in New 
Zealand when compared to overseas literature.  As there has been limited research 
conducted on these ethnic differences, this section will broaden its scope to include 
literature that studies female labour supply in the New Zealand setting.  Similar to the 
previous one, this section will be partially broken down to the three major categories 
affecting female labour supply; the characteristics of the women themselves, household 
and family influences, and spatial effects.  I examine each of these in turn after first 
summarising the major descriptive patterns that have been evident in past research.  
These descriptive patterns are presented first.  The next section includes empirical 
literature that only controls for personal characteristics, followed by controls for 
individual characteristics and household influences.  The last section controls for 
individual, household and spatial effects.  Again, the intuition behind the structure is 
that anticipated results may vary between studies depending on the factors controlled 
for.  That is, research that controls for variables in each of the three major categories 
may produce different results for the individual characteristics variables than literature 
that just controls for individual characteristics. 
Descriptive Patterns  
A sizeable amount of literature has also been produced within New Zealand examining 
female labour supply.  However due to the relatively late development and availability 
of wide ranging and comprehensive data sets, the vast majority of this literature has 
only been undertaken since the early 1990s.  Furthermore, a high proportion of New 
Zealand literature has focused on descriptive trends, patterns or issues between and 
within female sub-groups. 
Long-term trends in female labour force participation has been covered extensively by 
Davies and Jackson (1993) who provide both the historical context of women‟s 
employment dating back to the late 19
th
 century, and more recent data on participation 
rates.  While Hyman (1978) shows that women‟s labour force participation has been 
gradually increased from 29.1% in 1945 to 42.5% in 1976, Davies and Jackson (1993) 
illustrates the upward trend continued between 1976 and 1986 for Māori, Pacific Island 
and Pākehā women.   
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In the few years after 1986 the gap between Māori and Pākehā women increased 
significantly as Māori women exited the labour force in greater proportions due to 
economic restructuring at that time (Statistics New Zealand, 1998a, 1998b).  For 
example, in 1986 Māori and non-Māori women‟s participation rate was roughly 54% 
and 53% respectively.  However by 1989 Māori women‟s participation had dropped to 
just over 45% while there was only a slight dip to 53% for non-Māori women.  Since 
then, rates for both Māori and Pākehā women have gradually increased with the 
difference having only been narrowed slightly (Te Puni Kokiri, 1998).   
With respect to between groups comparison of female labour force participation, 
Johnston (2005) provides one of the most recent and comprehensive summaries.  While 
his classical „M‟ shaped female labour force participation by age is also produced by 
Statistics New Zealand (1998a), many other interesting comparisons of female 
subgroups are provided by Johnston (2005).  Specifically, labour force participation is 
lower for sole mothers than for partnered mothers, lower with a greater number of 
children, higher when the age of youngest child is greater, lower for less qualifications, 
and lower for non-Pākehā ethnicities.  Furthermore, Dixon (1996) points out that 
married women are less likely to be in the labour force as opposed to divorcees or 
never-married females.  
A couple of other New Zealand publications show the interaction between unpaid and 
paid work.  For example, Callister (2005) looks at the distribution of unpaid and paid 
work between males and females and summarises that, although total work is roughly 
the same between the males and females, men do more paid work and women do more 
unpaid work.  Statistics New Zealand (2001) provide a similar summary of the 
male/female distribution, but continue further to show that on average Māori spend one 
hour more on unpaid work per week, but four hours less on paid work.  Finally, and 
somewhat surprisingly, individuals with children on average spend more time on both 
unpaid and paid work than individuals without children.  
While it is useful to have an overview of these group differences, examining studies 
providing empirical analysis and estimations of labour force participation provide 
greater insight to help understand these trends and patterns.  The collection of empirical 
literature is given more consideration in the coming sections. 
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Individual Characteristics  
Roberts (1999) examined the relationship between individual characteristics and labour 
force participation in his study using area unit data from the 1996 census.  The use of 
area unit data enabled regressions to be run between the labour force participation rates 
of each area unit and the individual characteristics of those area units, while holding 
other factors constant.  While the main focal point of this research is to examine the 
correlation between self assessed disability and health problems, and labour force 
participation, other variables representing gender, qualifications, marital status, age 
structure, ethnicity, and the presence of unpaid work are also included. 
Unfortunately there is no separate analysis based on ethnicity or gender, although a 
greater proportion of an area unit‟s population that is Māori or female is associated with 
lower participation rates in that area unit.  Surprisingly, a greater proportion of 
unqualified individuals was not statistically related to participation.  While this 
contradicts much overseas literature, it could well be a result of the use of area unit data 
rather than an indication of no relationship between the two.  Although the strength of 
the correlations is not particularly strong and the causation is not determined, the 
suggestion that unfavourable health status and disability reduce participation in the 
labour force is somewhat supported.  This outcome has also been established in 
Cunningham, Fitzgerald and Stevenson‟s (2005) qualitative study which found almost 
twice as many Māori workers than non-Māori claim to have not been able to work 
because of illness or disability. 
Returning again to Roberts (1999), results presented on the correlation with the 
presence of unpaid work are also surprising.  Competition for time suggests undertaking 
unpaid work reduces the time available for market work, and therefore may remove 
some people from work altogether.  Yet the results do not support this argument 
because a greater proportion of people undertaking unpaid work is positively correlated 
with labour force participation.  This may well be explained by the fact that the 
measurement of unpaid work is on an incidence basis rather than the number of hours 
dedicated to unpaid work.  The fact that there is a correlation between unpaid and paid 
work provides justification for Gronau (1973; 1977) and Becker‟s (1965) inclusion of 
home production into their labour supply models as outlined in Appendix 1. 
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Further reasoning for this outcome seems to have been uncovered by Shirley et al. 
(2001) in their research into individual attitudes and experiences within the labour 
market.  From the interviews conducted, they found voluntary work had led to many 
women finding paid employment within the same organisation.  Further, even if their 
involvement did not result in paid employment within the same organisation, many 
respondents claimed the contacts, experience, knowledge and skills gained from this 
work assisted them in obtaining paid work in other areas.  On the other hand, a small 
number of cases suggested other forms of unpaid work required individuals to either 
reduce the number of hours worked or to withdrawal completely from paid 
employment.  Not only did this unpaid work include care for their own children, but 
also other responsibilities such as only looking after sick or disabled parents, and 
grandchildren. 
Respondents also identified that the increase in time demands from voluntary work 
often meant everyday household responsibilities, such as domestic tasks and childcare, 
were passed to other family members resulting in significant redistributions of 
workloads.  For this reason, it is essential to include literature studying family and 
household influences to gain a better picture of individual‟s labour supply decision. 
Household and Family Influences 
One of the earliest papers to look at factors determining labour supply of women in 
New Zealand was the study of married women by Ross (1987).  The author utilises the 
Society for Research on Women in New Zealand Inc.‟s random survey to establish the 
importance of economic and demographic characteristics on both the decision to seek 
employment and the number of hours worked.  The survey, which was undertaken 
between 1967 and 1968, collected socioeconomic information on a random sample of 
5398 working aged Caucasian women living in the four major cities of New Zealand. 
Like comparable overseas studies, this paper uses the interaction between market and 
reservation wages to model and estimate the likelihood that a wife will enter the labour 
force.  According to this argument an individual will work if her market wage is above 
her reservation wage, and the number of hours worked is assumed to be dependent on 
the relative size difference between the reservation and market wage (Heckman, 1974b).  
Obviously this approach poses a number of problems as market wages are observable 
only for current workers and reservation wages are not readily observable for all 
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individuals.  In an attempt to overcome these problems the author imputes market 
wages for non-workers based on the wage received by a sample of comparable workers 
and correcting for sample selectivity bias.  As for the reservation wage, this is 
determined by the relationship between market wages, reservation wages and hours 
worked for current workers, as mentioned above. 
Subsequently, the estimated equation for labour force participation is based on the 
market wage determinants, namely the years of completed schooling, years of 
continuous work since completion of education, whether there was an interrupted work 
experience, and occupation.  Reservation wages in this model are determined by the 
years of completed schooling, age and number of children, spouse‟s income, age, and 
family transfer income.   
Predictably, the presence of at least one child aged under five years has a very strong 
negative effect on the likelihood of participation.  However, the result for children aged 
over five is statistically insignificant.  In terms of hours supplied, both child age groups 
resulted in a moderate and statistically significant decline in hours worked by wives, 
indicating that the presence of older children (aged 5 to 9 years) causes mothers to 
reduce the number of hours worked, but not to completely withdraw from paid 
employment. 
Although statistically significant the negative effect of spousal income and family 
transfers on female participation is very weak.  These two results again provide 
justification for a number of models presented in Appendix 1.  Firstly, the fact that 
spousal income is correlated with female participation indicates those models assuming 
income is at least partially pooled within a two person setting are supported empirically.  
Otherwise we would not expect to see a correlation between the two.  Secondly, other 
non-labour income via family transfers, further support the theory that non-labour 
income provides a disincentive for women to work.   
Finally, both school and experience were found to be statically insignificant.  The 
inclusion of disruption of work experience has not, to my knowledge, been used in any 
other estimating literature.  Perhaps this is due to data restrictions in quantitative 
studies. 
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Hillcoat-Nallétamby and Baxendine (2005), however, has extensively covered the 
sequencing nature of female work patterns over their life cycle.  Using data collected 
from the 1995 New Zealand Women: Family, Employment, Education survey, they find 
that non-Māori women are more likely than Māori women to have at least three spells 
of working broken up by non-work spells.  Whereas Māori women are more likely to 
have either never worked or to have one continuous working spell. 
Two publications by Brooks (1990; 1991) illustrate the extent to which demographic 
and economic factors affect full-time equivalent labour force participation of male and 
females.  Unlike previous studies mentioned above looking at cross-sectional data, 
Brooks (1991) examines whether there is a long run relationship between certain 
explanatory factors and labour force participation.  Although time series data from the 
Quarterly Employment Survey between 1965 and 1990 are used, analysis of female 
labour force participation based on female wage rates, rather than combined 
male/female wages rates, are only available from 1973. 
Although it was found that demographic factors were far more influential on female 
participation in comparison to males, economic factors were also prominent.  For 
example, results show some evidence of a „discouraged workers effect‟ as female 
participation rates are negatively correlated with the overall unemployment rate.  
However, the size of this correlation is a lot smaller compared to the effect that the 
proportion of the population under fifteen has on female participation over this time 
period.  Other less substantial negatively correlations that are consistent with previous 
research include the household real disposable income from government, and household 
real disposable income from sources not including salary, wages and government 
transfers. 
A rise in female real after tax hourly wage rate did not drastically increase labour force 
participation as the correlation coefficient, while positive, was relatively small.  
Whereas the ratio of female tertiary students to the number of people aged over fifteen 
was significantly large, indicating an enlarged willingness to enter the labour force due 
to a transformation in attitudes and tastes.  Again, this shows the importance of 
including schooling as a time allocation possibility in the labour supply model, as 
Rosenzweig (1981) and Skoufias (1993) have in Appendix 1. 
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Essentially, the same model and technique was run to cover male and female labour 
force participation between 1978 and 1988 in Brooks‟ (1990) earlier work on the long 
term effect of demographic and economic factors.  The data set used and economic 
technique applied are identical, however, the wage variable in this particular study is the 
overall wage rates and not the female wage rate.  While the other variables all presented 
correlation in the same direction as the above study, only the wage rates had a strength 
that was similar to the results present in Brooks (1991).  The strength of the 
unemployment rate and the proportion of the population under 15 coefficients were 
significantly less in this study, whereas, the positive effect of the proportion of women 
in tertiary education has strengthened during this reduced time frame.  This time around 
the effect of income from other sources, and income from the government were 
statistically insignificant with participation over this shortened time period. 
Chiao and Walker (1992) studied in more detail the effects of non-labour income on 
discrete labour supply decisions.  Their female labour supply model estimates the 
expected probability of being in the labour force given that the individual is in one of 
four wage and salaries intervals.  The wage and salaries intervals were dependent on an 
individual‟s expected labour income and the level of beneficiary assistance, which were 
abated away when wage and salary income increases.  This allows the authors not only 
to estimate expected wages for non-workers as mentioned in other studies, but also to 
estimate the incentive that full-time replacement income has on labour supply.  In 
essence, the full-time replacement income shows how much greater an individual‟s 
combined labour and non-labour income is when they are working, as opposed to their 
income when they were not. 
Consistent with their hypothesis, the full-time replacement income is negatively and 
strongly associated with non-participation, meaning that greater earned income over and 
above the value of benefits received entices a greater number of people in paid 
employment.  This helps highlight the disincentive a government benefit system has on 
labour supply that was identified in Appendix 1.  Data from the 1987/8 Household 
Expenditure and Income Survey and the subsequent multinomial logit analysis further 
emphasises previous indications that having young children, being Māori, young and 
married all reduces the likelihood of participation in the labour force.   
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According to the economic theory outlined in Appendix 1, being married reduces 
participation because the husband‟s income acts as non-labour income for the wife, 
which in turn reduces the need for her to enter the labour market.  However, Pouwhare‟s 
(1999) qualitative research identifies another complementary reason for this 
relationship.  Interviews with 30 Māori women from around New Zealand found family 
violence from spouses can seriously inhibit women‟s ability to search for and retain 
jobs, as well as to perform in the labour market.  Although the sample size is very small, 
the use of interviews has allowed sensitive information to be gathered on topics not 
otherwise picked up through quantitative means. 
Specific tactics used by spouses to prevent or jeopardise employment opportunities 
included verbal, psychological and physical abuse such as, accusations of infidelity, 
harassment of her and her work colleagues, and the burning of work clothes.  Non-
participation by spouses in unpaid household work, such as domestic duties and 
childcare, were also used to keep women in the household and away from paid 
employment. 
The claim that tactics shifting the childcare workload more heavily towards women 
reduces the likelihood of women finding employment is not surprising considering other 
findings presented in this section.  Specifically, we have seen that having children, and 
especially young children, reduces labour force participation of women.  Therefore if 
the workload associated with having a child is weighted entirely on the mother within a 
household, then it is probably even more likely that those mothers would not enter the 
labour force.  Results from this section have also suggested that other household 
influences such as spousal income, family benefits and being married also reduced the 
likelihood of women entering the labour force.  Furthermore, once household influences 
were controlled for, additional personal characteristic variables have now become 
apparent.  For example, being young and participating in formal education were both 
negatively correlated with female participation.   
Finally, the demand for labour, as proxied by the national unemployment rate, was also 
negatively correlated with labour force participation, which once again, indicates New 
Zealand women are affected by the discouraged worker effect.  While the state of the 
national economy seems to be important, the demand for labour in one‟s local area may 
be more influential in determining female labour outcomes.  On the other hand, spatial 
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characteristics within an individual environment may also be important in determining 
the labour supply of women.  Consequently, I now turn to investigating literature in 
which the author has attempted to control for, and examine the effects of one‟s 
geographic location. 
Spatial Impacts 
Considerable work has been undertaken attempting to control for a person‟s spatial 
environment when estimating labour supply.  Harris (1992) for example, implements a 
dummy variable for each of the major urban areas in New Zealand, and uses aggregate 
data from the 1986 census to extend the work on labour force participation and hours 
worked to include ethnic and gender dimensions.  The author uses the same technique 
that Ross (1987) used by comparing reservation and market wages for labour force 
participation and Heckman‟s (1974b) proportionality assumption for estimating hours 
worked.  Similarly, missing values for market wages and reservation wages are 
established using the same process as in Ross (1987), however a slight variation in the 
determinants are used in the estimating equation.  For example, dummy variables are 
used for six age groups, the presence of children in four different age groups, and 
whether an individual graduated from high school.  Furthermore, controls were placed 
on occupation and industry group for the estimation of hours worked, and on each major 
urban area for estimating the participation decision. 
As aggregated data is used from the Society for Research on Women in New Zealand 
Inc.‟s 1967/8 random survey in this particular study, individuals were grouped based on 
their age, ethnicity, gender, work status, location, and household income.  The estimates 
for the probability of being in the labour force are based on weighted probit regression 
analysis, with the weight of each observation dependent on the number of individual 
categorised in each observation.  For the number of hours worked however, the 
continuous nature of hours supplied meant that a weighted ordinary least squares 
regression analysis was employed. 
Again results suggest there are significant effects on labour force participation from the 
presence of children.  The presence of pre-school aged children was found to 
dramatically reduce the labour force participation of women over all ethnic groups 
studied, however, the strength of this effect was not homogenous.  Instead, Pākehā 
women tended to drop out of the workforce more than both Māori and Pacific women 
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when there is at least one child aged below five years.  The same can be said when a 
child aged between five and nine years is present, however surprisingly, the strength of 
the correlation is greater for all ethnic groups than when compared to the presence of 
younger children.  In terms of the number of hours worked, women of all ethnicities 
(although the strengths are greater for Pākehā women) lowered the hours dedicated to 
paid employment when there is a child of any age present, although it is substantially 
greater when the child is aged between 5 and 9 years. 
In contrast to Ross (1987), it was found that individuals who graduated from high 
school have a positive and statistically significant effect on participation, with the effect 
being considerably larger for Pākehā women.  Further contrasting evidence suggests 
that greater non-labour income was found to have a positive effect on participation for 
both Māori and Pacific Island females, while for Pākehā women the correlation was 
weakly negative and insignificant.  Unlike for the participation rate, no correlation was 
found for Māori and Pacific Island women for the level of non-labour income and 
labour supply.  This suggests that when non-labour income increases, Pākehā women 
reduce their hours worked rather than completely withdraw from the workforce, 
whereas, Māori and Pacific women tend not to decrease hours worked, but alternatively 
increase their participation rate. 
While spatial influences in this model were controlled for through the main urban areas, 
unfortunately no results are presented ascertaining whether location is an influential role 
in affecting labour supply decisions.  The same can be said about a replica study 
performed by Harris and Raney (1991) on New Zealand females, which only provides a 
simple statement saying the results for “area-control variables were significant and 
important” (Harris & Raney, 1991, p. 97).   
While the purpose and data set is exactly the same, the authors includes the number of 
hours dedicated to volunteer work and the total number living in a household receiving 
social welfare payments into the estimating equation.  Although comprehensive 
discussion around the role of volunteer work on determining participation rates and the 
number of hours worked is missing in this study, it is important to note that a greater 
number of hours devoted to volunteer work actually increased the level of participation 
for all ethnic groups.  The effect on the number of hours worked is much more 
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confusing, with a moderately negative correlation for Pākehā women being the only 
ethnic group showing a statistically significant effect. 
Further support for the positive effect of greater education is also provided.  Although a 
greater number of household members receiving social welfare increases participation 
for all ethnicities, only the correlation for Pākehā reaches statistical significance.   
Alexander and Genç (2005) present findings on the relationship between location and 
labour force participation when using unit record data collected from the 2002 Income 
Survey.  Whilst the relatively small sample of roughly 6,000 married and 2,500 single 
women in the 2002 survey resulted in ethnicity being included as a set of dummy 
variables, the sample is big enough to separate by gender and social marital status.  Both 
a binary (labour force participation) and multinomial (labour force status)  models were 
estimated based on the inclusion of ethnicity, region of residence, qualification, age, age 
squared, number of children aged above and below five, years since immigrating (where 
appropriate) and other household income, as explanatory variables. 
Although Harris and Raney (1991) suggested economic influences are significant in 
influencing labour outcomes, neither the binary nor the multinomial models could 
produce any statistically significant results for any urban areas within New Zealand.  
However, the usual positive effect of age and qualification, and the negative effect of 
children in both age groups, and other household income were present.  The author‟s 
initiative to include an immigrant and years since immigration variables has led to 
significantly negative effect of participation for married females only.  The strength of 
the negative correlation is much greater for married women who have lived in New 
Zealand less than five years as opposed to those who immigrated between five and ten 
years ago.  This suggests there is a time period required for assimilation and adjustment 
to New Zealand culture. 
One of the few publications attempting to test the correlation between unpaid and paid 
work is Carson, Krsinich and Kell (2001).  They provide an in-depth analysis of the 
relationship between unpaid and paid work, by examining the amount of time spent on 
unpaid activities, rather than using the presence of unpaid work as Roberts (1999) did. 
The paper utilises the 1998 New Zealand Time Use Survey which collected 
information, in diary form, on time spent on each activity in two successive days.  The 
purpose of the study is to identify possible factors contributing to time devoted to 
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unpaid and paid work.  Consequently, two separate models, one for paid and one for 
unpaid work, are developed based on the categorisation of social, demographic and 
employment characteristics.   
Unfortunately this categorisation technique does not allow for testing the effect of the 
amount of unpaid work on paid work.  However, the classification of labour force status 
does allow for corner point estimates to be estimated using weighted linear models. 
Results illustrate that predictably, females devotes more time towards unpaid work than 
men, and that individuals (combined male and female) in full-time and part-time 
employment devoted 17 and 5 hours less to unpaid work respectively, than those either 
unemployed or not in the labour force.  Although the causal relationship between the 
two is undefined in this study, these outcomes tend to suggest there are competing 
demands for time allocation between paid and unpaid work.  Again, this would give 
further credibility to those models presented in Appendix 1 classifying home production 
as a third time use option.   
Although not specifically tested for the female sample, but rather the combined female 
and male sample, there was no significant relationship between labour supply and urban 
or rural living.  Results specifically for female turned up many insignificant correlations 
with labour supply, including age of youngest child, highest qualification, number of 
children and whether they paid for childcare.   
The correlation between the cost of childcare and labour supply has also been examined 
by Hillcoat-Nallétamby and Dharmalingam (2002), who produce statistically significant 
results for the total cost and hours of childcare.  Unfortunately an insight into how the 
cost per hour per child creates disincentives for paid employment is not possible 
because the cost of childcare is measured in a per week basis depending on how many 
hours are used.  Furthermore, the positive correlation for both the total childcare cost 
and the number of childcare hours on labour force participation does not provide 
causality.  Nonetheless the findings suggest, like the labour supply models in Appendix 
1, that women who are in the labour force are faced with an additional cost of 
employment by having to pay for childcare. 
Data collected from the 1998 New Zealand Childcare Survey allows for the type of 
childcare used to also be tested against the likelihood of paid employment using a 
multivariate logistic regression model.  Females who used other family members for 
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childcare were far more likely to be in the labour force than women who used more 
formal childcare types or women that did not use any childcare at all.  Again, although 
causality is not determined and one could make an argument for both directions, this is 
a clear indication of the importance of the household structure in an individual labour 
supply decision. 
Recent work in New Zealand has taken advantage of not only an increase in the range of 
relevant data sets, but also increased accessibility to unit record data.  Winkelmann and 
Winkelmann (1997) used a sample of 150,000 unit records from the 1981, 1986 and 
1991 censuses, that over sampled the Māori population, to understand the level of 
influences demographic and socio-economic background factors have on the labour 
force status of Māori and non-Māori.   
As the predicted probability that an individual with certain characteristics is in one of 
the four labour force statuses (employed full or part-time, unemployed, or not in the 
labour force) is calculated, a multinomial logit model is employed.  Separate regressions 
are run for each combination of ethnicity and gender controlling for urban/rural living, 
local unemployment rate, age, marital and parental status, and education.  
In the first multinomial model, it is assumed that each explanatory variable has the same 
effect on both Māori and non-Māori women, essentially presuming Māori and non-
Māori react identically to each factor.  If this model was to hold, then result show that 
91% of the difference in the probability of being out of the labour force in 1981, 95% in 
1986, and 78% in 1991, between Māori and non-Māori women can be explained by 
differences in the demographic and socio-economic factor presented above.  The 
unexplained proportion in this model must be, according to the authors, due to 
unobserved variables not included in the analyses, such as health, differences in school 
quality or ethnic discrimination. 
Lifting the restriction of equal response to certain variables so that Māori and non-
Māori can now react to factors differently, presents interesting reading on the varying 
predicted labour force probability between Māori and non-Māori women.  Similar to 
previous studies mentioned above, higher education tends to increase labour force 
participation rates, with a greater effect of higher education seeming to favour Māori.  
For both ethnic groups, the effect of being married tends to lower participation, however 
the drop off in rates is significantly greater for non-Māori.   
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A rise in the local unemployment rate has minimal effect on the non-Māori likelihood 
of entering the workforce.  There is however, a noticeable drop in the likelihood of 
being in the labour force for Māori, perhaps suggesting Māori women are affected more 
by local demand for labour.  Unsurprisingly the effect of being a single mother as 
opposed to a joint mother on the predicted probability of being in the labour force is 
strongly negative, and once more, the effect is substantially greater for Māori mothers. 
Poot and Siegers (1992) also used the local female unemployment rate as an indicator 
for the demand for labour in their study of female labour force participation and 
fertility.  They explicitly consider the causal relationship between fertility and labour 
force participation by combining the 1976, 1981 and 1986 censuses based on 22 Local 
Government Regions.  In previous studies, fertility (or a similar proxy) had been treated 
as an exogenous explanatory factor, whereas here, the determinants causing sub-
national variations in labour force participation and fertility are considered, as well as 
the causal relationship between participation and fertility.   
Separate weighted regressions are run for labour force participation and for fertility 
rates using a variety of economic and demographic variables for each area unit.  The 
effects of non-female income, age, and female unemployment rate on labour force 
participation are consistent with previous studies, and as predicted, the direction are 
generally in the opposite direction to the fertility rate effect.  One variable not included 
elsewhere in New Zealand literature is the proportion of an area‟s population that is 
Roman Catholic which unsurprisingly, is positively correlated with total fertility rate, 
and negatively with female participation. 
In terms of the causal nature of the relationship between fertility and labour force 
participation, the authors could not find any significant evidence for a causal 
relationship one way or another, when each variable is included in the other model.  
Instead, the authors conclude that the negative relationship between the two is most 
likely because they are generally affected by the same factors, but in opposite 
directions. 
Maani (2000) also uses local unemployment rates when studying employment and 
education choices of young adults.  This research seeks to understand, among other 
things, the determinants of labour supply behaviour for this subgroup.  The 
Christchurch Health and Development Study (CHDS), which provides longitudinal data 
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on a cohort of individuals born in Christchurch during 1977, was implemented in this 
study.  This unit level data provided a wealth of information on the economic and 
academic status of an individual throughout their childhood and adolescent upbringing, 
as well as information on the household in which they lived in.  A multinomial choice 
model incorporating work, study or non-employment was utilised to determine the 
effect that ability, academic performance, peer and school factors, personal 
characteristics, foregone earnings and socio-economic factors play in the decision of 
young adults.   
A sample of 365 females produced many statistically insignificant results, including 
ethnicity, mother‟s and father‟s qualification, rural living, local unemployment rate, IQ, 
average grade, and benefit use on the probability of being employed over non-
employment.  However, the results also show three new explanatory factors affecting 
employment that (to my knowledge) have not been produced elsewhere.  Specifically, 
the higher number of siblings in the household strongly raises the likelihood of being 
employed.  This represents an additional household structure pattern other than the 
commonly displayed marital status and dependent child effects on employment status.  
It may indicate that the higher financial burden of a larger family entices some of the 
elder children to enter the labour force so they can contribute to the family‟s income.   
Whether the individual‟s parents own the house they live in was also found to have a 
positive correlation with employment, which as the author rightly points out, reflects a 
household‟s economic constraint.  Finally the CHDS asks individuals to self report their 
friends‟ use of alcohol, illicit drugs, and other illegal behaviour, and from this, a 
variable describing the level of deviant affiliation with a peer is developed.  There is 
evidence of a peer effect on being employed as affiliation with more deviant peers was 
moderately and negatively correlated with employment.  
A perceived lack of local job opportunities has also been identified as a barrier to 
finding employment in Parker‟s (1997) study of long term job seekers.  Data was 
collected in 1996 by developing a face-to-face questionnaire based on previous 
qualitative research on smaller groups that identified and ranked perceived barriers to 
finding employment.  Related to a lack of job opportunities, many respondents also 
identified a lack of mobility as a factor in determining their job prospects.  For example, 
not having a drivers licence and/or car, an inability to be able to move to areas with 
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more jobs, and living in areas that are isolated or without public transport were all 
classified as problems for women.  Consistent with results given above in previous 
studies, this qualitative data established benefits disincentives, lack of skills, experience 
and qualification, health problems and caring responsibilities as further obstacles.   
Although discrimination has not yet been found to have a negative effect on 
employment in previous studies because of a lack of data available, this study found that 
many respondents believed they had been discriminated against when searching for 
employment.  This was particularly apparent from Māori, Pacific Island and women 
respondents.  Also heavily biased towards these three groups was the cost of finding 
employment as many respondents suggested the cost of work clothes and transport to 
and from work prevented them from finding suitable work  
Kalb and Scutella (2003) also examined the cost of employment on the likelihood that 
females will enter the labour market, however this time quantitative techniques and data 
were used.  In Appendix 1, it is suggested in a number of labour supply models that a 
high fixed cost of being employed could potentially prevent a number of people seeking 
employment.  In part of their analysis, the authors in this study attempted to find support 
for the hypothesis that not only is demand for labour important in determining whether 
a woman will participate in the labour force, but also the cost of holding a job. 
Dividing the population by their marital status and parental status, the authors estimate 
labour supply by using sets of discrete choice labour hours for four subgroups of the 
population; couples with and without children, single men, single women, and sole 
parents.  The intuition behind this is that examining a smaller number of possible labour 
supply points enables the inclusion of the benefit and tax system into the analysis.  
Moreover, discrete choices in hours worked may also be a better representation of 
reality than using an unlimited number of labour supply possibilities. 
Most of the usual explanatory variables, such as age, education, region of residence, 
number of dependent children, age of youngest child, and local unemployment rate are 
included.  However, the use of the Household Economic Survey from 1991/2 through to 
1997/8 allows information to be gathered on other people residing in the same 
household as the subject.  Consequently for partnered women their husband‟s education 
is also included, for sole parents whether they live with their parents is integrated, and 
finally the fixed cost of working is included in all four subgroups. 
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Using multinomial logit analysis, the effect of the husband‟s education on the labour 
supply of his wife is shown to be weakly negative.  That is, if a husband has a bachelor 
or postgraduate qualification, then the wife reduces her labour supply to a small extent.  
This could signal a possible negative effect of husband‟s income on a wife‟s labour 
supply given the relationship between education and income. 
The fixed cost of working was also found to have a significant effect on female supply 
for all relevant subgroup.  In fact this correlation tended to be extremely strong and 
positive indicating that when the cost of working is high, then women will tend to work 
a greater number of hours to adequately cover these costs.  The theory that single 
parents who live with their parents would raise their labour supply, due to the additional 
help with childcare they may receive from other family members, was not supported in 
this paper as the correlation did not reach statistical significance. 
The effect of a partner has also been studied by Souness (2005) in her honours research 
on the labour force participation of New Zealand women.  Using a cross tabulation from 
the 1996 Census for the age of dependent children, highest qualification, age group, 
labour force status of partner and settlement type, two separate logit regression are run 
for rural and urban settlement type to test the relationship between having a partner 
present and the labour force participation of women.  Although the employment status 
of the partner is not tested, it is found that the positive effect of being partnered on 
participation is greater in rural area as opposed to urban areas. 
The main purpose of Souness‟ research however, is to examine the effect of settlement 
type (the proximity to major labour markets) on the participation of women.  The results 
suggest that once the explanatory variables are controlled for, then women living in the 
four types of classified rural areas are in fact more likely to participate in the labour 
force than women living in the main urban areas.  However, women living in main 
urban areas are more likely to participate than women living in other areas that are 
classified as urban, but have less proximity to and dependence on main urban areas.  
Therefore not only do these results suggest that the rural/urban divide can play a role in 
the whether a woman participates in the labour force, but also the level of „urbanness‟ 
may be a contributing factor. 
The results on the level of „urbanness‟ are not surprising considering that, although 
undertaken almost three decades earlier, Hyman (1979) found similar results when 
 65 
studying the inter-urban differences in female labour force participation.  The 
definitions describing the level of urbanisation are vastly different between the two 
studies, as Hyman (1979) develops two labour force participation models with a 
different dummy variable representing the urbanisation effect in each one.  In the first, 
the population size of the urban area is used, while in the second an alternative variable 
for the population size is used, whereby if two urban areas are adjacent to each other, 
then their populations are combined.   
Using area unit data from the 1971 Census, separate regressions are run for married and 
single women within the 24 urban areas of New Zealand.  For married women, using 
either variable for the size of the urban area produces significantly positive correlation, 
signifying that participation rates are greater in urban areas with bigger population once 
demographic and economic variables are controlled for.  For single women, although 
both variables produce positive correlations, only the original variable for population 
size is statistically significant.  Moreover, for all four calculations, it was found that 
living in a South Island urban area had a negative effect on participation as opposed to 
living in a North Island urban area. 
We have seen in this section that there appear to be considerable spatial impacts from 
locating in certain areas.  Not only are there urban/rural impacts, but it also seems that 
the level of „urbanness‟ plays an important part in determining the level of female 
labour force participation.  Furthermore, higher local unemployment rates and greater 
fixed cost of employment also tend to reduce the likelihood that females will be in the 
labour force.  The final spatial influence to be identified by literature in this section 
indicates surrounding characteristics of an individual‟s place of residence may also be 
important.  Specially, social networks such as associating with deviant peers seem to 
play an influential role in an individual‟s labour supply decision.  Unfortunately, the 
majority of research examining geographic differences has typically focused on the 
local demand for labour.  Much less work has focused on how geography influences the 
supply for labour through mechanism such as fewer formal childcare facilities and 
lower market wages in certain areas. 
This section has also identified numerous individual and household impacts that have 
not been identified in the previous two sections.  In terms of individual characteristics, 
participating in a greater number of voluntary work hours increased the likelihood of 
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participating, while being an immigrant reduced it.  Household influences such as 
husband‟s education, house tenure, number of siblings, single motherhood, childcare 
cost, and type of childcare used have now been identified as influencing the labour 
supply decision of females. 
Finally, it was noted early that controlling for more explanatory variables may produce 
different results for the individual and household characteristics.  However, this section 
has provided similar results for the effect on children, education, age, other family 
income, and marriage, which seems to indicate that they are resilient and robust to the 
exclusion of other explanatory variables. 
Summary 
The detailed discussions of both international and New Zealand literature on female 
labour supply, and the subsequent summaries at the end of each subsection have shown 
a comprehensive list of observable factors that influence female labour supply.  Further, 
the section on international literature also showed possible explanatory variables that 
can help to explain ethnic differences in labour supply.  The examination of 
international literature studying ethnic difference in labour supply has created a detailed 
summary of various econometric methodologies that can be used to test for the 
relationships between labour supply and the explanatory variables.  By doing so, it will 
assist in developing a sound framework and proven econometric techniques to test for 
my hypotheses.  My chosen methodological approach is outlined in detail in Chapter 5. 
It is hoped that this review has not only presented an outline of influential factors 
contributing to female labour supply and ethnic differences, but has assisted readers and 
potential researchers in identifying areas in which New Zealand research is lacking.  
Specifically, considering that labour force participation rates of females differ 
immensely between ethnicities and that the volume of New Zealand female labour 
supply literature has been constantly growing, there has been a distinct lack of 
researchers who have attempted to address these differences.  Not only has there been 
limited research on young women‟s labour supply in New Zealand, but there has been 
almost no research examining the ethnic differences in young women‟s labour supply 
decisions.  It highlights a major gap in research to be filled by the present study. 
 67 
The potential factors which may explain the ethnic differences in young women‟s 
labour supply outcomes seen in the previous chapter, can be separated into three main 
categories; individual characteristics, family and household influences, and spatial 
effects.  Previous New Zealand literature has identified age, qualifications, immigration 
status, health, education status, experience and religion as individual characteristics 
influencing female labour supply.   
In terms of family and household influences, marital status, partner‟s education and 
employment status, domestic violence, household income and home ownership have 
been found in previous literature to be important.  Particularly pertinent to the current 
research topic is the numerous types of household responsibilities that are related to 
female labour supply.  For example, research has found that the presence of children is 
correlated with a reduction in the mother‟s labour force engagement (Alexander & 
Genç, 2005; Brooks, 1991; Chiao & Walker, 1992; Harris, 1992; Harris & Raney, 1991; 
Ross, 1987; Shirley et al., 2001; Winkelmann & Winkelmann, 1997).  Related to this is 
the cost of childcare, which has been found to be inversely related to labour force 
engagement (Hillcoat-Nallétamby & Dharmalingam, 2002).  Furthermore, the care of 
elderly and sick household members is also associated with a decline in the probability 
of being engaged in the labour market (Shirley et al., 2001).  On the other hand 
volunteer work was associated with an increase in labour force participation (Harris & 
Raney, 1991), while living with siblings also raised the chance of being in the labour 
force (Maani, 2000). 
Finally in terms of geographic location, local unemployment, settlement type, area 
location with New Zealand, peer effects and immobility are also related in labour 
market outcomes.  Unfortunately, with the exception of peer effects and immobility, 
previous research has typically focused on the connection between location and the 
demand for labour, and has often ignored the relationship between location and the 
supply of labour.  Analysing previous New Zealand and international literature will 
assist in selecting an appropriate dataset that will provide adequate information on a 
comprehensive range of factors influencing young women‟s labour supply outcomes.  
The choice of dataset and detailed information pertaining to the dataset is outlined in the 
chapter to follow.  
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Chapter 4 
Data 
This chapter is devoted to outlining a number of aspects relating to data used to assess 
the research question of why young Māori women continue to have lower employment 
rates than young Pākehā women.  It is broken into three main sections.  The first 
provides a formal definition of the research subjects that are under examination, as well 
as the process used to divide young women into ethnic groups.  The second section 
outlines the dataset used for the analysis and the advantages of using that particular 
dataset.  The final, and most substantial section, establishes the factors and variables 
used to explain ethnic differences in employment rates.  A significant proportion of the 
variables used in the forthcoming analysis have been included on the basis of results 
provided in previous female labour supply research summarised in the previous chapter. 
Research Subjects 
The term „young women‟ has been used frequently prior to this point, but at this time a 
formal statement defining the term is required.  In particular, it refers to women aged 
between 15 and 24 (inclusive) at the time the data was collected.  
As the crux of the forthcoming analysis relates to ethnic differences in employment 
rates of young women there is a need to clarify a number of points relating to the 
ethnicity of subjects.  The definition for „ethnicity‟ used in this paper follows one of self 
identification applied by Statistics New Zealand.  Namely “the ethnic group or groups 
that people identify with or feel they belong to.  Ethnicity is a measure of cultural 
affiliation, as opposed to race, ancestry, nationality or citizenship.  Ethnicity is self-
perceived and people can belong to more than one ethnic group” (www.stats.govt.nz).12  
The latter point regarding multiple ethnicities plays an instrumental role in how young 
women are allocated into various ethnic groups.  While individuals can belong to more 
than one ethnicity, there is a need to measure ethnicity in a manner in which 
comparative analysis can take place.  I choose to use the same prioritisation process that 
                                                 
12
 Further information can be found at, 
http://www.stats.govt.nz/methods_and_services/surveys-and-methods/classifications-and-
standards/classifications-and-related-statistical-standards/ethnicity/definition.aspx. 
 69 
has previously been employed by government agencies and other New Zealand 
researchers in order to provide consistency.
13
 
The Venn diagram in Figure 4.1 can assist in understanding this three stage 
categorisation process.  Firstly, a young woman is classified as Māori if she states she is 
of Māori ethnicity, and this can be in combination with any other ethnicity, including 
New Zealand European/Pākehā.  Therefore, of the 18.4% of young women categorised 
as Māori, roughly 51% have also identified themselves as belonging to at least one other 
ethnic group.   
Figure 4.1: 
Categorisation of Ethnicity for Young Women 
 
Source: New Zealand Census of Population and Dwellings 2001 
On the other hand, a young woman is classified as New Zealand European/Pākehā if she 
reports it as her only ethnicity.
14
  This requirements means that none of the 59.9% of 
young women categorised as being of New Zealand European/Pākehā ethnicity have 
identified themselves as belonging to another ethnic group.  All individuals that report 
New Zealand European/Pākehā ethnicity in combination with any other ethnicity except 
Māori, are excluded from the New Zealand European/Pākehā group, and are instead 
classified as belonging to other ethnic groups.  In chapters to follow, comparisons are 
made between young women categorised as Māori and young women categorised as 
being New Zealand European/Pākehā, with other ethnic groups being excluded from the 
analysis. 
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 Further discussion relating to the ethnic prioritisation method can be found in Allan (2001). 
14
 The term „New Zealand European‟ generally refers to New Zealand residents of European ancestry 
however, as ethnicity is self-perceived this may not always apply. 
NZ European
(59.9%)
All Other 
Ethnicities
(21.7%)
Māori
(18.4%)
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From here on I use the term Pākehā to refer to New Zealand Europeans in an attempt to 
avoid confusion with European immigrants.  As roughly 18% of young women self 
identify themselves as being Māori, it is imperative that a suitable data source is chosen 
to adequately represent this ethnic minority.  The following section will discuss in 
further detail the source of information chosen for this research topic. 
Data Source 
Data is drawn from unit records of the 2001 New Zealand Census of Population and 
Dwellings undertaken on Tuesday the 6
th
 of March.  Although the Census of Population 
and Dwellings (hereafter know as the census) is quinquennial in nature, access to unit 
records for the 2006 count was not available at the time of analysis.  
The census, covering all individuals living in private and public dwellings, provides a 
range of information on individuals and the household in which they live.
15
  While the 
decision not to incorporate qualitative methods into this study may result in the loss of 
certain detailed information, which is usually gathered through a small focused sample, 
the trade-off is worthwhile for two reasons.  Firstly, the use of a readily available source 
encourages replicatability and testing by other researchers – an essential feature of 
scientific enquiry.  Secondly, resource and time constraints faced by this research makes 
quantitative research an attractive option.  As the data has already been collected and 
prepared, and furthermore obtaining access to responses is relatively inexpensive, the 
use of the census is extremely cost-effective.   
As the census surveys the entire population this provides an extremely large number of 
observations to work with.  Even after removing individuals who were either living in a 
non-private dwelling or who were not at home on census night, the dataset still contains 
178,776 young Māori and Pākehā women aged between 15 and 24 who were living in 
their usual residence on census night.  Of these, 42,057 or 24% self-define as Māori. 
Not only does the census provide the largest coverage size for sub-populations, the 
richness of unit record data allows for more in-depth analysis through the creation and 
modification of derived variables.  In relation to the current research topic, records for 
all usual members that live in a household containing a young woman were used to 
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 The full individual and dwelling census questionnaires can be found in Appendix 2 and 3 respectively. 
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create a comprehensive array of variables, which represent in considerably more detail 
the composition and structure of households than has often been accomplished in past 
female labour supply studies.  As a result the development of a more comprehensive 
and holistic dataset has been achieved, and it is in the next section in which each 
variable is described in detail.  
Access to unit record data used in this study was granted and provided by Statistics New 
Zealand through their on-site data lab facility, with the cost-recovery fee being covered 
by Motu Economic and Public Policy Research.  The secured environment is designed 
to give effect to the confidentiality provisions of the Statistics Act 1975.  All results 
using census data have been subject to base three random rounding in accordance with 
Statistics New Zealand‟s release policy for census data. 
Dataset Variables 
Based on the combined individual and household records, Table A.1 in Appendix 4 
summarises the variables used as arguments.  Furthermore, the last two columns show 
either the distribution within each categorical variables for Pākehā and Māori women, 
or the mean and standard deviation for the continuous variables.  These variables are 
broken down into a number of groups: the dependent variables, age, individual 
characteristics, household composition, socioeconomic status, education status, unpaid 
work activities and geography. 
Dependent Variables 
The dependent variable in the binomial Model (I) outlined in the next chapter, empstat, 
defines whether the woman is employed or not.  It takes a value of one if she works for 
one or more hours per week for pay, and takes a value of zero if she is either 
unemployed or out of the labour force.  When individuals are combined together the 
overall employment rate is defined as the proportion of young women who are 
employed.  That is, 
)(
 
NUE
E
RateEmployment ,      (4.1) 
where E is the number of young women employed, U is the number of young women 
unemployed, and N is the number of young women not in the labour force. 
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Other studies have typically used labour force participation as the indicator of labour 
force engagement, whereby, 
)(
)(
NUE
UE
Rate ionParticipat Force Labour .    (4.2) 
However, I argue that due to deficiencies in the census relating to the classification of 
unemployed individuals, employment status is more appropriate to use.  For more 
discussion surrounding these deficiencies see Appendix 5. 
In Model (II) and (III), as outline in the following chapter, the dependent variable is 
modified slightly to better represent the pattern shown in Figures 2.8, in which young 
women also have an additional option of studying.  Essentially young women allocate 
themselves into one of four options which combine employment and education.  
Therefore the multinomial dependent variable, actstat, equals one if the young woman 
is employed but does not study, two if the young woman is employed and studying, 
three if they are studying but not employed, and four if they are not employed and not 
studying.
16
 
Precisely how the dependent variables are utilised in the analysis will become clear in 
the following chapter.  In the meantime, the variables used as arguments for 
understanding the difference in employment rates of young Pākehā and Māori women 
are summarised and discussed in the following section. 
The sections to follow summarise the variables used as arguments in explaining the 
variation in employment rates between young Pākehā and Māori women.  Following the 
description of each variable, comment will be made regarding the expected direction of 
the correlation with employment status.  For clarity, each of the independent variables 
are allocated into one of eight categories; ethnicity, age, individual characteristics, 
                                                 
16
 The education participation rates calculated from responses to the census understates the true level of 
education involvement by young women.  This understatement will also affect the category distribution 
within the activity status variable (actstat). That is, some individuals classified as being employed may 
actually be studying and employed, while some inactive individuals may actually be studying only.  See 
Appendix 6 for further information.  Stillman (2006) provides an overview of the methodological 
differences in calculating inactivity rates across a variety of data sources.  He concludes that the 
Household Economic Survey (HES) measures more accurately inactivity rates over time than any other 
dataset.  Unfortunately, the limited sample size, and restrictions in household responsibilities and 
geography measures means that the HES is unable to be utilised in this particular study. 
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household composition, socioeconomic status, education status, unpaid work activities 
and geography. 
Ethnicity 
As the centre piece of this thesis relates to examining ethnic differences in employment 
rates, the variable, maori, is created to indicate if a young woman is of Māori ethnicity 
or not.  It takes a value of one if a young woman is Māori and equals zero if she is not.  
As my dataset only contains young Māori and Pākehā women, as mentioned previously, 
a value of zero therefore refers to those young women who are classified as being 
Pākehā. 
Age 
The first group of independent (control) variables used as arguments for the difference 
in employment rates of young Pākehā and Māori women are age controls.  As prior 
labour supply research has concluded age is fundamentally important in the relationship 
with employment, a series of age variables are included here as arguments.   
Age is broken down into ten dummy variables (age15, age16, age17 etc) with each 
variable representing each year of age between 15 and 24.  When age15 is used as the 
base for the age variable, the expectation is the rate of employment will increase at each 
year of age above 15.  Not only does a higher age reflect a general movement away 
from compulsory education into other options such as employment, but a higher age 
also reflects greater market wages for two distinct reasons.   
Firstly, one major component of an individual‟s market wage is a result of experience. 
Experience boosts productivity and therefore individuals with greater experience can 
demand higher wages.  Since experience is unavailable in the given dataset, age is 
instead used as a proxy for experience, and hence we would expect older individuals to 
have a higher market wage.   
Secondly, young women in the 15-24 age bracket face different minimum wage 
regulations depending on their age.  The day before census night, new minimum wage 
rates came into effect so the adult and youth minimum wages were raised to $7.70 and 
$5.40 per hour respectively.  Furthermore, the age at which individuals qualified for the 
adult minimum wage was lowered from 20 to 18 years.  Again we would expect young 
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women above the adult minimum wage threshold will have higher market wages than 
young woman below the threshold.  Overall the employment rate is expected to rise as 
young women get older, ceteris paribus. 
Individual Characteristics 
Previous labour supply studies have typically found a strong relationship between 
education and employment when an individual‟s highest qualification is used to 
represent their ability in the labour market.  However, a problem arises from the 
inclusion of a similar variable in this research topic due to the age bracket under 
question.  Many younger women may not have completed all of their studies when the 
census was conducted, and so highest qualification would not adequately summarise 
their ability.   For example, if highest qualification was used as the predictor variable 
then an educationally able 16 years old, who would only have had time to complete year 
11, would be equal in ability to a 23 year old that dropped out of school at 16 with only 
year 11 qualification. 
To counter this issue, school_edu is instead used to represent whether a young woman 
has at least year 11 qualification regardless of age.  This allows every young woman a 
chance to complete the first stage of formal qualifications and hence provide a better 
indication of her ability.  As with experience, greater education sends an indicator to 
employers on an individual‟s ability and productivity.  Given this, people holding year 
11 qualifications would expect to receive a higher market wage than those who have not 
completed year 11, to compensate for higher productivity.  Subsequently, higher wages 
for more educated women will push the market wage above the reservation wage from 
some women, and consequently increase the number of women in employment and the 
overall employment rate. 
Two variables attempt to identify whether young women have an attachment to Māori 
culture.  The dummy variable iwi indicates whether young women identified as 
belonging to any of New Zealand‟s iwi, while mancestry denotes whether young 
women identified as being a descendant from a Māori.  Recalling that the definition 
used to identify Māori is based on self-perceived cultural affiliation, individuals who 
stated their iwi, or who have Māori ancestry, may be more likely to be involved in 
cultural activities, events, and ceremonies.  Furthermore, if this involvement is regular 
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and time consuming then the prospects of young women finding suitable employment 
that fits around these commitments might be diminished.  
The final individual variable included as an argument refers to whether a young woman 
was born in New Zealand, or was born overseas and immigrated (immigrant).  
Immigrants who experience cultural or language difficulties may find their 
competiveness in the New Zealand labour market diminished.  Language difficulties in 
particular, are likely to reduce an individual‟s market wage as their productivity is lower 
than an equally skilled New Zealand born worker.  It is predicted that, all other things 
equal, immigrants are less likely than New Zealand born individuals to work. 
Some variables described above – age, school_edu, and immigrant - indicate the likely 
influence on the probability of employment via the influence on the expected wage and 
employability.  However, an individual‟s labour supply may also be affected by the 
household composition and structure in which she lives. 
Household Composition  
The use of unit record data from the census has allowed a comprehensive array of 
variables to be created to describe the composition of a young woman‟s household.  
These represent in considerably more detail the composition and structure of households 
than has usually been the case in past female labour supply studies.  Previous 
researchers have identified the individual or her family nucleus as the influential entity 
in determining labour supply.  This thesis hypothesises however, that because many 
households contain multiple family nucleuses that may be related,
17
 it is the household 
composition and the characteristics of the entire household that matter, not just the 
young woman‟s family nucleus. 
One of the primary features making the household unit relevant is the number of 
children present.  As we have seen in the previous chapter, children are frequently 
related to a reduced likelihood of being engaged in the labour force.  Therefore in this 
thesis children are expected to be negatively correlated with employment for two main 
reasons.  Firstly, it may reflect the desire by young women to care for, and spend time 
with, their own (and other people‟s) children.  That is, the opportunity cost of foregoing 
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 4.1% of Pakeha and 14.2% of Maori households contain at least 2 family nucleuses.  However I am 
unable to determine what proportion of these are related families. 
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this time is high as young women place great value on childcare responsibilities.  
Secondly, if a young mother were to enter paid employment she would likely need to 
find suitable childcare.  Without access to free childcare, wage compensation for 
working mothers needs to be high enough to cover the cost associated with childcare.  
In many cases, the monetary benefit from working may not adequately cover the 
associated cost of childcare, therefore reducing the likelihood of young women seeking 
employment. 
Unit record data allows certain household attributes, including children, to be broken 
down into a set of dummy and continuous variables.  While many prior studies have 
simply included a continuous variable representing the number of children that a 
woman has, this assumes (with little substance) that the decline in the probability of 
employment is linear in relation to the number of children.  This study recognises the 
non-linear effect of children by including a dummy variable for presence of at least one 
child, and a continuous variable for number of children beyond one.  The breakdown 
into two separate variables relaxes the above assumption by presuming that the drop in 
the probability of employment is greatest for the first child, and that each subsequent 
child after the first has a smaller but linear effect on the probability of employment.   
Figure 4.2 below shows the employment rate of young women living in households 
containing members with specific characteristics, and provides some empirical evidence 
for the process stated above.  It illustrates that the employment rate for young women 
who have one child aged under five is 32 percentage points lower than young women 
who do not have any young children.  However, the drop in the employment rate with 
each successive child after the first one is practically linear, therefore providing support 
for the use of both dummy and continuous variables.  
Although a prefect linear trend from the first household member onwards is not present 
in the other characteristic, there still seems to be a general oscillation around a trend line 
drawn from the first household member to the last for most of the characteristics.  One 
exception is the dramatic drop in the employment rate of young women who have four 
members receiving accident compensation payments (ACC) as opposed to three 
members.  However establishing whether this is a trend is difficult to determine given 
the small number of young women who live in household with four members receiving 
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ACC.  Nonetheless, the same process of including both dummy and continuous 
variables is implemented for other variables within the household composition category. 
Figure 4.2: 
Employment Rates of Young Women by Number of Household Members Possessing Certain 
Characteristics, 2001 
 
Source: New Zealand Census of Population and Dwellings 2001 
Given this breakdown into a set of dummy and continuous variables, four variables are 
used to examine the relationship between a young woman‟s own children and 
employment.  The first set of these summarises the number of children aged under five 
that a young women has.  kidu5own, indicates whether a young women has at least one 
child aged under five, and the second, ownkidu5, represents the number of pre-school 
aged children for women who have at least one child aged under five.  Information from 
Table A.1 show that over 22% of young Māori women have at least one child aged 
under five, and of those Māori mothers, the average number of children aged under five 
that they have is 1.37.  On the other hand, for young Pākehā women, only 8% have at 
least one child aged under five, and the average number of young children that each 
Pākehā mother has is 1.24.  When both of these variables are included in the analysis, 
kidu5own measures the change in the probability of employment for the first child aged 
under five, while ownkidu5 measures the change in the probability of employment for 
each subsequent child after the first.   
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The second set of child variables includes kid516own denoting that a young woman has 
at least one child aged between five and sixteen, and ownkid516 specifies the additional 
number of children aged between five and sixteen.  Again Māori are more likely to have 
at least one school aged chid than Pākehā (5.4% versus 1.3%), and of those mothers, 
Māori also have a slightly higher average number of school aged children than Pākehā. 
Children are distinguished by age as there is an expectation that children are more time 
intensive at younger ages than at older ages.  Mothers who have school age children 
essentially have access to free childcare during the hours their children are in school.  
They will have more time available and be less constrained by childcare costs than 
mothers with preschool children, and therefore are more likely to be in paid 
employment than mothers will preschool aged children. 
While the relationship between children and employment has long been established, 
little if any attention has been paid to the effect that other people’s children has on the 
employment prospects of young woman.  Some young women may be required to 
provide informal care to children they may be related to, but who are not their offspring 
or their immediate kin.  The argument to include other people‟s children as a potential 
domestic constraint follows a similar line to the inclusion of the own children variables 
previously described.  Young women may often be used as informal childcare providers 
for other people‟s children (such as siblings, nephews, cousins etc) when they have the 
lowest earnings potential within the household.  They can provide „free‟ childcare for 
the household while those children‟s parents - who have a higher earnings potential - 
work in paid employment.  Essentially, the household sends the members with greater 
employability and higher earning potential into the formal labour market, while those 
household members with lower earnings contribute to the overall welfare of the 
household by providing childcare. 
To test for this correlation between the presence of other children and young women‟s 
likelihood of employment, four distinct variables are created.  Again children are 
distinguished by age so there are two sets of other children variables.  kidu5oth 
represents the presence of at least one child aged under five living in the same 
household as a young woman, but who is not the child of that young women, while 
otherkidu5 denotes the number of other household member‟s children in the household 
aged under five.  Table A.1 shows that not only are young Māori women more likely to 
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live in households containing at least one other person‟s child than Pākehā (16.4% 
versus 3.9%), of the women living in those household, Māori have a higher average 
number of other people‟s children. 
The second set again refers to those other household member‟s children aged between 
five and sixteen, so that kid516oth is the dummy variable for the presence of those 
children and othkid516 is the continuous variable for number of other children aged 
between five and sixteen.  Almost 53% of young Māori women live in a household that 
constrains at least one other household member‟s school aged child, while this is the 
case for only 37% of young Pākehā women.  As with the four own children variables, 
the four other people‟s children variables are expected to be negatively correlated with 
the probability of being employed. 
Although the presence of children may increase the domestic responsibility for young 
women, if there are other household members available to provide informal childcare 
assistance at home, then these responsibilities might diminish, allowing more time to be 
freed up for paid employment.  To take into account this possibility, two variables are 
included to identify the number the household members receiving the Domestic 
Purposes Benefit (DPB).  The majority of DPB recipients qualify for this benefit 
because they are a sole parent of their child and are not receiving adequate child support 
payment from the other parent.  However, individuals may also receive the DPB if they 
are the sole parent of a child that is not their own or if they are the full-time caregiver of 
a sick or infirmed person that would otherwise need formal care.
18
  Given that sole 
parents receiving the DPB are likely stay at home to look after their children, then a 
young women who lives with a sole parent may have her domestic responsibilities 
reduced if they are instead passed onto the stay at home sole parent. 
As per above, ddpb is the dummy variable denoting if there is at least one household 
member (other than the young women herself) receiving the DPB, while ndpb specifies 
the number of additional household members receiving the DPB.  There are significant 
ethnic differences with 17.2% and 5% of young Māori and Pākehā women respectively 
living in a household containing at least one other person receiving the DPB.  Both 
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 More information relating to the Domestic Purposes Benefit can be found at the following Work and 
Income New Zealand‟s websites,  
http://www.workandincome.govt.nz/individuals/a-z-benefits/domestic-purposes-benefit-care-of-sick-or-
infirm.html  
 http://www.workandincome.govt.nz/individuals/a-z-benefits/domestic-purposes-benefit-sole-parent.html 
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ddpb and ndpb are expected to be positively correlated with the probability of being 
employed. 
Similarly, domestic responsibilities may be passed on to other household members who 
are unemployed and are assumed to have more free time available to service the 
household.  To test for this possibility, the dummy variable, dunemp, is included to 
indicate if there is at least one household member (excluding the young women herself) 
receiving the unemployment benefit, while nunemp represents the additional number of 
household members receiving the unemployment benefit.
19
  Again young Māori women 
are more likely than Pākehā women (22.2% versus 15%) to live in a household 
containing these members.  The expectation is that living in these households free up 
time for young women to undertake paid employment, as the recipient‟s household 
members take over the majority of household responsibilities.  
While supervision of young children is often required, other individuals may also be 
dependent and require day to day care from other household members.  Typically this is 
for health reasons.  To pick up the extra responsibility and domestic constraints that 
may be placed on young women who care for other household members, three sets of 
variables are created.  Again each set includes both a dummy variable and a continuous 
variable for reasons stated earlier. 
The first set includes a dummy variable, elderly, which indicates if there is at least one 
person over 65 living in the same household as a young woman, and a continuous 
variable, numelderly, which represents the additional number of persons over 65 living 
in the same household.  65 is chosen as the cut of age simply because it is age at which 
superannuation is available and where qualification for other government health benefits 
generally ceases.  Almost 4% of young Māori women live in a household contain at 
least one elderly person while the corresponding incidence for Pākehā is just under 
2%.
20
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 More information relating to the invalid‟s benefit can be found at Work and Income New Zealand‟s 
website, http://www.workandincome.govt.nz/individuals/a-z-benefits/unemployment-benefit.html. 
20
 This ethnic difference is even more marked once the age structure of Maori and Pakeha are taken into 
account.  In particular, less than 2% of the Maori population are aged over 65, while more than 10% of 
the Pakeha population is aged over 65 (Source: New Zealand Census of Population and Dwellings 2001).  
This would suggest that a large percentage of elderly Maori are living in household that contain young 
Maori women. 
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Similar to the children variables, having an elderly person present may reduce the 
likelihood of young women entering paid employment.  The care and assistance of an 
elderly person may reduce a young women‟s time to be devoted to paid employment, 
and also reduce the monetary benefit of being employed.  On the other hand, if an 
elderly person is still in good health then they can provide effective childcare for other 
household members as demonstrated by Tienda and Glass (1985) in the previous 
chapter.  Therefore in the first possibility, elderly and the probability of being employed 
would be negatively correlated, while the latter point would suggest that employment 
and elderly would be positively correlated.  These opposite effects make it unclear as to 
the expected results. 
The second set of variables provides an indication of the health status of household 
members living with a young woman.  dinvsick is a dummy variable indicating if there 
is at least one person (excluding the young woman herself) living in the household who 
receives the invalids and/or sickness benefit as a source of income, whereas, ninvsick 
specifies the additional number of people in the household receiving an invalid and/or 
sickness benefit.  Once again, Table A.1 shows that young Māori women (9.1%) have a 
greater incidence of living in households containing at least one member with health 
issues than their Pākehā counterparts (4.2%). 
The main requirement for receiving an invalid‟s benefit is that because of sickness, 
disability or injury, an individual is “permanently and severely restricted” in their ability 
to work.
21
  On the other hand, an individual can receive the sickness benefit if their 
ability to carry out, find or be available for full-time work is restricted by disability, 
injury or sickness.
22
  If there are individuals within the household with health or 
disability issues, as proxied by the reception of one of the above benefits, then young 
woman maybe asked to provide assistance to those members, which in turns reduces the 
likelihood of her seeking and receiving wage labour. 
As the New Zealand‟s Accident Compensation Corporation (ACC) provides financial 
compensation for among other things, lost earnings and treatment for injuries caused by 
non-fault accidents, households that contain individuals who receive this payment may 
                                                 
21
 More information relating to the invalid‟s benefit can be found at Work and Income New Zealand‟s 
website, http://www.workandincome.govt.nz/individuals/a-z-benefits/invalids-benefit.html. 
22
 More information relating to the sickness benefit can be found at Work and Income New Zealand‟s 
website, http://www.workandincome.govt.nz/individuals/a-z-benefits/sickness-benefit.html.  
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require increased care and assistance from others in the household, including young 
women.  Two variables are used to identify the number of household members 
receiving regular accident compensation payments from either ACC or a private work 
accident insurer.  Again dacc is a dummy variable that indicates if there is at least one 
household member (other than the young women herself) receiving regular ACC 
payments, and nacc is a continuous variable that indicates the additional number of 
household member receiving regular ACC payments.   
There is little ethnic difference in the incidence of young women living in households 
containing at least one ACC recipient, with 3.6% of young Māori women and 3.3% of 
young Pākehā women living in such situations.  In hypothetical terms, all three sets of 
variables follow the argument that the cost associated with hiring a professional to care 
for an elderly, sick, disabled or injured person will lower the monetary benefit of 
employment, as well as reduce the time available to be devoted toward paid 
employment. 
Of interest is the kinship and partnership status of each young woman, and in particular 
whether they live with a partner and/or either one or both of her parents.  While prior 
literature suggests that women‟s labour supply decision are influenced by her partner, 
the fact that young woman are at an age where they still may live at home with her 
parents as well as her partner, suggests that other household influences need to be 
documented.  Therefore, six mutually exclusive dummy variables are derived; 
bth_parnt if a young woman lives with both of her parents but no spouse, spse_only if 
she lives with a spouse only, no_spse_no_prnt if she lives with neither a parent nor 
spouse, one_prnt if she lives with only one parent, oneprnt_spse if she lives with one 
parent and her spouse, and two_prnt_spse if she lives with two parents and a spouse. 
There is a necessity to address a particular issue that arose from the development of 
these six variables.  One particular downside of using this particular dataset is that 
family members are only grouped together, and given a specific family identification 
number, if they are part of a nuclear family.  Therefore a young woman is only assigned 
to a family if she is a daughter, a partner, a partnered mother or a sole mother.  Even 
though a young women may still live with her parents while also living with her partner, 
the presence of a partner creates a new family identification number that is separate 
from her parents‟ family number, but instead corresponds to her and her partner only. 
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The same principle is applied when instead of being in a partnered relationship, the 
young women is either a partnered mother or a sole parent.  Once there are two family 
identification numbers within a household, there is no way of telling whether the two 
families are indeed related or not.  This restriction in the dataset indicates there could be 
a number of young women living with their parents, who because they are either 
partnered, a sole mother, or a partnered mother would not also be identified as a 
daughter.   
To counter this problem, a number of steps were taken in an attempt to identify 
potential fathers and mothers of those young women who also had a partner and/or a 
child of their own living in the household.  Firstly, males who live in a household with a 
young woman, and who were between 16 and 40 years older than that young woman 
were identified.
23
  If there was only one male that fitted this criterion then they were 
classified as the father of that young woman.  If there was more than one male fitting 
the criteria then a second step was involved.  The male whose age was closest to the 
average age which a father is when his daughter is born was then assumed to be the 
father.  Previous calculations using young women who were only daughters in the 
household had shown that the average age at birth was 29 years for fathers.  In the rare 
case that two or more men with the same age at birth lived with a young woman, then 
one of them was randomly chosen to be identified as her father.  The same process was 
also run to identify mothers using an average age at birth of 27 years. 
Unfortunately there is no way to tell how accurate this process is when attempting to 
identify actual mothers and fathers of young women who have their own family within 
the same household.  In fact in some cases, instead of identifying the young woman 
parents, the process may actually be identifying her partner‟s parents.  In other cases the 
process may be identifying people who have no familial relationship whatsoever to the 
young women living in the household. 
The main reason for adopting this procedure is theoretical.  Rather than a young 
women‟s labour supply decision being influenced by her parents or spouse, applying the 
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 This age bracket was chosen by examining the difference in age between young women (who still live 
at home, who are childless, and who are not partnered) and their fathers and mothers.  Almost 95% of 
actual fathers and 98% of actual mothers were aged between 16 and 40 when their daughter was born.  In 
setting this age bracket, I am assuming that any person with less than 16 years difference between 
themselves and a young woman in a household is too young to be their parent, while anyone who is more 
than 40 years older than a young woman is too old to be their parent.   
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above procedure allows the possible influence of parents, spouses, and other non-
nuclear family members to be documented.  By acknowledging the presence of two 
related families in the household, comparative advantage and specialisation can be 
recognised.  That is, a young women living with a mixture of both parents and a spouse 
maybe more likely to stay at home and undertake domestic duties because, relative to 
the other family members, she has a lower earning potential in the labour market.  She 
therefore specialises in domestic duties since other family member have a comparative 
advantage in employment.  If the assumption is made that a young woman has lower 
earning potential than her parents or spouse, then we would expect her probability of 
employment to be lower than a young woman who lives by herself.  While a young 
woman living without other relatives around may have to fend for herself by entering 
the workforce, those women living with relatives may not be required to work for pay if 
she contributes to the household by providing assistance in domestic duties. 
The final household composition variable to be taken into consideration is a continuous 
variable that represents the number of persons living in a young women‟s household. 
nperson is expected to identify any other household members not included in other 
categories mentioned above, such as, uncles, aunties, cousins and non-relatives.  In 
doing so, it is predicted that other persons in the household can assist in addressing the 
domestic responsibilities within the household.  Therefore, having more people 
available to assist domestic responsibilities should free up time for young women to 
enter paid employment as these responsibilities can be spread over a larger number of 
people.  The expectation is that the number of person living in a young women 
household will be positively correlated with employment. 
All of the variables described above have been included because of the influence they 
have on young women‟s time and monetary reward in the formal labour market.  
However, economic theory predicts that certain factors are also likely to alter the labour 
supply decision of young women, namely socioeconomic status, education status, 
unpaid work activities and geography.  I look at each in turn. 
Socioeconomic Status 
One of the key socioeconomic factors contributing to the labour supply decision is non-
labour income.  Previous studies and economic theory have argued that higher non-
labour income reduces the need to earn income from the labour market.  While there is a 
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theoretically and intuitive reason for including non-labour income into the analysis, no 
estimate is present in the dataset.  Instead information is only gathered on whether 
individual received certain income sources, some of which are not tied to the 
employment status of the person receiving them. 
The first of these, investment, specifies whether a young woman received interest, 
dividend, rent or other investment as a form of income, while the second stud_allow 
denotes whether they receive a student allowance or not. oth_govt_benefit on the other 
hand, refers to the receipt of other government benefits or income support excluding 
ACC, superannuation, unemployment benefit, sickness benefit, DPB, invalids or student 
allowance.  Finally, oth_source indicates other sources of income, including support 
payment from non-household members, but excluding ACC, superannuation, 
unemployment benefit, sickness benefit, DPB, invalids or student allowance, wages, 
salary, investments, and any other government benefit or government source.  Although 
these variables only indicate the presence of non-labour income, there is still an 
expectation that receiving any one of these will reduce the likelihood of those young 
women working.  With the exception of oth_govt_benefit, young Pākehā women are 
more likely to have each of these sources of income, as shown by Table A.1. 
Finally, two variables represent the wealth and income status of the household in which 
young women live.  Firstly, hhincome is a continuous variable representing the 
household income that is equivalised to account for differences in household size.  
When household income is high there is an expectation that the need for young women 
to work is lower as other household members are adequately covering the income needs 
of the entire household.  However on the other hand, young women may be encouraged 
to gain work experience by undertaking part-time work while still studying.  This 
practice might be more prevalence in higher income households where there is a greater 
appreciation of the long term importance of being exposed to labour market experience 
at a younger age.  While higher household income should be negatively correlated with 
young women‟s probability of employment in the first instance, household income and 
employment would be positively correlated in the latter example.  A prediction of 
whether final results show a positive or negatively relationship is made difficult by the 
fact that it will depend on the relative strengths in each direction. 
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As the variable hhincome was not readily available from the dataset a number of steps 
were employed to derive the equivalised household income.  Unfortunately, as income 
data is only collected by income brackets for each individual, the midpoint of each 
individual‟s income bracket are summed together to generate the household‟s combined 
income.
24
  As household income is partially dependent on the number of people in that 
household, it is important to derive a per household member calculation.  Although 
larger households require more household income they are able to benefit from 
economies of scales through sharing living costs.  Essentially this means that a two 
person household does not need twice as much income as a one person household, since 
a two person household can share living costs that do not double with the addition of a 
second person (e.g. electricity, internet, cable etc).  To address this, the square root 
equivalised scale
25
 is employed whereby household income is divided by the square 
root of the number of household members to finally produce hhincome.
26
  
Although household income provides an indication on the household current financial 
status, wealth may also be important in the employment decisions of members.  In 
particular even though household income might be low, the household may be able to 
live off their accumulated assets without the need for household members, including 
young women, to enter paid employment.  Again, the census does not question the value 
of individual‟s or household‟s asset, however it does question whether the occupants 
own the house they live in.  Without detailed information of asset accumulation, home 
ownership (own_house) is instead used as a proxy for the financial status of the 
household in which young women live.  The house does not necessarily need to be 
owned by the young woman; it is sufficient that it be owned by one of the occupants.  
As with hhincome, there is an expectation that young women who live in owned 
households are economically stable, therefore reducing the need for young women to 
enter paid employment.  Instead young women may choose to undertake other activities 
such as education. 
                                                 
24
 Total household income includes income earned by young women themselves.  As the value of income 
derived from each income source (including non-labour sources) for each individual is not available, it 
was decided to include young women‟s income in the overall household income total.  This means that 
there is some endogeneity issues whereby young women who work, are likely to increase the household 
income and therefore contribute to this correlation. 
25
 Publications such as Atkinson, Rainwater and Smeeding (1995) have used this method in past research. 
26
 To receive tangible results on the household income variable, I divide the equivalised figure by 10,000 
in order to understand the effect on the probability of employment when household income increases by 
$10,000.  If this final step had not been undertaken, results in Chapter 6 would represent the effect of a $1 
increase in income. 
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Education Status 
Given that young people also have the option of studying, two variables are included to 
represent the level of involvement in education. The variable, ftstudy, indicates whether 
the individual is attending or studying in an educational institution for at least twenty 
hours per week.
27
  The variable ptstudy on the other hand, is a dummy variable for 
whether the individual is studying for less than twenty hours per week.
28
  Since there is 
a fixed amount of time in any given day, if an individual spends time in education then 
this must be offset by a reduction in time in other activities.  Therefore, there is an 
expectation that those young woman who are studying, either full-time or part-time, are 
less likely to be employed than young women who are not studying.  Not only do young 
women have the options of working or studying, but other labour supply models 
summarised previously have also identified unpaid work activities as a further 
alternative time use option. 
Unpaid Work Activities 
While the census asks respondents whether they undertake any of the six prescribed 
unpaid activities, unfortunately it does not question the number of hours devoted to each 
unpaid activity.  Nonetheless, the responses have created the following unpaid activity 
dummy variables. 
The first, housework, indicates if a young woman undertakes household work or not.   
Activities include cleaning, cooking, repairs, gardening, etc, for her household.  The 
variable, volunteer, describes whether the young women does help or voluntary work 
for or through any organisation, group or marae.  There are also two variables relating 
to childcare. chldcare_nonmem indicates whether the young woman looks after a child 
that does not live in the same household as her, while chldcare_mem refers to looking 
after a child that is a member of their own household.  It is important to note that the 
latter does not necessarily imply the care of a young woman‟s own child, but rather the 
care of a child that lives in the same household.  Again there are two variables 
associated with the care of an ill or disabled person either outside or inside the 
household.  sick_mem denotes a young woman who looks after an ill or disabled 
household member, while sick_nonmem refers to non-household members.  Therefore at 
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 For simplicity, I describe ftstudy as full-time study. 
28
 Again for simplicity, I describe ptstudy as part-time study.  A small proportion of young women 
indicated that they undertook both levels of educational engagement.  In these instances, they were 
classified as undertaking full-time study only. 
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this stage it is useful to think of a young woman distributing her time between three 
possible activities; employment, education and domestic duties. 
The five previous sections have included variables that summarise the characteristics of 
either a young woman, or her fellow household members.  There is a further category of 
variable which draws information at another scale, namely location in which individuals 
live.  These variables are addressed below. 
Geography 
Location variables are used to study the role of context.  Specifically I am interested in 
examining the effect of not just the claims on the young woman‟s time implied by the 
structure of her household dependence and kinship structure, but also those generated 
by the community, as well as the employment options conferred by settlement type 
(rural versus urban), local demand for labour, and the level of deprivation in the area. 
I use several different scales at which contextual effects might operate.  This is done in 
order to identity what it is about an individual‟s geographical context that affects their 
labour outcomes.  For example, simple area controls do not provide any indication as to 
what it is about that area that contributes to an individual‟s labour outcome.  By 
breaking geography into a number of different dimensions, a better understanding of the 
role of geography will be advanced by identifying whether each particular dimension is 
related to labour outcome primarily though the demand or supply side of labour. 
The closest is the household structure and the dependency levels I infer from them as 
previously addressed.  The next scale designed to capture a community effect is the 
meshblock whose influence is captured by a deprivation index, while the degree of 
Māori concentration is studied at the next broader level.  The influence of the labour 
market is measured at its own appropriate scale; the local labour market area, and in this 
case through the female and male unemployment rate prevailing on census night.  
Finally, at yet another scale I introduce settlement type, augmenting the overly simple 
rural-urban distinction with a differentiation of rural, based on their exposure to 
metropolitan influences, and on urban settlement type based on size and their influence 
from major urban centres.  All four of the scales warrant further discussion. 
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The level of deprivation is calculated at a meshblock level.  Meshblocks are the smallest 
geographical unit identified by Statistics New Zealand, and in 2001 there were over 
38,000 of these units.
29
  Ten dummy variables (depone, deptwo, depthree, etc) for each 
of the ten levels of deprivation in each meshblock are used to identify local effects on 
individual labour supply decisions.  
Living in more deprived areas has the potential to shape young woman‟s employment 
outcome in a number of ways.  For example, individuals living in more deprived areas 
may face social exclusion and isolation that can limit information on potential job 
opportunities reaching young woman.  Furthermore, they may also have lower morale 
and motivation if they are consistently surrounded by other individuals with poor 
employment and education outcomes.  Poorer quality or fewer government services 
assisting participation in training programs or identifying job prospects may also be a 
characteristic of more deprived areas.  Social networks, which can often increase one‟s 
ability to find employment, may also be diminished if access to motor vehicles and 
communication technology such as telephones and internet is restricted.  Finally, higher 
prevalence of crime that is often found in more deprived areas may make financial 
criminal activities a viable alternative to employment.  Essentially, local community 
effects have the potential to influence young women‟s supply of labour. 
The New Zealand Index of Deprivation
30
 uses responses from the 2001 census to 
develop a weighted latent variable for each meshblock combining the number of people; 
aged 18-59 receiving a means-tested benefit, aged 18-59 unemployed, living in 
households with income below an income threshold, with no access to a telephone, with 
no access to a car, aged below 60 living in a single parent family, aged 18-59 without 
any qualifications, living in households below a bedroom occupancy threshold, not 
living in own home.  Once the nine components are combined to form a continuous 
deprivation score, each meshblock is sorted from lowest to highest in terms of their 
level of deprivation, and divided into tenths of the deprivation distribution.  This gives 
the ten levels of deprivation depicted in the dummy variables listed above.  Table A.1 
highlights young Māori women have a greater likelihood of living in areas with high 
                                                 
29
 Meshblocks can range in geographically size from a block of houses in a built up area to vast areas of 
rural land. 
30
 For further information of the deprivation index see,  
http://www.moh.govt.nz/moh.nsf/Files/phi-users-manual/$file/phi-users-manual.pdf 
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levels of deprivation.  For example, over 57% of Māori live in a deprivation eight or 
higher area, while this is the case for roughly 24% of Pākehā. 
As the deprivation index is based on all residents within the meshblock, young women 
have some limited influence on their deprivation level.  Therefore young women with 
poor socioeconomic outcomes, including not working, will cause the strength of any 
correlation to be overstated.  In meshblocks where there are a large numbers of residents 
this endogeneity will be relatively small, however in meshblocks with few resident, 
endogeneity will be more of an issue. 
Utilising the suburban geographical scale, maoripct calculates the percent of a young 
women‟s area unit population that is Māori.  If young Māori women live in area units 
containing a higher proportion of Māori then cultural ties, and hence involvement in 
Māori events and activities may be stronger than for Māori women living in areas with 
low Māori concentration.  Therefore living in a highly Māori concentrated area may 
reduce the likelihood of being employed as more time may be spent in cultural 
activities.  Again it is expected that the degree of Māori concentration will influence the 
supply of labour as opposed to the demand for labour. 
The next geographical scale utilised to examine young women‟s employment prospects 
are local labour market areas (LMA).  These were first developed in New Zealand by 
Newell and Papps (2001) to identify areas in which people both live and work.  Using 
the distance that workers travel from home to work, two separate sets of LMA have 
been defined.  The first set of classifications contains 140 LMAs while the second uses 
modified parameters, which generally aggregates many of the relatively smaller areas, 
to create a smaller set of larger 58 LMAs.  As young women are heavily urbanised
31
, 
little is lost by combining less populated rural areas that typically contain few young 
woman.  Therefore 58 LMAs are utilised.
32
 
To measure the local labour market conditions that young women face, the female 
unemployment rate (fem_une58) and the male unemployment rate (male_une58) are 
calculated for the relevant local labour market area.  As males typically play the role of 
major breadwinner in a household and it can be argued that young women are secondary 
workers, including the male unemployment rate will identify if there is an added worker 
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 See the rural and urban tabulations within settlement type in Table A.1. 
32
 A map of New Zealand outlining the 58 local labour markets can be found in Appendix 7.  
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effect.  That is, when the male unemployment rate is higher in certain LMAs, secondary 
workers such as young women, may be enticed into work to cover the lower 
employment stability of male workers implied by the downturn in the demand for male 
labour.  If the added worker effect was to hold then young women‟s probability of 
employment would be higher in areas where the male unemployment rate is higher. 
As women are typically segregated into a limited number of occupations, it is more 
appropriate to measure the employment prospects of young women in their local labour 
market by using the female unemployment rate rather than the overall population‟s 
unemployment rate.  For example, if there was a sudden increase in unemployment in a 
male dominated sector, then this should have little effect on the chances of a young 
women finding employment.  Therefore, I instead examine the female unemployment 
rate and predict that when this rate is high, the probability of a young women being 
employed is reduced.  Higher unemployment among women suggests that young 
woman will have greater competition for a limited number of jobs.  Therefore, a higher 
proportion of younger women will either be unemployed or they may remove 
themselves from the labour force as the limited jobs may be offered to more 
experienced and older women.  Thus, young woman living in areas where job prospects 
are low, as indicated by a higher female unemployment rate, will result in a lower 
probability of being employed.   
Unlike the previous two geographical scales where the argument for their inclusion 
came through the supply side of labour, the local unemployment rate is attempting to 
identify how the demand for labour in a young women‟s local area can alter her 
likelihood of being employed.  Again referring to Table A.1, the average local female 
unemployment rate faced by young Māori women is 8.7% while for young Pākehā 
women the local female unemployment rate is 7.7%, indicating that Māori are more 
likely to live in areas with a lower demand for female labour. 
As with the level of deprivation, the local female unemployment rate includes the 
outcome of young women themselves.  There will a small amount of feedback where a 
young woman who is unemployed will increase her local unemployment rate, and 
therefore overstated the level of correlation between the two.  The degree to which this 
may be an issue is likely to be small considering the relative large number of people in 
each labour market area.  Nonetheless, it is an issue that needs to be identified. 
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While employment conditions within an individual labour market may be influential in 
labour outcomes, other factors relating to their geographical location may also be 
important.  Young women living in rural areas may have restricted access to services, 
such as childcare centres, and government agencies that assist them in gaining 
employment.  It is for this reason that a fourth geographical scale is included.  Instead of 
using the classic rural/urban division that is used so often in other labour supply studies, 
I draw on seven variables that summarise the diversity that is present along the 
urban/rural spectrum.
33
  Urban areas are divided into one of three categories; main 
urban areas (main_urban), satellite urban community (satellite_urban), or independent 
urban community (independ_urban).   
Main urban areas are the sixteen main centres in New Zealand, which include; 
Whangārei, Auckland, Hamilton, Tauranga, Rotorua, Gisborne, Napier-Hastings, New 
Plymouth, Wanganui, Palmerston North, Kapiti, Wellington, Nelson, Christchurch, 
Dunedin and Invercargill.   Satellite urban communities are towns that have strong links 
with one of the sixteen main centres, and which have at least 20 percent of the 
employed residents working in one of the main centres listed above.  If instead an urban 
town has less than 20 percent working in one of the main centres and there is little 
dependence on the neighbouring main centre, then this urban area is defined as an 
independent urban community. 
In terms of the rural spectrum, rural areas are broken down into four categories 
representing their influence from neighbouring urban areas.  rural_high_influ are rural 
areas with high urban influence and typically refer to rural areas located just outside a 
major centre where a significant number of residents commuting into the main centre 
for work.  Rural areas that have some influence from main urban areas but where a 
considerable proportion of residents instead commute to independent or satellite urban 
communities for work are considered to be rural areas with moderate urban influence 
(rural_mod_influ).  If an area has very little connection with urban areas, and instead 
have a strong rural focus where the majority of residents work in a rural area, then these 
they are classified as rural areas with low urban influence (rural_low_influ).  Finally, 
high_rural indicates highly rural and remote areas that have little or no reliance on 
surrounding urban areas for employment.  Table A.1 again shows that young Māori 
                                                 
33
 For further information on the type of rural and urban areas see, 
http://www.stats.govt.nz/reports/urban-rural-profile.aspx.  Maps outlining the national and some regional 
settlement type distributions are provided in Appendix 8 through 14. 
 93 
women are slightly more likely to live in rural areas and in smaller satellite and 
independent urban centres. 
Even though this section has already included a control for the employment prospects 
that young women face, there is still an expectation that living in less urban areas will 
reduce the probability that a young women will work.  In a sense, not only does living 
away from the main centres restrict individual access to services that may help them 
find employment, but it is also likely to increase the fixed cost that individuals face 
when being employment.  Specifically if a young women lives a significant distance 
away from potential employers, the time and monetary cost associated with travelling to 
work will reduce her monetary benefit from working.  Overall, there will be a decline in 
the probability of employment for young women living away from the main urban 
areas.  The potential negative relationship between employment and living away from 
the main urban centres should be generated primarily through the supply of labour 
rather than the demand of labour. 
In summary, census unit records have allowed not only young women‟s geographic 
context to be represented in considerably more detail than has often been the case in 
previous female labour supply studies, but also other aspects of their lives.  At the 
narrowest level, individual characteristics were identified. The next scale above 
individuals and their attributes is the effect that household composition and structure 
have on the probability of employment.  
The use of unit record data has allowed this scale of young women‟s lives to be 
scrutinised in great detail.  In particular it has allowed the identification of 
characteristics possessed by household members that may increase or decrease the level 
of domestic responsibilities that a young women has.  Neighbourhood and community 
effects are the next level up that potentially shapes young women‟s labour supply, while 
broadening to a suburban level, the degree of Māori concentration may also be 
influential.  Widening the focus again encompasses her local labour market, while at the 
broadest level, a young women‟s settlement type is observed.   
Though access to unit record data has allowed for the development of a more 
comprehensive and holistic dataset that encompasses the five scales of each young 
woman‟s life, there still remains a number of key modelling decisions that need to be 
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addressed in order to study the difference in employment rates between young Pākehā 
and Māori women. 
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Chapter 5 
Modelling Differences in Participation Rates 
While the previous chapter identified a number of factors that may influence labour 
outcomes of young Māori and Pākehā women, this chapter outlines the method that will 
be employed in order to test whether these factors can in fact explain the ethnic 
differences in employment rates between young Māori and Pākehā women.  Recall from 
Figure 2.1 that although employment rates tended to increase with age, Pākehā women 
aged between 15 and 24 have consistently higher employment rates than their Māori 
equivalents.  This chapter develops a way of exploring and understanding these ethnic 
differences in employment rates for young women by modelling their participation.   
In Chapter 2 two reasons were given for using econometric methods in addition to the 
descriptive analysis.  Firstly, the former allows interrelationship between two (or more) 
potential explanatory factors, such as age and settlement type that was illustrated in 
Chapter 2, to be separated from each other.  In essence it attempts to account for how 
several factors behave simultaneously in influencing the labour outcomes of young 
women.  Secondly, it allows hypotheses to be explicitly tested by giving a clear 
indication as to the direction and extent each factor has on the probability of a young 
woman being employed.  
The chapter is presented in two sections.  The first provides a very brief summary of the 
economic theory of labour supply covered in Appendix 1 as its bears on the 
participation of young women.  The second outlines the statistical methods required to 
quantify the effect each explanatory variables has on the probability of young women 
being employed. 
Economic Theory Background 
The vast majority of labour supply research uses the basic neo-classical choice 
framework of leisure versus paid work.  This basic model suggests an individual 
allocates their time in two ways; leisure and paid work.  An individual therefore gains 
utility (satisfaction) either through the consumption of goods and services (C), or 
through leisure activities (L) such as playing sport, reading and watching television.  
More formally; 
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),( LCfU .         (5.1) 
However, the level of utility attainable by individuals is limited by the amount of goods 
that can be purchased, which is in turn restricted by the income of the individual 
generated from labour and non-labour sources.  Labour income is received through 
working H hours in the labour market for a constant hourly wage, W.  Non-labour 
income (V) is a fixed amount of income an individual receives irrespective of whether 
they work or not.  Therefore the budget constraint is dependent on an individual‟s 
income (Y), and is given by; 
VWHY .         (5.2) 
The second constraint faced by individuals is time whereby the sum of continuous hours 
spent on paid work and leisure together cannot exceed the number of hours in a week 
(i.e. T=168), so that; 
HLT .         (5.3) 
This implies that increase in hours worked in the labour market must be at the expense 
of leisure hours, and vice versa.   
An individual will therefore maximise their utility with their own personal preferences 
and tastes in mind subject to these two constraints.  Although the standard framework 
through which to study the employment rates of young women is useful, it does not 
recognise that employment rates of young Māori women may be lower because they 
face greater unpaid domestic responsibilities.  In this model, domestic responsibilities 
are classified as leisure since it is not paid in wages or registered in national accounts 
(Waring, 1988).   
Other academics have noted this point and have argued that the separation in time-use 
between labour and leisure is far too simplistic, and that much of an individual‟s leisure 
time is absorbed by domestic duties such as housework and childcare.  In order to 
address this, Gronau (1977) and Burda, Hamermesh, and Weil (2006) have augmented 
the basic model in (5.1) by including home production (P) as a third time-use option. 
Home production refers in this case to productive activities individuals can pay 
someone else to do on their behalf, but instead undertake themselves without pay or 
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remuneration.  With the inclusion of home production as a possible time-use option, and 
individual‟s utility function can now be represented by; 
),,( PLCfU .        (5.4) 
While this framework comes closer to addressing the experience of young women, there 
still exist a number of issues.  The first relates to the fact that not all time-use options 
have been defined.  Central to the study of young people‟s labour supply is the role that 
involvement in study plays.  In the framework outlined so far, participation in education 
would be classified as leisure even though it is a (potentially) productive activity.  A 
framework including studying as a fourth time-use option paints a more complete 
picture of the options open for young women to allocate their time. 
The second issue relating to the current framework is that one of the key assumptions of 
this model is that each individual lives alone by themselves, so their labour supply 
decisions are based solely on the utility they will receive personally.  However in the 
majority of cases, young women do not live alone, but instead live within a family 
context in which labour supply decisions of individual members are often made to 
maximise the overall utility of the family rather than each individual.  Under those 
circumstances an individual‟s labour supply is dependent on the labour supply decisions 
of other family members. 
The collective nature of family labour supply is a particular problem for the current 
research topic as young women‟s living arrangements are both complicated and diverse.  
Major adjustments are often made during these years as young people attempt to gain 
more independence by „flying the nest‟ to flat, live with their partner, or start a family, 
among other living arrangements.   
It is worth demonstrating this point graphically.  Figure 5.1 below illustrates the living 
arrangements of young women by age.  It shows that by age 16, 94% of young women 
are living with either one or both of their parents, with less than 5% of young women 
living without a parent or spouse.  However by age 19, the living arrangements of 
young women become considerably more diverse with 48% living with one or both 
parents, 14% living with their spouse and 36% not living with a parent or spouse.  
Furthermore, roughly 3% combine living with their spouse and at least one parent.  By 
age 23, the proportion of young women living with at least one parent declines 
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significantly to under 25%, while 35% live with their spouse and 38% lives with neither 
a parent nor spouse.  Again roughly 3% live with a combination of their spouse and at 
least one a parent. 
Figure 5.1: 
Living Arrangements of Young Women by Age, 2001 
 
Source: New Zealand Census of Population and Dwellings 2001 
Using the framework given by (5.4) above may not be appropriate for the study of 
young women‟s labour supply as the majority do not live by themselves, but rather live 
in vastly more complicated and diverse households where their decision to supply 
labour to the market is influenced by other household members. 
Rosenzweig (1981) attempts to address both of these issues by modifying the utility 
function to include not only the schooling option for young people, but also the 
presence of a young person‟s mother and father in order to develop a single family 
economic decision making unit.  The family utility function is dependent on the 
family‟s consumption, leisure of each of the three family members, and the child‟s 
hours and cost of schooling.  This model is likely to better summarise the choices young 
women face when living as a child in a family setting.  
Again however there are a number of issues surrounding this approach.  Firstly, home 
production is missing as a time-use choice and secondly, it does not take into account 
more complicated living arrangements in which young women often find themselves.  
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These arrangements can include living with one or both parents while also being 
partnered, as shown by Figure 5.1, or where a young women lives as a single adult with 
a child of their own.   
In summary, while there has been considerable work by academics around modelling 
labour supply decisions for individuals and families, there has been relatively little 
conceptual or empirical work that recognises the wide variety of household contexts 
which now prevail, particularly in indigenous households.  Most conceptual models of 
labour supply assume either that individuals are living alone, or are the head of a 
household.  Clearly these various living arrangement types mean that a more 
comprehensive family labour supply model will need to be developed.  Rather than a 
young women‟s labour supply decision being influenced by her parents or spouse, a 
more realistic model would need to take in consideration the influence of parents, 
spouses, and other non-nuclear family members.   
Extensions 
While it is not the purpose of this research to develop a comprehensive economic model 
corresponding to the labour supply decisions of young women, there is a need to 
establish a simple economic framework better representing the labour supply context 
within which most young women operate.  Equation (5.5) extends the neoclassical 
individual labour supply model as given by (5.1) to include these more complicated 
living arrangements.  In particular, a young woman (Y) can live with her spouse (S), 
mother (M), father (F) and other family members (i) who can include, but not limited to 
a young woman‟s siblings, grandparents or children.  According to this model the 
family‟s utility is dependent on the consumption (C), leisure (L) and home production 
(P) of each family member.  I further assume that young women, her spouse and other 
family members have a further choice of studying (E), so that the family‟s utility 
function is given by; 
),,,,,,
,,,,,,,,,,,(
iiiiFFF
MMMSSSSYYYY
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PLCEPLCEPLCfU
      where i=1,2…k. (5.5) 
 
This family utility function is limited by two constraints.  The first of which is the 
budget constraint as given by (5.6) where; 
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iiFFMMSSYY VWHVWHVWHVWHVWHC . (5.6) 
Assuming that income is pooled within the family setting and that all income is spent, 
then the value of the family‟s consumption is equal to the sum of all members‟ labour 
and non-labour income (V).  Labour income is income received for the sale of one‟s 
labour time, so that it is the product of their hourly wage (W) and hours worked for pay 
(H).  
The second constraint limiting utility is the time constraint each member has and is 
represented by (5.7); 
iiiii
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       (5.7) 
As there are a limit number of hours in a given week, the sum of hours dedicated to 
each time-use option cannot exceed the number of hours in a week (T).  Each member 
can allocate time between leisure (L), paid work (H) and home production (D), while 
young women (Y), her spouse (S) and other family members (i) have a fourth time use 
option of education (Q). 
While this model is relativity simplistic, it can be used as a tool to help understand how 
the explanatory variables described in the previous chapter affect the probability of 
young women being employed.  However, to understand the actual extent in which each 
explanatory variable alters the probability of being employed it is necessary to specify 
an appropriate statistical model. 
Statistical Modelling of Young Women’s Labour Supply 
Model I 
In relation to testing the hypothesis under examination, I start with employment as the 
dependent variable.  Model (I) begins with the probability of employment (Pr[E]) as a 
function of ethnicity to test statistically whether employment rates for young Māori 
women are lower than for young Pākehā women.  
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The use of a bounded variable, such as 0<Pr[E]<1, as the dependent variable in a 
regression framework is subject to a number of well known problems including the 
estimation of Pr[E] outside its range.  For reasons that are thoroughly detailed in 
Wrigley (1985) I transform Pr[E] into the log of the odds ratio which yields the linear 
logit model; 
logit (Pr[E])  
)1(
log
Pr[E]
Pr[E]
       (5.8) 
X                      (5.9) 
Where Pr[E] is the probability the young women chooses paid employment (of at least 
one hour per week) and 1- Pr[E] is the probability she chooses not to work for pay.  
The term X refers to the explanatory variable (ethnicity in this initial case) and the 
parameters  and  are to be estimated.  
The logit transformation runs from minus infinity to plus infinity as Pr[E] increases 
from 0 to 1, and while the probabilities themselves are bounded, the logits are 
unbounded. It follows that; 
X
X
e
e
Pr[E]
1
        (5.10) 
So the predicted probabilities can be found by substituting for the parameters in the 
above equation.  An initial logit regression with employment status as the dependent 
variable and ethnicity as the only independent variable calculates β=-0.8987101 and 
α=0.5557616.  Substituting into (5.10) when X=1 for Māori and X=0 for Pākehā 
calculates that the employment rate for young Māori and Pākehā women are 41.5% and 
63.5% respectively.  These are the precise figures presented in Table A.1 for the 
variable empstat. 
To assist in the initial regressions the statistical software STATA is utilised along with 
its command dlogit
34
 to produce marginal effect on the probability of employment for 
the explanatory variable.  Marginal effects measure the rate at which the predicted 
                                                 
34
 Thanks to Steve Stillman for modifying the dlogit2 STATA ado file in order to calculate marginal 
effects for dummy variables. 
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probability changes with a unit change in X.  In this initial case, it measures the change 
in the probability of being employed when a young woman changes from being Pākehā 
(X=0) to being Māori (X=1).  For discrete variables such as the maori variable, marginal 
effects are calculated through the model; 
01
|ˆ|ˆ
XX
P P
X
Pr[E]
       (5.11) 
Where Pˆ equals the predicted probability of employment for each of the sample groups.  
Again by substituting the predicted probabilities of employment found from (5.10) into 
(5.11) estimates that the marginal effect of being Māori is -22.  Therefore young Māori 
women have employment rates 22 percentage points lower than young Pākehā women. 
After the initial regression to establish the presence of an ethnic difference, subsequent 
groups of variables are sequentially added into the model in order to track their 
influence on the ethnicity effect.  The purpose of this process is twofold.  Firstly, to 
identify the extent to which groups of independent variables are correlated with other 
groups of independent variables.  Secondly, to take into account any endogeneity issues 
than may arise if some of independent variables have two-way causation with the 
dependent variable, which may in turn produce biased results.   
For example, in this particular research, age is the least endogenous variable as changes 
in age are expected to cause changes in the likelihood of someone working.  There 
cannot be a two-way causation in this case as changes in the likelihood of someone 
working cannot cause a change in their age.  On the other hand, unpaid work is one of 
the more endogenous variables.  Specifically, does an individual not work because they 
have domestic responsibilities to undertake, or do they undertake domestic 
responsibilities because they are not working?  Because of this two-way causation it is 
difficult to conclude whether undertaking unpaid work is the cause or effect of not 
working. 
To counter the issue of endogeneity the least endogenous variable groups are added into 
Model (I) first, while more endogenous variable groups are entered into the model last.  
Therefore age variables are the first set of controls to be added to the bivariate ethnicity 
model.  The second group includes individual characteristics, while the third group 
contains the geography variables.  This is followed in turn by household composition, 
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and then unpaid work activities and studying are included simultaneously since they 
both represent time-use options.  Finally, the most endogenous variable group, 
socioeconomic status, is included to complete the full model.   
More formally, the probability of employment (Pr[E]) can be summarised as follows; 
(I) Pr [E] = f  (Ethnicity, Age, Individual Characteristics, Geography, Household 
Composition, Study and Unpaid Work Activities, Socioeconomic 
Status). 
Running a logistic regression
35
 based on Model (I) with the intermediate steps permits 
us to predict how much the explanatory variables discussed in the previous chapter 
affect the probability of a young woman being employed.  To assist in running these 
regressions, the statistical software STATA is utilised along with its command dlogit to 
produce marginal effects
36
 and standard errors
37
 on the probability of employment for 
each explanatory variable.  The value taken by the marginal effect will state the change 
in the probability of being employed when there is a change in one of the independent 
variables, while all other independent variables remained constant.  Equation 5.11 is 
used for the independent dummy variables, whereas if the independent variable is 
continuous then the marginal effect is calculated by differentiating the logistic equation 
so that; 
Pr[E]  
X
X
e
e
1
       (5.12) 
X
Pr[E]
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1.
1
      (5.14) 
 )ˆ1(ˆ PP        (5.15) 
To determine if there is a correlation between employment status and each explanatory 
variable, STATA uses the standard errors to estimate the probability that the observed 
pattern has occurred by chance.  If this probability is lower than 5% then the correlation 
                                                 
35
 Logistic regression uses predictor variables (ether numerical or categorical) to predict the probability of 
an event occurring by fitting data to a logistic curve. 
36
 Marginal effects measures the change in the predicted probability of being employed when there is a 
unit change in one independent variable, while holding all other independent variable constant. 
37
 Standard errors measure the variability between the estimated probability of being employed and the 
actual probability of being employed. 
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between the dependent and independent variable is deemed to be statistically significant 
at the 5% level.
38
  While statistical significance provides statistical evidence of a 
relationship, it does not identify whether this relationship is large or important.  Instead 
the size of the marginal effect calculates the size of the relationship.  
Ecological Variables 
Using this regression analysis to measure at both the individual level and aggregated 
geographic (ecological) level as explanatory factors creates a specific modelling issue.  
If the individuals grouped together by this aggregated geographic data share similar 
unobservable characteristics, then the true effect of each explanatory variable may be 
more uncertain than is actually provided by the regression analysis.  Because these 
unobserved biases are allocated to every individual member within that geographical 
level, then the standard errors on the explanatory variables will be forced lower than 
their true value, which in turn may result in some uncorrelated relationships to become 
correlated.   
Recall from the previous chapter that there were a number of aggregated geographical 
level utilised.  Firstly, the level of deprivation was calculated at a meshblock level while 
secondly, the density of Māori was established at an area unit scale.  Thirdly, the female 
and male unemployment rates were determined within each labour market area, and 
finally the settlement type was established by their population size and their proximity 
to major urban centres. 
In an attempt to counter this issue, the STATA command robust cluster is employed in 
each regression.  However, as the dataset has multiple levels of geographic aggregation, 
the most conservative option is applied by adjusting for the clustering issues at the 
highest level of aggregation.  By controlling at the highest aggregation level where the 
population size of each geographical unit is sufficiency large, any intra-cluster 
correlation occurring at lower levels of aggregation should be reduced by the large 
number of non-cluster individuals.  In particular, correcting at the local labour market 
area generates standard errors generally larger than if a lower level of aggregation was 
used or if the adjustment was not made at all.
39
 
                                                 
38
 Statistical significance at the 1% level is also calculated. 
39
 As a robustness check, Model (I) was regressed using a lower level of aggregation as a cluster control.  
However, there was little change to the standard errors.    
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Model II 
The logit regression on Model (I) should produce results consistent with the pattern 
shown in Figure 2.1, wherein young Māori women have lower employment rates than 
their Pākehā counterparts.  However, also recall from Chapter 2 that lower employment 
rates by young Māori women may potentially be accounted for by individuals at these 
ages being involved in education instead.  Considering that employment and education 
are not mutually exclusive, greater insight into the involvement in these productive 
activities by young women is likely to be gained by examining how combinations of 
employment and education differ between young Pākehā and Māori women.   
To examine how young Māori and Pākehā women allocate themselves into various 
combinations of employment and education, Model (I) is extended by replacing the 
binary employment dependent variable with a four state dependent variable (actstat).  In 
this case, the dependent variable is broken down into four categories; employment only, 
studying only, employment and studying, and inactive (nether studying nor employed).  
While it has already been established that young Māori women are less likely to be 
employed than their Pākehā counterpart, Figure 2.8 and Table 5.1 also highlights 
significant ethnic differences in the employment and education combinations 
undertaken by young women.  Although the percent of young Pākehā and Māori women 
just studying is roughly equal, Pākehā women are more likely be just employed as well 
as combining employment and study.  On the other hand, Māori are over twice as likely 
to be inactive than young Pākehā women. 
Table 5.1: 
Activity Status of Young Māori and Pākehā Women Aged 15-24, 2001 
 Pākehā Māori 
Employed Only 37.8% 29.1% 
Employed and Studying 25.8% 12.4% 
Studying Only 21.0% 20.4% 
Inactive 15.4% 38.1% 
Source: New Zealand Census of Population and Dwellings 2001 
Multinomial models, as is the case here, are useful when the dependent variable is 
categorical and the outcomes have no natural ordering.  Although inactivity is presumed 
to be the least preferred outcome, there is not a natural order of preference for the other 
three states.  If j represents the employment and education choice of young women, then 
it takes a value of one for employed only, two for employed and studying, three of 
studying only, and four for neither studying nor employed.   
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In the four state multinomial logit model, the probabilities of employment and 
educational outcome for young women are; 
XXX
Xjj
j
eee
e
]Pr[A
3322111
 for j=1,2,3  (5.16)  
while the probabilities of being inactive (j=4) is given by; 
XXX4j
eee
]Pr[A
3322111
1
   (5.17) 
Again initial calculations with activity status as the dependent variable and ethnicity as 
the sole independent variable estimates that α1 = 0.8963214, α2 = 0.3113312, α3 = 
0.514426, β1 = -1.163658, β2 = -0.9334094, β3 = -1.63764.  Substituting the 
corresponding figures into (5.16) and (5.17) for Māori (X=1) and Pākehā (X=0) 
calculates predicted probabilities for each outcome that are identical to the figures 
provided in Table 5.1. 
Model (II) suggests the probability of an individual being in one of these four states is 
dependent on their ethnicity, age, individual characteristics, geography, household 
composition, unpaid work activities, socioeconomic status.  However because 
involvement in study is now part of the dependent variable, the study variables are 
removed from the right hand side argument.  Receiving a student allowance 
(stud_allow) is also removed as a control variable since one‟s ability to receive this 
payment is dependent on one‟s involvement in study.  Formally, 
(II) Pr [Aj] = f (Ethnicity, Age, Individual Characteristics, Geography, Household 
Composition, Unpaid Work Activities, Socioeconomic Status). 
Again STATA is used to run a regression analysis of Model (II) which includes the 
intermediate step of introducing each group of variables one at a time.  This time 
however, the command dmlogit
40
 is utilised to predict the degree to which each 
explanatory variable affects the probability of young women being in each of the four 
states.  Once more, spatial clustering present in the ecological variables is adjusted in 
the same fashion as in Model (I). 
                                                 
40
 Again thanks to Steve Stillman for modifying the dmlogit2 STATA ado file in order to calculate 
marginal effects for dummy variables. 
 107 
Model III 
In developing Model (I) and (II) it is assumed that the probability of employment (or 
activity status) is described by the same parameters for Māori and Pākehā.  When 
interpreting the results for these models I have further assumed that both Māori and 
Pākehā women will react in the same way, in terms of their probability of being 
employed or in each activity status, when exposed to each explanatory variable.  
However, the essence of the hypothesis underlying this thesis is that a) not only are 
Māori more likely to be exposed to household structures generating greater domestic 
responsibilities which in turn compete with employment, but also b) that Māori labour 
supply will, for a variety of reasons, be more or less sensitive to many of the right hand 
side arguments. 
In other words, there will be identifiable interaction effects between ethnicity and many 
of these arguments.  This third interaction model, allows for the possibility of 
differential reactions to all factors for Māori and Pākehā in examining the likelihood of 
being in each of the four states.  Specifically; 
(III) Pr [Aj]  = f  (Ethnicity, Age*Māori, Individual Characteristics*Māori, 
Geography*Māori, Household Composition*Māori, Unpaid Work 
Activities*Māori, Socioeconomic Status*Māori). 
Again sets of variables are included stepwise, the command dmlogit is used, and spatial 
clustering is controlled for the same manner as the previous two models. 
In summary, running regressions on Models (II) and (III) will assist in assessing 
whether there is support for the hypothesis that young Māori woman are more likely to 
live in household structures generating domestic responsibilities that compete with paid 
work (and education), and whether these responsibilities have a stronger negative effect 
on the likelihood of a young Māori women securing employment and/or studying, 
relative to her Pākehā counterparts.  Results from all three models are presented and 
discussed in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 6 
Results 
Participation of young Māori women in paid employment remains substantially lower 
than Pākehā women of the same age.  Chapter 3 outlined reasons other academics have 
offered as to why participation rates might vary, and paid special attention to studies 
comparing indigenous populations.  Chapter 4 and 5 outlined the data and processes 
implemented to examine possible reasons for this pattern.  In this chapter we get closer 
to understanding the ethnic differences in participation rates.  The data brought to this 
study of young Māori women is unique in its breadth and attention to the role of the 
household as a possible reason for this long standing difference in participation. 
This chapter presents the results for each of the three models outlined in Chapter 5 to 
distinguish the effect each explanatory variable has on firstly, the probability of young 
women being employed, and secondly the probability they will be in one of four activity 
statuses.  It is broken into three separate sections, with each section representing one of 
the models previously discussed. 
Model I with Employment Status as Dependent Variable 
Logistic regression analysis is performed on Model I in order to measure the marginal 
effects each independent variable has on the likelihood of a young women being 
employed.  Due to the size of the full results from the stepwise introduction of the 
groups of independent variables, they are confined to Table A.2 within Appendix 15, 
and only selected results are reproduced below.   
Recall that groups of independent variables were systematically introduced to the model 
to understand the extent to which they can explain the difference in employment rates 
between Māori and Pākehā. Table 6.1 below shows the effect of being Māori on the 
likelihood of employment when various independent variables are controlled for at the 
same time.  When ethnicity is the sole independent variable we learn that if a young 
woman is Māori, her probability of being employed is 22 percentage points lower than 
her Pākehā counterparts.  Not only does this support the trend displayed in Figure 2.3, 
but it also confirms the numerical difference in employment rates (63.5% for Pākehā 
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and 41.5% for Māori) for women aged 15 to 24, as depicted in the first row of Table 
A.1 in Appendix 4. 
Table 6.1: 
Estimated Logit Marginal Māori Effects on Probability of Employment 
 Māori 
Ethnicity -0.220 
 (0.014)** 
+  
Age -0.229 
 (0.016)** 
+  
Individual Characteristics -0.168 
 (0.012)** 
+  
Geography -0.126 
 (0.007)** 
+  
Household Composition -0.085 
 (0.007)** 
+  
Time-Use -0.088 
 (0.007)** 
+  
Socioeconomic Status -0.073 
 (0.008)** 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 5% 
** significant at 1% 
Notes: Sequential introduction of groups of independent variables.  Full 
regression results in Appendix 15. 
Source: New Zealand Census of Population and Dwellings 2001 
Once differences in age structures between Māori and Pākehā are controlled for, the 
negative effect of being Māori on young women‟s probability of being employed 
slightly increases to 23 percentage points, indicating that there are few ethnic 
differences in age structure of young women.  However, once the individual 
characteristics (school qualification, immigrant status, iwi affiliation and Māori 
ancestry) are also included along with age and ethnicity, the negative effect of being 
Māori on young women‟s probability of being employed declines to 17 percentage 
points.  There is a further decline in the negative effect of being Māori once geography 
(13 percentage points) and then household composition (nine percentage points) are 
sequentially added to the regression.   
Once the time-use variables, which include both education status and unpaid work 
activities, and socioeconomic status are included the effect of being Māori on the 
probability of being employed falls to seven percentage points.  This means that if 
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Māori possessed the same observed characteristics as Pākehā, then the difference in the 
employment rates would only be seven percentage points rather than 22 points.  This 
substantial reduction indicates that two-thirds of the difference between the employment 
chances of Māori and Pākehā women is due to differences in their observed 
characteristics. 
While this provides interesting reading, this thesis seeks to understand how each factor 
alters the likelihood of being employed.  Table A.2 of Appendix 15 identifies the 
marginal effect and robust standard errors for each of the independent variables.  As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, when interpreting the results I assume that if young 
women are faced with an adverse (or favourable) characteristic, then the effect this has 
on their probability of being employed is identical for both Māori and Pākehā.  The first 
column after the variable names in Table A.2 indicates, with an „M‟, if Māori either 
have a higher mean than Pākehā for the continuous variables, or have a higher incidence 
in the binary categorical variables.  This allows for quick reference when seeking to 
understand if Māori or Pākehā are more likely to face certain circumstances that 
adversely or positively alter their chances of being employed.  Therefore in interpreting 
these results I have assumed that young Māori women‟s lower employment rate is due 
to Māori being more likely to face circumstances that reduce all young women‟s 
probability of employment, rather than Māori women reacting more adversely than 
Pākehā when both are faced with the same circumstance. 
Table 6.2 below extracts the last column from the full results in Table A.2 to highlight 
the marginal effect on the probability of employment and robust standard errors for all 
independent variables.  Marginal effects measure the change in the predicted probability 
of being employed when there is a unit change in one independent variable, while 
holding all other independent variables constant.  Robust standard errors (in 
parentheses) on the other hand estimate the probability that the observed marginal effect 
has occurred by chance.  If this probability is lower than 5% then the correlation 
between the dependent and independent variable is deemed to be statistically significant 
at the 5% level.  
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Table 6.2: 
Estimated Binary Logistic Marginal Effects on Probability of Being Employed 
   Marginal Effect 
on Pr[E] 
Ethnicity   
 maori M -0.073 
   (0.008)** 
Age   
 age15 M 
Base 
   
 age16 M 0.044 
   (0.006)** 
 age17 M 0.175 
   (0.011)** 
 age18 M 0.193 
   (0.018)** 
 age19  0.213 
   (0.021)** 
 age20  0.233 
   (0.021)** 
 age21  0.247 
   (0.020)** 
 age22  0.256 
   (0.020)** 
 age23  0.266 
   (0.021)** 
 age24  0.275 
   (0.015)** 
Individual Characteristics   
 school_edu  0.193 
   (0.004)** 
 immigrant  -0.053 
   (0.005)** 
 iwi M -0.011 
   (0.006) 
 mancestry M 0.006 
   (0.007) 
Geography   
 depone  -0.016 
   (0.010) 
 deptwo  0.003 
   (0.007) 
 depthree  0.007 
   (0.006) 
 depfour  0.010 
   (0.008) 
 depfive  
Base 
   
 depsix  -0.016 
   (0.007)* 
 depseven M -0.022 
   (0.007)** 
 depeight M -0.032 
   (0.010)** 
 depnine M -0.074 
   (0.016)** 
 depten M -0.111 
   (0.009)** 
 main_urban  
Base 
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 satellite_urban M 0.007 
   (0.010) 
 independ_urban M 0.055 
   (0.011)** 
 rural_high_influ  -0.029 
   (0.009)** 
 rural_mod_influ  -0.026 
   (0.011)* 
 rural_low_influ M -0.020 
   (0.011) 
 high_rural M -0.001 
   (0.025) 
 loc_ns M -0.012 
   (0.026) 
 male_une58 M -0.000 
   (0.005) 
 fem_une58 M -0.013 
   (0.006)* 
 maoripct M 0.001 
   (0.000)* 
Household Composition   
 kidu5own M -0.371 
   (0.012)** 
 ownkidu5 M -0.082 
   (0.009)** 
 kid516own M -0.050 
   (0.014)** 
 ownkid5_16 M 0.049 
   (0.019)* 
 elderly M -0.036 
   (0.012)** 
 numelderly  0.005 
   (0.027) 
 dacc M 0.018 
   (0.012) 
 nacc M -0.041 
   (0.030) 
 ddpb M -0.003 
   (0.006) 
 ndpb M -0.043 
   (0.025) 
 dinvsick M -0.034 
   (0.007)** 
 ninvsick M -0.038 
   (0.011)** 
 dunemp M -0.048 
   (0.008)** 
 nunemp M -0.004 
   (0.007) 
 kidu5oth M -0.030 
   (0.010)** 
 othkidu5 M 0.001 
   (0.009) 
 kid516oth M 0.043 
   (0.008)** 
 othkid5_16 M 0.043 
   (0.007)** 
 bth_prnt  
Base 
   
 no_spse_no_prnt M 0.018 
   (0.012) 
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 spse_only  0.121 
   (0.009)** 
 one_prnt M -0.006 
   (0.007) 
 oneprnt_spse M 0.059 
   (0.014)** 
 two_prnt_spse M 0.034 
   (0.021) 
 nperson M -0.020 
   (0.005)** 
Education Status   
 ptstudy  -0.031 
   (0.012)** 
 ftstudy  -0.155 
   (0.010)** 
Unpaid Work Activities   
 housework  0.105 
   (0.005)** 
 volunteer M 0.002 
   (0.005) 
 chldcare_mem M -0.049 
   (0.004)** 
 chldcare_nonmem M -0.007 
   (0.004) 
 sick_mem M -0.007 
   (0.005) 
 sick_nonmem M 0.029 
   (0.007)** 
Socioeconomic Status   
 own_house  0.035 
   (0.005)** 
 hhincome  0.057 
   (0.003)** 
 investment  0.085 
   (0.014)** 
 oth_govt_benefit M -0.117 
   (0.007)** 
 oth_source  -0.079 
   (0.009)** 
 stud_allow  -0.120 
   (0.009)** 
Observations  178776 
Robust standard errors in parentheses  
* significant at 5% 
** significant at 1% 
  
Notes: Full regression results in Appendix 15.  ‘M’ indicates if Māori have a higher 
incidence for dummy variable or higher average for continuous variables. 
Source: New Zealand Census of Population and Dwellings 2001 
For example, the results for school_edu show that if a young woman has at least year 11 
school qualification, then her probability of being employed is roughly 19 percentage 
points higher than if she did not have that level of qualification.  Therefore the 
assumption I have made is that the magnitude of the positive effect of education is 
identical for both Māori and Pākehā women.  However, some of the difference in 
employment rates between young Māori and Pākehā women can be explained by the 
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fact that young Māori women are less likely to have formal qualifications (as indicated 
by the absence of the „M‟), which in turn decreases their probability of being employed.  
The positive effect of education shown here is not particularly surprising given that 
education sends a signal to employers of their ability.  These results are also consistent 
with prior New Zealand research such as Harris and Raney (1991), and Winkelmann 
and Winkelmann (1997). 
Household Composition and Unpaid Work Activities 
Attention now turns to the results for household composition and this section shows that 
variables measuring dependency are important.  The marginal effects for the variables 
kidu5own and ownkidu5 indicates that if a young women has one child under the age of 
five, then the probability of her being employed is reduced by 37 percentage points, and 
for every additional child, the probability is reduced by another eight percentage points.  
As for having a child aged 5-16, ownkid5_16 suggests that although the magnitude is 
not as big, there is still a considerable drop in employment probability of around five 
percentage points for those with one school age child.  However, the variable 
representing each additional school aged child shows that each additional child aged 5-
16 after the first child actually increases the probability of being employed by five 
percentage points.   
Of the 22 percentage point difference in employment rates between young Māori and 
Pākehā women highlighted earlier, these results indicate that 3.8 percentage points of 
this difference is explained through ethnic differences in the number of own children 
aged under five.  Differences in the number of own school aged children however, only 
account for 0.12 percentage points difference in employment rates. 
What these results show is the importance of measuring the influence of children by 
both the age and number of children a woman has.  While comparisons with previous 
New Zealand literature is difficult to make due to the wide variety of measures of child 
influence, results provided here are consistent with previous research highlighting the 
negative relationship between children and participation.  There are however, some 
dissimilarities with Ross (1987) who separated the study of children into the age and 
number of children.  While he found the size of the relationship between children and 
labour force participation was different between pre-school aged and school aged 
children, he also showed that the negative effect of having two or more children under 
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five was actually greater than the negative effect of the first child aged under five.  This 
is in contrast to my results. 
The variation in the probability of employment between the ages of children is not 
particularly surprising given that women who have children aged over five essentially 
have access to „free‟ childcare in the form of primary school.  Nonetheless, Table A.1 in 
Appendix 4 shows that young Māori women are more likely to have a child in each of 
the age groups than Pākehā.  Therefore because of the negative effect that children, 
especially young children, have on the probability of being employed, this must 
partially explain the ethnic difference employment rates.  
Not only do young women‟s own children reduce their likelihood of being employed 
compared to women without, but living in a household that contains other household 
member‟s children further reduces the employment probability of all young women.  If 
there is one child under the age of five that does not belong to the young woman, then 
the chances of her being employed is reduced by around three percentage points holding 
all other variables constant.  This result tends to suggest that young women may be 
called upon to undertake childcare of other younger children within a household, which 
in turn results in reduced ability to undertake paid employment as well.  Again, ethnic 
difference in the number of other children aged under five contributes to 0.25 
percentage points difference in employment rates between young Māori and Pākehā 
women. 
Results also show that for every additional household member‟s school aged child there 
is a four percentage point increase in the likelihood that a young woman will be 
employed.  Perhaps this indicates that other older children can assist with domestic 
duties, therefore freeing up more time for young women to undertake paid employment.  
Given Māori are more likely to live in households containing other people‟s children 
aged 5-16, if Māori had the same number of children as Pākehā then the difference in 
employment rates would actually be another 0.54 percentage points greater. 
While the effect of her own children on a woman‟s employment is not surprising (and is 
well documented in the literature), the effect of other people‟s children in the 
household, to my knowledge, has not been identified in any prior research.  Although 
Maani (2000) found a positive relationship between the number of siblings and the 
probability of employment, my results add to our knowledge of female labour supply by 
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identifying two further influences.  Firstly, that the age of other people‟s children is 
influential, and secondly, that other people‟s children do not necessarily need to be the 
sibling of a young women. 
In interpreting the results relating to the presence and number of children I am inferring 
that young women undertake care of these children, and it is this childcare that reduces 
available time to be devoted to other activities such as employment.  However, there is 
no guarantee this childcare actually takes place.  It may be of more interest to instead 
examine whether young women actually undertake childcare and how this relates to 
their likelihood of being employed.  Unfortunately, the unpaid work variables available 
is the dataset only measure the incidence of unpaid work and not the number of hours 
undertaken.  Consequently, the marginal effect of undertaking each particular unpaid 
work activity is essentially calculating the change in the probability of being employed 
at the margins.  That is, what happens to young women‟s probability of being employed 
if they undertake zero hours of unpaid work as opposed to one hour (or even one 
minute) of unpaid childcare.  As such, the number of children present in household may 
provide a better estimation to the actual amount of unpaid work undertaken than the 
actual unpaid work variables.   
With that in mind, if a young woman actually states that she looks after a child who is a 
member of the household, then her likelihood of working is reduced by roughly five 
percentage points, even after controlling for the number of children in the household.  
The results for both the number of children and actually undertaking childcare confirms 
children, and especially young children, generate significant domestic constraints 
influencing the probability of being employed. 
Although the presence of children understandably reduces the likelihood of employment 
for young women, the characteristics of other people living in the household also affects 
a young woman‟s probability of employment.  For example, having one elderly person 
(aged 65 years and over) present in their household reduces the likelihood of work by 
almost four percentage points, however there is no additional effect of having more than 
one elderly person.  Again, this indicates that young women‟s chances of working are 
constrained by pressure to care for elderly relatives living with them.   
As mentioned in Chapter 4 it is possible that elderly and employment might be 
positively correlated since elderly persons with good health can provide informal 
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childcare.  The negative relationship established above may actually be much stronger 
but has been partially counteracted by some elderly person providing informal childcare 
within household, which in turn frees up time for other household members, including 
young women, to seek employment.  As Māori women are more likely than Pākehā to 
live in households containing elderly persons, the greater exposure of young Māori 
women to this domestic responsibility must partially explain their lower probability of 
being employed.  Calculations show that only 0.06 percentage points of the difference 
in employment rates between Māori and Pākehā are explained through ethnic 
differences in the number of elderly persons. 
Further to the caring responsibilities young women may face, results show young 
women who live with one household member receiving an invalids or sickness benefit 
are over three percentage points less likely to be employed.  Moreover, for every 
additional household member on an invalids or sickness benefit a young woman‟s 
propensity to work is reduced by a further four percentage points.  However, the result 
for the corresponding unpaid work variable describing if a young women cared for a 
sick or ill household member did not reach statistical significance.  Overall, the 
inference from the results is that young women living with household members who 
have poor health are required to assist in the caring responsibilities of those household 
members.  In turn it restricts young women‟s time to be devoted to other activities such 
as paid employment.  Once again, young Māori women are more than twice as likely as 
Pākehā to live with at least one household member receiving an invalids or sickness 
benefit, and it is this greater incidence that contributes to 0.17 percentage points 
difference in employment rates between young Māori and Pākehā women. 
My results relating to the care of elderly or sick household members confirm results 
found by Shirley et al. (2001) in which participants in their survey claimed that caring 
for elderly parents prevented them from seeking employment.  However, for the first 
time, my thesis has quantified this relationship at a national level and gives statistical 
justification for this empirical relationship. 
It was expected that having more household members on the domestic purposes benefit 
(DPB) and unemployment benefit may mean household responsibilities would be 
exclusively undertaken by those individuals receiving the benefit, therefore freeing up 
time for other household members, including young women, to undertake employment.  
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Contrary to expectations, young women who live with one person receiving the 
unemployment benefit are five percentage points less likely to employed, while there is 
no statistical relationship between DPB and employment.  The former result suggests 
there may be some peer effect for young women to stay at home with other household 
members who receive the unemployment benefit and provide care functions within the 
home.  According to this model, differences in the number of household members 
receiving the unemployment benefit between Māori and Pākehā contribute 0.12 
percentage points to the ethnic difference in employment rates. 
Finally, in relation to the remaining four unpaid work activities, if a young woman 
claims she looks after a non-household member who is ill or disabled, then their 
chances of working actually increases by three percentage points.  Furthermore, there is 
a ten percentage point increase in the probability of being employed for young women if 
they report undertaking housework.  These are rather confusing results given that 
undertaking unpaid work reduces time that can be devoted to employment.  It is 
possible in terms of the care for an ill or disabled non-household member it may be 
simply represent that looking after a non-household member is not as time demanding 
as looking after a household member. 
In summary, the results produced for household composition and unpaid activities 
support the claim that young women are faced with considerable domestic 
responsibilities which in turn lowers their probability of supplying their labour on the 
open or wage market.  The key point is that Māori are generally more likely than their 
Pākehā counterparts to be exposed to domestic responsibilities factors reducing the 
likelihood of young women working.  In particular, young Māori are more likely to be 
living in a household containing their own or other people‟s children, elderly persons, 
people with health problems, and people receiving the DPB or unemployment benefit. 
Geographical Effects 
Contemporary geographers are contributing much to the study of labour participation by 
focusing on the link between the home and the workplace.  Central to their 
conceptualisation is how the structure of the household and neighbourhood influences 
these relationships.  These ideas are also central to my own thesis, namely, that 
household structure plays a role in understanding who undertakes paid work and why, 
as well as how and why the indigenous population is more heavily influenced by these 
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household constraints.  Results relating to geographical effects highlight that, at many 
levels, a young women‟s geography is important in influencing their participation in 
employment.   
Findings show some support for the earlier prediction that young women living in less 
urban and more rural areas would be less likely to be employed, although there are a 
couple of exceptions.  For example, living in highly rural areas, rural areas with low 
urban influence and satellite urban communities were not correlated with the 
employment rates of young women as they did not reach statistical significance.  
Furthermore, the chances of employment were actually greater for women living in an 
independent urban area than in a main urban area.  In particular young women living in 
independent urban communities are 5.5 percentage points more likely to be working 
than equivalent young women living in the main urban areas.  This is likely to be 
partially a migration effect as many ambitious, educationally able young women leave 
these smaller towns for tertiary education in the main centres (Souness, 2005).  
Consequently, migration to main centres would raise the employment rate in smaller 
towns, and lower it in main centres due to a greater proportion of young women 
studying.   
Other than those exceptions, living in any of the other rural areas reduces the chance of 
employment by around three percentage points.  As there is little ethnic difference in the 
incidence of young women living in each of the settlement types, only 0.0785 
percentage points of the ethnic difference in employment rates can be explained through 
this geographical scale. 
These results do not necessarily imply that the probability of employment is lower 
because of fewer job opportunities as the model controls for the local unemployment 
rate.  Instead rural areas may have restricted access to services (such as government 
agencies that assist in gaining employment) and childcare centres that would assist in 
lowering domestic responsibilities faced by young women.  Other young women who 
live in rural areas with a high level of urban influence may face greater fixed costs of 
employment if they have to travel longer distances to work in urban areas.  Therefore, 
the monetary and time cost incurred by travelling reduces the reward of employment 
and may result in some young women deciding not to seek employment in the first 
place. 
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However, local labour market conditions do seem to have some effect on the probability 
of being employed.
41
  In particular, for every one percent increase in the local female 
unemployment rate, the probability of young women working reduces by just over one 
percentage point.  A higher unemployment rate implies fewer jobs for women, and that 
these unemployed women compete with one and another for a limit number of available 
job placements.  Therefore, in local labour markets where employment prospects are 
low (as indicated by a high female unemployment rate) the likelihood of a young 
women being employed is lower.  These results are entirely consistent with previous 
New Zealand research such as Brooks (1991), Poot and Siegers (1992), and Hyman 
(1979) although they used the combined male and female local unemployment rate.  
Moreover, the size of the relationship is slightly greater than that found by Winkelmann 
and Winkelmann (1997) who also used the combined male and female local 
unemployment rate. 
Findings relating to the level of deprivation in a young woman‟s meshblock show that 
young women are less likely to be working if they live in a meshblock with high level 
of deprivation.  Specifically, young women living in a deprivation ten area are 11 
percentage points less likely to be employed than similar women living in a deprivation 
five area.  This may indicate some area effects.  However, there is likely to be a high 
level of selection bias as young women who perform well in terms of their employment 
outcomes are more likely to be able to afford to live in lesser deprived areas.  For 
supporting evidence the results between the last two columns of Table A.2 in Appendix 
15 are compared. They suggest some of the relationship between deprivation and the 
probability of employment is absorbed once socioeconomic status is included in the 
regression.  As Māori are more likely to live in high deprivation areas, calculations 
estimate that three percentage points of the difference in employment rates between 
young Māori and Pākehā women can explained through differences in the level of 
neighbourhood deprivation. 
Finally, it was hypothesised that women living in areas with a higher prevalence of 
Māori inhabitants would reduce the chances of employment because of greater 
community responsibilities.  However, findings show that while there is a statistically 
significant result, the actual size of the relationship is minimal and in an opposite 
direction than expected.  That is, a one percentage point increase in the proportion of 
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 A map of New Zealand outline each of the 58 local labour markets can be found in Appendix 7. 
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Māori living in an area unit is associated with a 0.1 percentage point increase in the 
probability of being employed. 
Summary 
Model I provides important insights into factors affecting the labour supply decisions of 
young women.  In particular, there is significant evidence to conclude that young 
women are adversely affected by household structures likely to increase their domestic 
responsibilities.  Further results on the positive impact that age, education, urban living, 
and residing in low unemployment areas have on the likelihood of employment are 
consistent with prior research.  The model has also confirmed the hypothesis that Māori 
are more likely to face adverse situations lowering the probability of employment.  In 
particular, referring to Table A.1 of Appendix 4, young Māori women are more likely to 
live in households containing their own children, other people‟s children, elderly, 
people receiving the DPB, unemployment benefit, and sickness or invalids benefit.  
Furthermore, they are more likely to care for children within the household, as well as 
live in more deprived areas, and areas with higher unemployment rates. 
Not only has this research highlighted new household structures influencing labour 
supply, it has also supported many previous findings with the New Zealand literature.  It 
also provides evidence showing the multidimensional role that geography can play.  On 
one side, the demand for labour, as proxied by the local unemployment rate, is 
important.  However, the main contribution to the literature on employment 
participation relating to geographical effects is the results relating to the supply of 
labour.  In particular, variations in settlement type and neighbourhood deprivation alter 
young women‟s labour outcomes and this seems to be fed through the supply of labour 
as opposed to the demand for labour. 
The final point of interest refers to the effect studying plays on the probability of 
employment.  In general, Table 6.2 highlights that young women who study, either part-
time or full-time, are less likely to be employed.  As we discovered in Figure 2.8, young 
women may often combine study and employment together.  In order to capture the 
influence of ethnicity on choices made between these various options the following 
section presents results when four combinations of employment and studying are used 
as the dependent variable instead of employment status alone. 
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Model II with Activity Status as the Dependent Variable 
The fact young women have the options of both employment and studying means the 
results presented in the previous section may only illustrate part of young women time-
use decisions.  Although the results produced by Model I suggests Māori face greater 
domestic responsibilities that reduce the likelihood of being employed, the results do 
not indicate what young Māori women are doing instead of being employed.  In 
particular, they may either be inactive (neither studying nor employed) or studying 
without any employment.  To better understand how young women allocate their time 
between employment and education, a multinomial logit regression on Model II has 
been run to estimate how each explanatory variable alters the probability that young 
Māori are employed only, employed and studying, studying only, or inactive.   
Again there is a stepwise introduction of groups of variables but due to the size of the 
output the full results are relegated to Table A.3 in Appendix 15.  The first row of each 
activity status in this table shows how the effect of being Māori generally declines as 
more groups of independent variables are included.  For example, when ethnicity is the 
only control variable the percentage of young Māori women in only employment is 
around nine percentage points fewer than Pākehā women.  Furthermore the 
corresponding figures for studying only, and employment and studying are one and 13 
percentage points respectively.  On the other hand, the percentage of Māori women who 
are inactive is 23 percentage points greater than Pākehā women. 
Once all the explanatory variables are included in the multinomial model much of the 
ethnic difference in the probability of being in each state is absorbed by the independent 
variables – as was the case in the binary logistic regression.  In particular, the effect of 
being Māori on the probability of being in employment only all but disappears, while 
the probability of being employed and studying is reduced to just under six percentage 
points.  For inactivity, roughly 75% of the ethnic difference in the probability of being 
inactive can be explained through the inclusion of all the explanatory variables. 
To assist in comparing how each explanatory variable affects the probability of young 
women being in each of the four activity states Table 6.3 below extracts the last column 
for each activity status from the full results to provide a more compact table.  The first 
column after the variable name indicates, with an „M‟, if Māori have a higher mean than 
Pākehā in the continuous variables, or have a higher incidence in the categorical 
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variables.  This allows for quick reference when seeking to understand if Māori or 
Pākehā are more likely to face certain circumstance that adversely or positively alter 
their probability of being in each of the four activity statuses.
42
  For example, if the 
results found that when young women had a certain characteristic the probability of all 
young women being inactive increased, then the „M‟ indicates if a greater proportion of 
Māori possess this characteristic.  If this is indeed the case then some of the ethnic 
differences between Māori and Pākehā in their activity statuses are due to a greater 
proportion of Māori possessing that particular characteristics which increases the 
probability of young women (either Pākehā or Māori) being inactive. 
Breaking the time-use of young women into four distinct possibilities highlights 
variations not identified by the binary model in the previous section.  For example, 
results from Model I outline that young woman who had at least year 11 qualification 
were more likely to be employed.  However, results from Table 6.3 show young women 
possessing that minimum qualification are actually less likely to be just employed, and 
more likely to combine employment and education.  This shows the positive effect of 
education for young women is a result of more educationally able women combining 
part-time employment while continuing to studying.  Similar variation in results 
between Model I and II can also be found in the two major areas of focus. 
Table 6.3: 
Estimated Multinomial Logistic Marginal Effects on Probability of Activity Status Outcome 
   Employment 
Only 
Employment 
and Studying 
Studying 
Only 
Inactive 
Ethnicity      
 maori M -0.003 -0.056 -0.000 0.059 
   (0.009) (0.009)** (0.007) (0.008)** 
Age      
 age15 M 
Base Base Base Base 
   
 age16 M 0.201 -0.084 -0.098 -0.019 
   (0.011)** (0.006)** (0.006)** (0.005)** 
 age17 M 0.435 -0.151 -0.202 -0.082 
   (0.017)** (0.009)** (0.017)** (0.010)** 
 age18 M 0.531 -0.211 -0.234 -0.086 
   (0.015)** (0.020)** (0.016)** (0.015)** 
 age19  0.544 -0.213 -0.242 -0.089 
   (0.015)** (0.023)** (0.013)** (0.015)** 
 age20  0.555 -0.211 -0.247 -0.098 
   (0.012)** (0.020)** (0.010)** (0.016)** 
 age21  0.581 -0.224 -0.253 -0.104 
   (0.011)** (0.018)** (0.014)** (0.016)** 
 age22  0.596 -0.233 -0.258 -0.105 
                                                 
42
 Full descriptive detail pertaining to Māori and Pākehā distribution within each variable can be found in 
the last two columns of Table A.1 in Appendix 4. 
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   (0.014)** (0.016)** (0.017)** (0.016)** 
 age23  0.606 -0.235 -0.260 -0.111 
   (0.016)** (0.015)** (0.020)** (0.015)** 
 age24  0.613 -0.236 -0.261 -0.115 
   (0.014)** (0.013)** (0.016)** (0.013)** 
Individual Characteristics      
 school_edu  -0.049 0.180 0.063 -0.194 
   (0.009)** (0.006)** (0.007)** (0.005)** 
 immigrant  -0.050 -0.007 0.032 0.025 
   (0.009)** (0.005) (0.003)** (0.004)** 
 iwi M -0.028 0.008 0.025 -0.006 
   (0.006)** (0.007) (0.005)** (0.004) 
 mancestry M 0.029 -0.017 -0.018 0.006 
   (0.005)** (0.005)** (0.007)** (0.005) 
Geography      
 depone  -0.027 0.010 0.034 -0.017 
   (0.008)** (0.004)* (0.010)** (0.006)** 
 deptwo  -0.010 0.012 0.012 -0.013 
   (0.008) (0.005)* (0.005)* (0.005)* 
 depthree  0.005 0.003 -0.001 -0.007 
   (0.006) (0.003) (0.007) (0.005) 
 depfour  0.006 0.003 0.002 -0.012 
   (0.004) (0.006) (0.008) (0.004)** 
 depfive  
Base Base Base Base 
   
 depsix  -0.007 -0.008 0.005 0.009 
   (0.007) (0.003)* (0.007) (0.004)* 
 depseven M -0.015 -0.007 0.006 0.016 
   (0.006)* (0.005) (0.006) (0.004)** 
 depeight M -0.027 -0.005 0.015 0.017 
   (0.012)* (0.006) (0.013) (0.005)** 
 depnine M -0.047 -0.028 0.046 0.029 
   (0.025) (0.008)** (0.025) (0.007)** 
 depten M -0.058 -0.049 0.054 0.052 
   (0.015)** (0.008)** (0.014)** (0.006)** 
 main_urban  
Base Base Base Base 
   
 satellite_urban M 0.071 -0.046 -0.041 0.017 
   (0.013)** (0.006)** (0.009)** (0.006)** 
 independ_urban M 0.110 -0.033 -0.073 -0.005 
   (0.013)** (0.008)** (0.011)** (0.007) 
 rural_high_influ  0.029 -0.044 -0.003 0.019 
   (0.014)* (0.009)** (0.009) (0.007)** 
 rural_mod_influ  0.048 -0.056 -0.015 0.023 
   (0.011)** (0.007)** (0.008) (0.008)** 
 rural_low_influ M 0.062 -0.059 -0.036 0.033 
   (0.013)** (0.008)** (0.010)** (0.007)** 
 high_rural M 0.106 -0.076 -0.049 0.018 
   (0.024)** (0.013)** (0.022)* (0.012) 
 loc_ns M 0.141 -0.101 -0.141 0.101 
   (0.060)* (0.079) (0.044)** (0.012)** 
 male_une58 M -0.011 0.009 0.007 -0.005 
   (0.008) (0.004)* (0.006) (0.003) 
 fem_une58 M -0.009 -0.005 0.006 0.008 
   (0.010) (0.004) (0.008) (0.003)* 
 maoripct M 0.003 -0.002 -0.002 0.001 
   (0.001)** (0.000)** (0.001)** (0.000)* 
Household Composition      
 kidu5own M -0.139 -0.177 -0.011 0.327 
   (0.018)** (0.009)** (0.015) (0.009)** 
 ownkidu5 M -0.037 -0.018 0.009 0.047 
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   (0.013)** (0.015) (0.011) (0.007)** 
 kid516own M -0.026 -0.025 0.036 0.015 
   (0.018) (0.012)* (0.016)* (0.007)* 
 ownkid5_16 M 0.048 -0.010 -0.014 -0.024 
   (0.024)* (0.032) (0.015) (0.014) 
 elderly M 0.013 -0.040 -0.015 0.042 
   (0.013) (0.008)** (0.011) (0.007)** 
 numelderly  0.020 -0.010 -0.037 0.028 
   (0.026) (0.021) (0.021) (0.019) 
 dacc M 0.020 -0.001 -0.023 0.004 
   (0.009)* (0.007) (0.009)** (0.007) 
 nacc M -0.035 -0.011 0.035 0.011 
   (0.035) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) 
 ddpb M 0.037 -0.027 -0.019 0.009 
   (0.008)** (0.004)** (0.006)** (0.003)* 
 ndpb M 0.011 -0.040 -0.003 0.032 
   (0.026) (0.022) (0.017) (0.015)* 
 dinvsick M 0.014 -0.036 -0.019 0.041 
   (0.008) (0.004)** (0.006)** (0.005)** 
 ninvsick M -0.006 -0.023 0.004 0.026 
   (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.008)** 
 dunemp M -0.019 -0.026 0.006 0.039 
   (0.005)** (0.004)** (0.006) (0.003)** 
 nunemp M 0.006 -0.008 -0.007 0.009 
   (0.009) (0.005) (0.007) (0.004)* 
 kidu5oth M 0.062 -0.066 -0.057 0.061 
   (0.014)** (0.008)** (0.012)** (0.005)** 
 othkidu5 M 0.024 -0.008 -0.034 0.018 
   (0.014) (0.011) (0.012)** (0.006)** 
 kid516oth M 0.042 0.008 -0.049 -0.001 
   (0.008)** (0.003)** (0.010)** (0.005) 
 othkid5_16 M 0.059 -0.008 -0.046 -0.005 
   (0.009)** (0.003)** (0.009)** (0.003) 
 bth_prnt  
Base Base Base Base 
   
 no_spse_no_prnt M 0.027 -0.022 0.047 -0.052 
   (0.015) (0.008)** (0.016)** (0.009)** 
 spse_only  0.169 -0.036 -0.092 -0.041 
   (0.011)** (0.006)** (0.013)** (0.007)** 
 one_prnt M 0.020 -0.019 0.001 -0.003 
   (0.008)* (0.003)** (0.009) (0.004) 
 oneprnt_spse M 0.162 -0.077 -0.095 0.010 
   (0.015)** (0.015)** (0.013)** (0.010) 
 two_prnt_spse M 0.151 -0.096 -0.106 0.052 
   (0.012)** (0.020)** (0.023)** (0.015)** 
 nperson M -0.035 0.010 0.029 -0.004 
   (0.007)** (0.003)** (0.008)** (0.003) 
Unpaid Work Activities      
 housework  0.042 0.057 0.004 -0.103 
   (0.004)** (0.004)** (0.004) (0.003)** 
 volunteer M -0.108 0.087 0.069 -0.047 
   (0.005)** (0.005)** (0.004)** (0.005)** 
 chldcare_mem M -0.066 0.003 0.040 0.024 
   (0.006)** (0.003) (0.003)** (0.004)** 
 chldcare_nonmem M -0.005 -0.003 0.002 0.006 
   (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003)* 
 sick_mem M -0.019 0.008 0.017 -0.006 
   (0.009)* (0.005) (0.005)** (0.004) 
 sick_nonmem M -0.034 0.054 0.002 -0.022 
   (0.006)** (0.004)** (0.005) (0.005)** 
Socioeconomic Status      
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 own_house  -0.002 0.028 0.001 -0.027 
   (0.005) (0.004)** (0.004) (0.003)** 
 hhincome  0.061 0.005 -0.030 -0.035 
   (0.003)** (0.001)** (0.004)** (0.002)** 
 investment  -0.033 0.114 0.021 -0.101 
   (0.008)** (0.006)** (0.011) (0.009)** 
 oth_govt_benefit M -0.073 -0.038 0.054 0.057 
   (0.007)** (0.008)** (0.005)** (0.005)** 
 oth_source  -0.157 0.068 0.138 -0.049 
   (0.009)** (0.005)** (0.008)** (0.007)** 
Observations  178776 178776 178776 178776 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 5% 
** significant at 1% 
   
Notes: Full regression results in Appendix 16.  ‘M’ indicates if Māori have a higher incidence for dummy 
variable or higher average for continuous variables. 
Source:  New Zealand Census of Population and Dwellings 2001. 
Household Composition and Unpaid Work Activities 
Again starting the focus on the presence of children, Table 6.3 shows that when there is 
one child aged under five belonging to a young women then she is far less likely to be 
employed, both with (18 percentage points) or without combining studying (14 
percentage points).  Furthermore, her probability of being inactive increases by 33 
percentage points.  Similar patterns can be found with the presence of each additional 
pre-school aged child.  In particular, each additional child aged under five reduces the 
likely of being just employed by an additional four percentage points, while there is a 
five percentage point increase in the likelihood of being inactive. 
There are also some interesting relationships between activity status and the presence of 
other people‟s children.  Recall from Model I that the presence of other people‟s pre-
school aged children reduced the likelihood of young women being employed, and this 
may be a result of young women required to provide secondary childcare to these young 
children.  Results for Model II however, indicate that the drop in the probability in 
employment is due to the decline in the likelihood of young women being in both 
employment and education.  In particular, having one child aged under five that belongs 
to another household member reduces the probability of being employed and studying 
by around seven percentage points, increases the chances of a young women being just 
employed by six percentage points, and reduces the likelihood of being in study with 
employment by six percentage points.  There is also a six percentage point increase in 
the chance of a young women being inactive for the first child, and a further two 
percentage point increase for each additional pre-school aged children belonging to 
another household member.   
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Ultimately, the results indicate that the presence of other people‟s children is associated 
with lower participation in education (with or without combining employment), and 
instead young women are either more likely to be inactive or instead concentrate purely 
on paid employment. 
Even after controlling for the number of children present within a young women‟s 
household, the calculations on the childcare unpaid work categories further show a clear 
effect of being required to provide care for children.  In particular, young women who 
actually identified themselves as providing childcare to a household member were seven 
percentage points less likely to be just working, and instead were four and two 
percentage points more likely to be studying only, and inactive respectively.  In terms of 
childcare of non-household member, there is a less than one percentage point increase in 
chances of a young women being inactive. 
Overall, Māori are more likely to undertake both forms of unpaid childcare as well as 
live in households which contain their own and other people‟s children.  Therefore, the 
greater exposure of Māori to these domestic responsibilities can account for some of the 
ethnic difference in the percentage of young women who are inactive.  The presence of 
young children can also explain why young Māori women have less involvement in 
combining both employment and study. 
Consistent with findings produced by Model I, the presence of one elderly person in a 
young woman‟s household was associated with a four percentage point drop in the 
likelihood of combining employment and studying, and a four percentage point increase 
in inactivity.  There is however, no additional effect from the presence of two or more 
elderly persons. 
In terms of the health status of household members, if one household member receives 
an invalid or sickness benefit then the probability of being inactive increases by four 
percentage points.  For every additional recipient there is a further three percentage 
point increase in the likelihood of being inactive.  As with elderly, one recipient is also 
associated with a decline in the probability of young women combining both 
employment and study.   
Again the inference here is that young women may be called upon to care for elderly, 
sick, or disabled household members, which consequently reduces the time young 
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women can devote to other activities like employment or education.  As such, the 
domestic responsibilities generated from the health status of household members 
increases the chances of young women being inactive.  Once again, the fact Māori are 
more likely than Pākehā to live in household containing sick or disabled persons means 
young Māori women‟s greater exposure to this domestic constraint can partially account 
for their higher inactivity rates. 
While the above results highlight the many forms domestic responsibilities can take, 
living in a household where a member receives either the unemployment benefit or 
domestic purposes benefit (DPB) may actually reduce young women‟s responsibilities.  
As mentioned in Chapter 4, since a household member receiving either of these benefits 
is not working they may assume the household tasks.  However, no evidence is found to 
suggest this is the case.  Instead, the opposite seems to be true.  That is, young women 
who live in a household containing one member on the DPB are one percentage point 
more likely to be inactive, and for every additional recipient there is a further three 
percentage point increase in the probability.  On the other hand, the presence of one 
recipient is associated with a decrease in the chance a young woman will be studying, 
with or without combining education. 
In relation to the number of household members receiving the unemployment benefit, 
there is decline in the chance of being employed, with or without combining study 
(three and two percentage points respectively).  Again there is a four percentage point 
increase in the probability of being inactive for the first recipient and a further one 
percentage point increase for each additional recipient. 
There is no clear explanation for these relationships.  Perhaps the presence of household 
members receiving either of the two benefits has some peer effect on young women.  
That is, seeing other household members are staying at home and not working could 
influence young women to also stay at home and provide assistance or company.  
Nonetheless, young Māori women are again more exposed to these household structures 
increasing young women‟s likelihood of being inactive, and these exposure differences 
can partially explain the difference in allocation between each activity status. 
The separation of young women‟s available time into four distinct states has also 
isolated a number of unpaid work activity effects not previously identified.  Even after 
controlling for the number of household members receiving either an invalids or 
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sickness benefit, young women who actually stated that they cared for an ill or disabled 
household member were two percentage points less likely to be employed only, and two 
percentage points more likely to be studying only.  
In terms of looking after a non-household member there were rather surprising results.  
Although young women reported as caring for an ill or sick non-household member 
were, as expected, three percentage points less likely to be employed only, they were 
also less likely to be inactive, and five percentage points more likely to be both 
employed and studying.  These are conflicting results given that unpaid work compete 
with employment and study for the allocation of young women‟s time.  It may be that 
the care of non-household member is not as demanding as the care for household 
members. 
Consistent with Model I, undertaking housework increased the likelihood of a young 
women working both with and without study, however this later model produced new 
and interesting results for young women who under volunteer work.  Peculiarly, 
undertaking volunteer work seems to have the opposite effect to what would be 
expected in three of four activity states.  For instance undertaking volunteer work 
increases the probability that a young woman is just studying by seven percentage 
points, increases employment and study by nine percentage points, and further reduces 
the probability of being inactive by five percentage points.  Employment only is the 
single activity status that holds its expectation with a significant 11 percentage point 
drop in the likelihood of young women being in this activity state if they do volunteer 
work.  Results may indicate that young women who study have much greater access to 
volunteer work and that it is a common activity among students. 
Again to summarise, the multinomial model provides further evidence that the domestic 
responsibilities, which I infer from particular household compositions, plays an 
influential role in the probability of young women being in one of the four activity 
states.  These results are also considerably clearer for the inactive status than for the 
other three employment and education combinations.  Not only did the previous binary 
model suggest that domestic duties reduce the probability of young women being 
employed or not, but this latest multinomial model further suggests that domestic duties 
also increase the chances of being inactive.   
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Unfortunately there is little comparable New Zealand literature in which the present 
results can be judged against.  Although Maani (2000) also ran a multinomial regression 
analysis with employment, studying and not employed as the three state dependent 
variable, the number of siblings within a young women household was the only 
household composition variable.  While she found that the number of siblings was 
associated with an increase in the likelihood of being either employed or studying, my 
results relating to the number of other people‟s children suggest that there is a positive 
effect on employment but a negative effect for studying. 
Regrettably I cannot infer causation from these results. That is, it is impossible to 
determine whether domestic responsibilities cause less time to be devoted towards 
employment and education, or whether because a young women is inactive, she has 
more available time to undertake the domestic responsibilities that are required within a 
household.  Nonetheless, once again part of the ethnic difference in the inactivity rate of 
young women can be explained by differences in domestic responsibilities, as Māori are 
significantly more likely to be exposed to these potential time constraints due to the 
household structures in which they live in. 
Geography 
Results pertaining to the role of settlement type show some variation from those found 
in Model I.  Recall that living in less urban and more rural areas generally reduced the 
chances of being employment, although independent urban community was the 
exception to the rule.  Results from the latest multinomial model show that the 
probability of being inactive is consistent with the prior findings, whereby young 
women are more likely to be inactive if they live outside of the main urban centres.  For 
example, young women living in either an independent urban community, rural area 
with high or moderate urban influence are about two percentage points more likely to be 
inactive than equivalent women living in the main urban areas.  While for young 
women living in rural areas with low urban influence this is a slightly greater at three 
percentage points. 
On the other hand, the probability of being in employment only is actually much greater 
in all other settlement types when main urban centres are used as the base.  Young 
women living in satellite and independent urban communities are seven and 11 
percentage points respectively, more likely to be employed without studying than 
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equivalent women living in the main urban areas.  Whereas in terms of rural living, the 
increase in the likelihood of being just employed is greater as young women live in 
areas with less and less urban influence. 
Although there was an expectation that living in less urban and more rural areas would 
decrease the chances of being employed only, the cause of this contrary finding may 
results from a lack of tertiary educational opportunities available outside the main 
centres.  Fewer educational opportunities cause young women to either migrate to other 
centres to study, or remain in non-main centres to seek employment instead.  There 
seems to be some support for this proposition since results show that young women 
living away from the main centres are less likely to just be studying only, and less likely 
to combine education and employment.   
Furthermore, there seems to be evidence of a possible migration effect whereby more 
educationally able young women migrate into the main centres to undertake higher 
forms of education.  In particular, the chance of a young women undertaking education 
only is seven percentage points lower in independent urban areas than in the main urban 
centres, whereas the likelihood of being employed only is 11 percentage points higher 
than in the main urban areas.  It suggests that educationally able women previously 
living in independent urban communities move into the main centres to undertake 
education, while the young women remaining behind seek employment instead.  
However, without longitudinal data, or information pertaining to prior place of 
residence, confirmation of a migration effect is impossible. 
As the local female and male unemployment rates are controlled for, the variations in 
the probability of being in employment across settlement types cannot be explained 
through differences in the demand for labour within those settlement types.  Instead 
fewer childcare and government services in less urban and more rural areas may 
underpin this relationship.  However, examining the results for the local unemployment 
rates shows that local demand for labour does indeed seem to partially explain the 
higher inactivity rate of Māori.  More precisely, for every one percentage point increase 
in the local female unemployment rate the probability of a young women being inactive 
increases by one percentage point.  Although there may be an endogeneity issue in the 
sense that an inactive young woman will increase her local female unemployment rate, 
results indicate the chances of being inactive are greater for young women when there is 
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low demand for female labour.  Given that Māori tend to live in labour markets with a 
higher female unemployment rate means some of ethnic difference in inactivity rates 
can be explained by differences in labour market conditions faced by Māori and Pākehā. 
On the other hand, for every one percentage point increase in the local male 
unemployment rate the probability of young women combining both employment and 
education increases by one percentage point.  Perhaps this suggests that areas with 
lower demand for men‟s labour generate uncertainty regarding men‟s employment 
stability.  As such, young women who study may also take up some form of 
employment to provide economic stability to the household.  Without further analysis 
on partnered women as a subset this cannot be established 
Consistent with the first model, which studied the simple choice of working versus not 
working, the level of neighbourhood deprivation also seems to be influential on the 
activity status of young women.  Particularly, when all other factors are controlled for, 
living in the least deprived areas reduces the chance of being inactive for young women, 
as well increasing the likelihood that young women will be studying, with or without 
being employed as well.  As household income is controlled for, it is rather surprising 
that young women living in a deprivation one area are three percentage points less likely 
to be just employed than those young women live in a deprivation five area.  Instead, 
young women living in a deprivation one or two area are more likely to be studying 
with or without combining employment. 
On the opposite side of the deprivation spectrum, there are again findings to suggest 
there may be some adverse neighbour effects occurring, although migration selection 
bias cannot be ruled out.  That is, women who are prone to inactivity move into higher 
deprived areas because of the lower housing cost associated with these areas.  However 
given the age group under consideration, it is not unreasonable to believe that younger 
women have greater constraints (such as financial) preventing them from migrating as 
opposed to older women.  Therefore by studying younger women the size of the 
potential migration bias should be reduced.  
Results show that the more deprived an area is, the greater the probability that young 
women will be inactive all other things being equal.  For example, young women living 
in a deprivation six area are one percentage point more likely to be inactive, while the 
corresponding figure for deprivation eight and ten areas are two and five percentage 
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points respectively.  Findings also show that living in these areas reduces the likelihood 
of young women being employed, with or without combining studying. 
The multiple levels of geographical influence examined in this thesis had not been 
attempted in past New Zealand literature.  Furthermore, only one researcher has 
attempted to examine the employment and education choices of young women.  For 
both of these reasons comparisons with previous research are difficult.  While Maani 
(2000) found no evidence to suggest the local female unemployment rate influenced 
young women‟s probability of being in either employment or study, this thesis has 
found some evidence to suggest that demand for female labour influence the chances of 
a young women being inactive.   
This thesis contributes to our understanding of young women‟s employment and 
education participation by highlighting that not only is the demand for labour important, 
but also other geographical effects influencing the supply of time to employment and 
education are significant too.  In particular, the level of metropolitan influence depicted 
by settlement type and neighbourhood effects resulting through the level of 
neighbourhood deprivation have been found to influence the employment and education 
choices of young women.  In terms of settlement type, I can only presume that 
geographically differences in educational opportunities, childcare services and 
governmental services can explain the pattern identified above.  For the level of 
deprivation, again I can only theorise that social isolation and exclusion, a lack of 
transportation infrastructure and exposure to negative social characteristics compound 
to generate the results above.  Nonetheless, for the first time, some of the theories of 
geographical influence put forward by Hanson and Pratt (1988), and Houston (2005) 
have been quantified for young women in particular. 
Summary 
To summarise, young Māori women are more likely than Pākehā women to live in 
household structures generating domestic responsibilities.  With a few exceptions these 
domestic responsibilities also tend to increase the probability of young women neither 
working nor studying.  Not only are these domestic responsibilities associated with 
inactivity, but there is also evidence suggesting that domestic responsibilities are also 
associated, in varying degrees, with changes in young women being in each of the three 
productive activity statuses. 
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I also find evidence to support the argument that geography can also be important in 
their employment and education decision making.  In particular, living in less urban and 
more rural areas, more deprived areas, and areas with higher female unemployment 
rates all increase the chances that young women will be economically inactive.  
Unfortunately, in this case there are two restrictions placed on the interpretation of these 
results.  Firstly, the cause of these effects cannot be determined, and secondly some of 
the geographical effects may be overstated due to a possible selection bias.  
Nonetheless, given that Māori are generally more likely to live in these areas, it can be 
concluded that geographical difference between Māori and Pākehā can partially explain 
the ethnic difference in the activity statuses of young women.   
Model III with Activity Status as Dependent Variable and Including Māori 
Interaction Variables 
The previous section identified the effect each explanatory variable had on the 
probability of being in each of the activity states for all young women regardless of 
ethnicity.  Essentially by grouping both Pākehā and Māori women together, the results 
indicated the size of the average affect for young women as a group.  However, it is 
possible that, for a variety of reasons, the size of the effect for particular factors is 
greater for one of the ethnicities.  In this section, Model III will explore the second 
hypothesis - that these household responsibilities negatively affect young Māori 
women‟s chances of activity more than their Pākehā counterparts.   
Model III repeats the second model where the probability of a young women being in 
one of the activity status is dependent on her ethnicity, age, individual characteristics, 
socioeconomic status, household composition, unpaid work activities and geography.  
Except now the dummy variable for Māori is multiplied with all other variables to 
develop a series of Māori interactions terms.  While Model II indicated the effect that 
certain explanatory variables had on the probability of young women being in each 
activity status, Model III will essentially show whether the effect for Māori is greater or 
less than the effect for Pākehā when these various domestic and other contextual 
conditions apply. 
Full stepwise results for Model III are presented in Table A.4 in Appendix 17.  Marginal 
effects and robust standard errors are calculated for each explanatory variable, as well 
the Māori interaction variables which are denoted by the suffix „Mao‟.  Again due to the 
 135 
size of this table, condensed results for relevant variables are provided within the text.  
Table 6.4 below extracts the last column for each activity status from the full results to 
provide results pertaining to individual characteristics.  The first column under each 
activity status represents the standard explanatory variable that has been used in the 
previous two models, whereas the second column of each activity status represents the 
Māori interaction.  A statistically significant result under the standard column represents 
the relationship between that independent and dependent variable for young Pākehā 
women.  If there is a significant effect under the Māori interaction column, then there is 
an additional effect of being Māori and having the characteristics identified by that 
particular variable, over and above the effect for Pākehā.  In essence, it summarises 
whether the effect of each factors for Māori is greater or less than the effect for Pākehā.  
In general terms, Table A.4 in Appendix 17 and the summarised results presented below 
show that very few Māori interaction terms reach statistical significance.  This indicates 
that Māori are just as sensitive to Pākehā when presented with certain characteristics or 
circumstances. 
One exception to this pattern is the result for qualification on inactivity.  They suggests 
that young Pākehā women who hold at least year 11 qualifications are 21.2 percentage 
points less likely to be inactive than young Pākehā women who do not have that 
minimum qualification, all else equal.  However, the Māori interaction terms suggests 
that the decrease in the probability of being inactive is 4.6 percentage points less than 
that for Pākehā.  Therefore, young Māori women possessing at least year 11 
qualifications are 16.6 (i.e. 21.2 – 4.6) percentage points less likely to be inactive than 
young Māori women not holding that minimum level of education.  The inference 
drawn here is that the positive effect education has on young women undertaking 
productive activity (i.e. education and/or employment) is less for Māori.   
There are a couple of possible reasons for this variation.  Firstly, it may be the case that 
on average of those women who gain year 11 qualification, young Māori women have 
lower grades than Pākehā, therefore resulting in Māori women being less attractive than 
Pākehā to potential employers.  Secondly, it may also be the case that Pākehā are, on 
average, more likely to continue their education past year 11 while Māori might be 
more likely to cease studying after gaining year 11.  This would again make Pākehā 
women more attractive to potential employers due to their higher level of qualifications. 
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Table 6.4: 
Estimated Multinomial Logistic Marginal Effects on Probability of Activity Status Outcome for Individual Characteristics with Māori Interactions 
  1)Employment Only 2) Employment And Studying 3) Studying Only 4) Inactive 
  Standard Māori 
Interaction 
Standard Māori 
Interaction 
Standard Māori 
Interaction 
Standard Māori 
Interaction 
Individual Characteristics         
 school_edu -0.053 0.034 0.187 -0.036 0.078 -0.044 -0.212 0.046 
  (0.010)** (0.008)** (0.007)** (0.009)** (0.007)** (0.007)** (0.004)** (0.005)** 
 immigrant -0.055 0.062 -0.008 -0.008 0.031 -0.024 0.032 -0.030 
  (0.009)** (0.014)** (0.004) (0.013) (0.003)** (0.013) (0.004)** (0.011)** 
 iwi 0.001 -0.036 0.001 0.014 0.003 0.026 -0.005 -0.004 
  (0.007) (0.013)** (0.009) (0.012) (0.010) (0.014) (0.008) (0.009) 
 mancestry 0.028 -0.085 -0.028 0.083 -0.026 0.068 0.027 -0.065 
  (0.006)** (0.016)** (0.008)** (0.019)** (0.008)** (0.015)** (0.006)** (0.011)** 
Observations 178776 178776 178776 178776 178776 178776 178776 178776 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 5% 
** significant at 1% 
Notes: Full regression results in Appendix 17 
Source:  New Zealand Census of Population and Dwellings 2001 
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Again, the reason for the inclusion of the Māori interaction terms is to provide evidence 
to validate or rescind the hypotheses that, not only do young Māori women face greater 
domestic responsibilities than Pākehā, but these responsibilities have a greater negative 
effect on the participation in employment and education of Māori. 
Household Composition and Unpaid Work Activities 
Findings from Table 6.5 below show there are very few Māori interaction variables 
reaching statistical significance, indicating there is not a particularly great difference 
between the effect that each factor has on Pākehā and Māori probability of being in each 
of the four activity status.  There are a few exceptions however.  One of particular 
importance is the role that having pre-school aged child has on the probability of being 
inactive.  If a young Pākehā woman has a child of her own aged under five, then her 
chances of neither working nor studying is 39 percentage points higher than an 
equivalent Pākehā woman who does not have a child aged under five.  However, if a 
young women is Māori then the increase in the probability of being inactive is much 
lower at 30.3 percentage points (i.e. 39 – 8.7).  This is contrary to expectations and 
perhaps indicates that young Māori women are able to free up time for employment 
and/or education by passing some childcare responsibilities onto other household 
members. 
Again there is an additional effect on the probability of being inactive for each 
additional child aged under five.  For young Pākehā women, each additional child after 
the first increases her likelihood of being inactive by 4 percentage points, however the 
results for Māori interaction does not reach significance.  Therefore Pākehā and Māori 
are just as sensitive as each other for each additional child aged under five. 
As with children aged under five, Māori seem to be less sensitive when they have one 
school aged child.  While young Pākehā women are four percentage points more likely 
to be inactive if they have one school aged children, young Māori women are less than 
one percentage point more likely.  There is however, no further effect for each 
additional school aged children for both Pākehā and Māori. 
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Table 6.5: 
Estimated Multinomial Logistic Marginal Effects on Probability of Activity Status Outcome for Household Composition with Māori Interactions 
  1)Employment Only 2) Employment And Studying 3) Studying Only 4) Inactive 
  Standard Māori 
Interaction 
Standard Māori 
Interaction 
Standard Māori 
Interaction 
Standard Māori 
Interaction 
Household Composition         
 kidu5own -0.165 -0.006 -0.194 0.088 -0.031 0.005 0.390 -0.087 
  (0.021)** (0.020) (0.009)** (0.025)** (0.015)* (0.014) (0.010)** (0.009)** 
 ownkidu5 -0.040 -0.003 -0.029 0.015 0.007 0.009 0.062 -0.021 
  (0.016)* (0.022) (0.018) (0.029) (0.018) (0.018) (0.010)** (0.011) 
 kid516own -0.027 -0.010 -0.059 0.070 0.044 -0.029 0.041 -0.032 
  (0.024) (0.022) (0.017)** (0.025)** (0.024) (0.025) (0.011)** (0.015)* 
 ownkid5_16 0.037 -0.002 0.010 -0.033 -0.023 0.035 -0.024 -0.000 
  (0.045) (0.048) (0.038) (0.044) (0.032) (0.040) (0.035) (0.037) 
 elderly 0.022 -0.022 -0.032 -0.042 -0.033 0.070 0.042 -0.006 
  (0.015) (0.018) (0.011)** (0.028) (0.012)** (0.015)** (0.007)** (0.011) 
 numelderly 0.013 -0.003 -0.015 0.036 -0.024 -0.020 0.026 -0.014 
  (0.030) (0.056) (0.023) (0.054) (0.022) (0.033) (0.026) (0.035) 
 dacc 0.028 -0.039 -0.003 0.006 -0.031 0.039 0.006 -0.007 
  (0.011)* (0.019)* (0.007) (0.012) (0.009)** (0.014)** (0.008) (0.013) 
 nacc -0.040 0.004 -0.015 0.025 0.021 0.026 0.035 -0.055 
  (0.041) (0.063) (0.027) (0.053) (0.030) (0.047) (0.027) (0.047) 
 ddpb 0.047 -0.033 -0.027 0.005 -0.030 0.035 0.009 -0.008 
  (0.009)** (0.015)* (0.006)** (0.011) (0.006)** (0.010)** (0.005) (0.007) 
 ndpb 0.058 -0.073 -0.057 0.049 -0.042 0.045 0.041 -0.021 
  (0.048) (0.054) (0.040) (0.050) (0.035) (0.041) (0.030) (0.031) 
 dinvsick 0.006 0.007 -0.038 0.017 -0.016 -0.004 0.047 -0.020 
  (0.012) (0.018) (0.006)** (0.015) (0.008)* (0.010) (0.005)** (0.007)** 
 ninvsick 0.007 -0.055 -0.041 0.066 0.004 0.006 0.030 -0.017 
  (0.017) (0.025)* (0.015)** (0.021)** (0.015) (0.019) (0.010)** (0.013) 
 dunemp -0.018 -0.010 -0.026 -0.003 0.000 0.022 0.043 -0.009 
  (0.005)** (0.010) (0.005)** (0.009) (0.006) (0.006)** (0.005)** (0.007) 
 nunemp 0.007 -0.010 -0.008 0.008 -0.011 0.015 0.012 -0.013 
  (0.010) (0.014) (0.006) (0.013) (0.008) (0.010) (0.006)* (0.007) 
 kidu5oth 0.062 -0.036 -0.070 0.034 -0.062 0.033 0.071 -0.031 
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  (0.014)** (0.015)* (0.009)** (0.013)** (0.013)** (0.016)* (0.006)** (0.010)** 
 othkidu5 0.044 -0.049 -0.018 0.037 -0.048 0.032 0.021 -0.020 
  (0.022)* (0.026) (0.013) (0.020) (0.016)** (0.017) (0.010)* (0.013) 
 kid516oth 0.048 -0.021 0.011 -0.005 -0.052 0.022 -0.006 0.004 
  (0.008)** (0.013) (0.003)** (0.011) (0.008)** (0.007)** (0.005) (0.008) 
 othkid5_16 0.069 -0.047 -0.009 0.018 -0.050 0.031 -0.009 -0.002 
  (0.009)** (0.007)** (0.003)** (0.006)** (0.008)** (0.005)** (0.004)* (0.004) 
 bth_prnt 
Base Base Base Base Base Base Base Base 
  
 no_spse_no_prnt 0.038 -0.033 -0.026 0.013 0.049 -0.019 -0.062 0.040 
  (0.016)* (0.017)* (0.008)** (0.012) (0.017)** (0.013) (0.008)** (0.009)** 
 spse_only 0.165 0.018 -0.038 0.024 -0.083 -0.031 -0.043 -0.010 
  (0.011)** (0.012) (0.006)** (0.013) (0.014)** (0.013)* (0.008)** (0.010) 
 one_prnt 0.025 -0.016 -0.017 -0.003 -0.001 0.007 -0.008 0.012 
  (0.009)** (0.009) (0.004)** (0.007) (0.010) (0.009) (0.005) (0.006) 
 oneprnt_spse 0.166 -0.019 -0.078 0.010 -0.098 0.010 0.011 -0.002 
  (0.016)** (0.020) (0.019)** (0.029) (0.019)** (0.035) (0.010) (0.018) 
 two_prnt_spse 0.157 -0.070 -0.105 0.057 -0.116 0.048 0.063 -0.035 
  (0.013)** (0.019)** (0.015)** (0.026)* (0.024)** (0.038) (0.018)** (0.013)** 
 nperson -0.038 0.026 0.013 -0.021 0.032 -0.021 -0.008 0.015 
  (0.007)** (0.006)** (0.002)** (0.005)** (0.007)** (0.004)** (0.004)* (0.004)** 
Observations 178776 178776 178776 178776 178776 178776 178776 178776 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 5% 
** significant at 1% 
Notes: Full regression results in Appendix 17 
Source:  New Zealand Census of Population and Dwellings 2001 
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Overall results show that Pākehā are generally more sensitive than Māori to the 
presence of their own children.  This is consistent with Harris (1992) who found that 
when there was a child aged either under five or aged between five and nine then 
Pākehā women were more likely to be out of the labour force than Māori. 
In terms of other household member‟s children, results show that Māori and Pākehā 
have different sensitivities when living with one other household member‟s child aged 
under five.  While the presence of one child increases young Pākehā women‟s chance of 
being inactive by seven percentage points, the corresponding figure for Māori is only 
four percentage points.  Māori also seem to be less sensitive in relation to undertaking 
study.  In particular, Pākehā women are seven percentage points less likely to combine 
employment and study, and six percentage points less likely to undertake study without 
employment.  However, for Māori the reduction in participation rates are much less at 
3.6 and 2.9 percentage points respectively. 
It is interesting to note that the presence of an elderly person, a person receiving regular 
ACC payments, or a person receiving the DPB in a young Pākehā women‟s household 
all reduce their chances of studying without combining employment.  However, the 
corresponding results for the Māori interaction effects show that young Māori women 
are actually slightly more likely to be studying without paid employment.  Again, the 
cause of this pattern is unclear.  However it provides further evidence suggesting Māori 
are less sensitive to household composition factors than their Pākehā counterparts.  This 
is again highlighted by the fact that Pākehā women are 4.7 percentage points more 
likely to be inactive when there is one household member on the invalid or sickness 
benefit.  Comparatively for young Māori women there is only a 2.7 percentage point 
increase in their probability of being inactive. 
In relation to undertaking unpaid work activities, there is no evidence to suggest that 
caring for a child within the household has any additional effect for Māori in terms of 
how they combine employment and/or education.  Caring for a non-household member 
child however has a small Māori interaction effect.  Although young Pākehā women 
who provide childcare for a non-household member are just as likely to be undertaking 
each of the four activity statuses as a young Pākehā women who does not provide that 
childcare, if a young women is Māori then is she is 2.5 percentage points more likely to 
study without any employment.  Without further information it is hard to conclude the 
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reason for this result.  It is possible that the time pressures relating to the childcare of a 
non-household member is not as great as the time pressure when caring for a child 
within a household.  
Finally, young Pākehā women who undertake volunteer work are actually three 
percentage points less likely to be inactive.  For Māori women the reduction in the 
probability of being inactive is 2.5 percentage points higher than it is for Pākehā.  This 
again seems to contradict the competing time-use theory.  However having said that, 
participation in volunteer work may help young women build stronger social capital 
through bigger and broader networks as Shirley et al. (2001) found.  These networks 
may, in turn, assist young women in locating and being offered educational and 
employment opportunities.  Undertaking volunteer work may also be indicative of a 
young women‟s motivation.  Because she is willing to provide some of her time to 
unpaid volunteer work she could be perceived as being motivated to engage in 
economically productive activities such as employment and education. 
In sum, there is little evidence to suggest that domestic responsibilities significantly 
affect young Māori women‟s employment and education choices more than Pākehā.  In 
fact, in terms of the probability of being inactive, if there is any difference at all it seems 
that the negative effect of domestic duties is less severe for Māori than Pākehā. 
Geography 
As with domestic responsibilities, results from Table 6.6 suggest there are few instances 
where geographical factors have a greater effect on Māori as opposed to Pākehā.  For 
example, in terms of the local female unemployment rate there is no greater effect for 
Māori, in comparison to Pākehā, of living in an area where the female unemployment 
rate is higher.  This is in contrast to Winkelmann and Winkelmann (1997) who found 
that Māori were more sensitive to the local unemployment rate and were therefore more 
likely to be out of the labour force when the unemployment rate was higher than their 
non-Māori counterparts. 
However in terms of settlement type, this model highlights an interesting trend 
regarding young women living in independent urban communities.  According to the 
results of Model II, women living in independent urban areas were more likely to be 
employed only, and less likely to be studying, with or without employment.  A selective 
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migration effect has been suggested in this thesis to cause more educational able young 
women to move to the main centres to seek tertiary education.  The results in Model III 
suggest that this migration effect is not as great for Māori.   
Even though Māori women living in independent urban areas are more likely to be 
employed without combining studying than Māori women living in the main urban 
centres, the size of this increase is not as great for young Pākehā women.  More 
precisely Pākehā women living in an independent urban community are 11.6 percentage 
points more likely to be employed only than equivalent Pākehā women living in the 
main urban areas.  However, for Māori the corresponding figure is 8.5 percentage 
points.  Furthermore, the decline in the probability of studying (with or without 
employment) is less for Māori in independent urban communities than it is for young 
Pākehā women.  Although the Māori interaction term for studying only does not quite 
reach statistical significance at the 5% level.  In relation to the other settlement types 
there is no Māori interaction effect illustrating that Māori are as sensitive to settlement 
types as Pākehā. 
Overall, if this inference is correct, then there are at least two reasons behind the reduce 
migration effect for Māori.  Firstly, Māori women are less educational able and 
therefore fewer need to migrate to the main centres to seek higher education.  Secondly, 
young Māori women are less geographically mobile because of financial or familial 
constraints.   
Finally, the findings relating to the effect of living in a deprived neighbourhood give the 
clearest evidence of an ethnic difference in the participation of young women and their 
geographical context.  Specifically, young Pākehā women living in derivation nine and 
ten areas are six and eight percentage points less likely to be employed only, compared 
to young Pākehā women living in a deprivation five area, all other thing being equal.  
However for Māori, these negative results are all but eliminated, meaning that Māori 
women in deprivation nine and ten areas are just as likely to be just employed as Māori 
women in deprivation five areas.   
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Table 6.6: 
Estimated Multinomial Logistic Marginal Effects on Probability of Activity Status Outcome for Geography with Māori Interactions 
  1)Employment Only 2) Employment And Studying 3) Studying Only 4) Inactive 
  Standard Māori 
Interaction 
Standard Māori 
Interaction 
Standard Māori 
Interaction 
Standard Māori 
Interaction 
Geography         
 depone -0.023 0.001 0.007 0.039 0.024 -0.009 -0.008 -0.031 
  (0.007)** (0.019) (0.006) (0.019)* (0.010)* (0.014) (0.007) (0.013)* 
 deptwo -0.010 0.014 0.008 0.035 0.005 -0.008 -0.004 -0.041 
  (0.009) (0.020) (0.006) (0.021) (0.006) (0.018) (0.006) (0.012)** 
 depthree 0.004 0.020 0.003 0.003 -0.003 -0.014 -0.003 -0.010 
  (0.006) (0.012) (0.003) (0.015) (0.008) (0.015) (0.006) (0.014) 
 depfour 0.004 0.015 0.001 0.018 0.003 -0.018 -0.007 -0.015 
  (0.004) (0.014) (0.008) (0.023) (0.009) (0.014) (0.005) (0.012) 
 depfive 
Base Base Base Base Base Base Base Base 
  
 depsix -0.012 0.024 -0.008 0.001 0.011 -0.021 0.009 -0.004 
  (0.009) (0.014) (0.004)* (0.015) (0.007) (0.012) (0.005) (0.012) 
 depseven -0.024 0.037 -0.006 -0.006 0.015 -0.025 0.016 -0.007 
  (0.007)** (0.017)* (0.006) (0.018) (0.006)* (0.012)* (0.005)** (0.013) 
 depeight -0.033 0.029 -0.002 -0.013 0.023 -0.023 0.012 0.007 
  (0.015)* (0.019) (0.005) (0.015) (0.015) (0.018) (0.006)* (0.012) 
 depnine -0.063 0.070 -0.020 -0.036 0.060 -0.041 0.023 0.006 
  (0.029)* (0.026)** (0.008)* (0.014)** (0.027)* (0.022) (0.006)** (0.008) 
 depten -0.076 0.077 -0.037 -0.034 0.066 -0.044 0.047 0.001 
  (0.015)** (0.018)** (0.008)** (0.015)* (0.013)** (0.012)** (0.006)** (0.010) 
 main_urban 
Base Base Base Base Base Base Base Base 
  
 satellite_urban 0.075 -0.024 -0.049 0.015 -0.043 0.016 0.017 -0.007 
  (0.013)** (0.025) (0.006)** (0.015) (0.008)** (0.018) (0.007)* (0.009) 
 independ_urban 0.116 -0.031 -0.041 0.035 -0.081 0.023 0.005 -0.027 
  (0.015)** (0.015)* (0.009)** (0.012)** (0.011)** (0.012) (0.008) (0.008)** 
 rural_high_influ 0.036 -0.042 -0.047 0.025 -0.008 0.022 0.019 -0.005 
  (0.013)** (0.036) (0.009)** (0.027) (0.010) (0.031) (0.007)** (0.014) 
 rural_mod_influ 0.051 0.008 -0.054 -0.022 -0.019 0.008 0.022 0.005 
 1
4
4
 
  (0.012)** (0.025) (0.008)** (0.021) (0.008)* (0.018) (0.008)** (0.014) 
 rural_low_influ 0.064 -0.007 -0.063 0.023 -0.038 -0.002 0.037 -0.014 
  (0.015)** (0.017) (0.010)** (0.016) (0.012)** (0.015) (0.009)** (0.011) 
 high_rural 0.125 -0.049 -0.079 -0.003 -0.069 0.068 0.024 -0.016 
  (0.027)** (0.034) (0.012)** (0.032) (0.025)** (0.026)** (0.013) (0.023) 
 loc_ns -0.103 -0.372 0.000 -0.230 -0.215 0.786 0.317 -0.184 
  (0.109) (0.166)* (0.064) (0.212) (0.034)** (0.000) (0.036)** (0.039)** 
 male_une58 -0.010 0.001 0.008 -0.000 0.005 0.001 -0.003 -0.003 
  (0.009) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) 
 fem_une58 -0.011 0.003 -0.004 -0.001 0.010 -0.006 0.005 0.004 
  (0.010) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.010) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) 
 maoripct 0.005 -0.004 -0.002 0.000 -0.004 0.004 0.001 -0.000 
  (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.000)** (0.000) (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.000)* (0.000) 
Observations 178776 178776 178776 178776 178776 178776 178776 178776 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 5% 
** significant at 1% 
Notes: Full regression results in Appendix 17 
Source:  New Zealand Census of Population and Dwellings 2001 
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In terms of combining employment and education, living in highly deprived areas tends 
to adversely affect the probability of combining both education and employment for 
Māori more than it does for Pākehā women.  In particular, Pākehā women living in 
deprivation nine and tens areas are two and four percentage points respectively less 
likely to combine both employment and education than Pākehā women living in 
deprivation five areas.  However for Māori, the corresponding reduction in probability 
is six and seven percentage points.  Finally, there is no additional Māori effect of living 
in highly deprived area on the probability of being inactive.  
Separating out ethnic effects in this section has highlighted a number of importance 
dissimilarities between Māori and Pākehā that has not been identified in any previous 
New Zealand research.  Most geographical factors produced statistically insignificant 
effects for the Māori interaction terms indicating that, while Māori are more susceptible 
to geographical effects influencing their employment and education choices, both Māori 
and Pākehā women react relatively similar when faced with these geographical effects.  
One point of interest however, is that the potential migration effects presented in Model 
II was not as great for Māori as it was for Pākehā.  Financial constraints or closer family 
ties may underpin this apparent immobility of young Māori women to migrate into main 
centres in order to undertake tertiary education.  Unfortunately, without further 
information it is impossible to determine whether this is indeed the case. 
Summary 
Overall the results produced by the three models presents a new and more 
comprehensive picture of determents of young women‟s employment and educational 
participation.  Firstly, the role of geography has been studied in extensively more detail 
than in past research, and subsequently results shows that settlement type, labour market 
conditions and level of deprivation all have significant effects on the probability of 
young women‟s participation in employment and education.   
While the demand for labour has long been studied, less emphasis has been placed on 
how geography can influence the supply of labour.  In particular this thesis has followed 
Souness and Morrison (2006) by studying urban and rural living at a more differentiated 
level. Like them, this research has found not only a difference in employment (and 
educational) outcomes at an urban versus rural level, but also at an intra-urban and 
intra-rural level.  As the demand for labour is controlled for, the results suggest these 
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influences are generated through the supply side of labour.  In particular, geographical 
variations in infrastructure, educational opportunities and government service are most 
likely to underpin these relationships. 
At yet another level, strong correlations have been found between the level of 
neighbourhood deprivation and employment (and educational) outcomes.  In particular 
young women living in more deprived areas are more likely to have adverse 
employment and educational outcomes.  Again as the demand for supply is controlled, it 
is assumed that social isolation and exclusion, exposure to poorer social characteristics 
and reduced transportation infrastructure may underline this relationship.  Furthermore, 
as Māori are more likely to live in more deprived areas, the difference in level of 
exposure can partially explain their lower participation in employment and education. 
Like the role of geography, the role of domestic responsibilities has also been studied in 
much greater detail than in past New Zealand literature.  In essence, there seems to be 
considerable domestic demands on the time of young women, and these pressures 
adversely affect their likelihood of participation in employment and/or education.  
While prior literature has frequently addressed the diminishing effect that having 
children has on a women‟s likelihood of working, these results suggest that household 
responsibilities also come in a variety of other forms.  In particular, the presence of 
elderly, sick, ill, disabled and other people‟s children are all associated with lower 
participation in employment and education for young women.   
It is these findings in which this thesis contributes most to our understanding of labour 
supply determinants for young women.  Results have shown that some of the ethnic 
difference in young Māori and Pākehā women employment and education choices can 
be explained through Māori women having greater exposure to domestic 
responsibilities.  There is no evidence to suggest that young Māori women are more 
sensitive to domestic responsibilities.  If anything, the reverse is true. 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
Although the employment rate of women has steadily increased from 54% in 1997 to 
59% in 2007, there are stark and persistent differences in employment rates between 
Māori and Pākehā women.  The differences are most evident for young (aged 15-24) 
women.  In 2006 for example, 64% of young Pākehā women were employed while the 
corresponding figure for Māori was significantly lower at 45%.  This 19 percentage 
point gap is extremely large by contemporary standards considering the ethnic 
difference in employment rates for women of all ages is only four percentage points.  It 
highlights that young Māori women are one of the least engaged groups in the New 
Zealand labour market. 
Although there is a general awareness of these differences, there has been no systematic 
enquiry into the origins of young Māori women‟s low engagement or its contemporary 
manifestations.  In order to address ethnic variations, this thesis draws on insights from 
two disciplines; from labour economics‟ theory and studies of female labour supply; 
and, from human geography and the role of contextual influences from the household 
through to settlement and local labour market areas. 
This research was undertaken to gauge the influences wider household circumstances in 
which young woman live have on their likelihood of undertaking paid employment.  
While previous studies have identified the individual woman and her family as key 
influences, this thesis extends the context to include the composition of the household, 
community and local labour market area. 
A significant proportion of young women‟s households now contain multiple (related) 
family nuclei.  Therefore it is the household, rather than the family per se, that is the 
primary contextual influence in participation.  The inferred childcare responsibility 
resulting from the presence of children is often quoted as the main factor limiting 
further labour market engagement.  However, geographers such as Hanson and Pratt 
(1988), have argued that there needs to be more careful analysis of intra-household 
structures over and above the presence of children.  For example, if household 
composition is more diverse (in that there are elderly, ill or disabled persons present 
within a household) then there may be more caring responsibilities placed on other 
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household members, particularly the younger women.  Part of this thesis focuses on this 
possibility. 
The second part of this thesis focuses on the role geographical influences play in young 
women‟s labour supply outcomes.  Like household composition above, I again combine 
approaches from the two disciplines.  Labour economists tend to focus on the influence 
local demand for labour has on whether women will work or not.  However, there is less 
focus on other factors relating to an individual‟s surrounding geographical area that may 
influence her supply of labour.  Geographers such as Hanson and Pratt (1988) and 
Houston (2005), argue that social networks, childcare and government services, the time 
and monetary cost of commuting and availability of public transport also influence 
women‟s labour supply.  Again, by combining both perspectives a richer empirical 
analysis results. 
Previous New Zealand female labour supply literature has identified age and 
qualification as two main components contributing to ethnic differences (Alexander & 
Genç, 2005; Harris & Raney, 1991; Poot & Siegers, 1992; Winkelmann & 
Winkelmann, 1997).  Some literature has suggested household composition and 
domestic responsibilities may have an important influence on young women‟s labour 
force participation.  Having pre-school aged children is consistently found to negatively 
affect the likelihood of being in the labour force (Alexander & Genç, 2005; Ross, 1987), 
and there is evidence to suggest that this negative effect of young children is actually 
greater for Pākehā women than it is for Māori (Harris, 1992).   
Other research has found that additional domestic responsibilities may restrict a 
women‟s likelihood of being employed.  Contrary to expectations, Roberts (1999) found 
that participation in unpaid work and labour force participation were positively 
correlated, while Shirley et al. (2001) found that participating in volunteer work assisted 
women in securing future employment through the strengthening of social networks.  
On the other hand, Carson, Krsinich and Kell (2001) found that individuals who were 
not employed undertook more hours of unpaid work on average.  Even though the 
literature provides conflicting results it is clear that there are considerable pressures 
within a woman‟s household that affect her likelihood of being employed.  However, 
until my study no one has suggested that these domestic constraints may cause greater 
influence on young Māori women. 
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Researchers have found evidence that influences beyond the household may be 
important.  Brooks (1991) established that women‟s labour force participation was 
lower in areas where the unemployment rate was higher, while Winkelmann and 
Winkelmann (1997) found that the negative effect of higher local unemployment rates 
was greater for Māori than Pākehā.  Finally, Souness (2005) not only found that the 
likelihood of women being in the labour force varied across the population size of urban 
areas, but also across rural areas with varying levels of influence from the major 
metropolitan centres. 
With this previous research in mind, three main hypotheses are advanced and tested to 
help explain why young Māori women have consistently lower employment rates than 
their Pākehā counterparts.  Firstly, that young Māori women have greater exposure to 
those household characteristics generating domestic responsibilities which in turn 
compete with time in paid employment.  Secondly, when Māori and Pākehā are both 
faced with these responsibilities, there is a stronger negative effect on the likelihood of a 
young Māori women securing employment relative to her Pākehā counterparts.  Finally, 
that young Māori women are more likely to live in geographical areas that adversely 
affect their likelihood of being employed compared to their Pākehā equivalents.  Given 
Māori propensity to work in low skilled jobs where there are few job alternatives, I also 
predict that Māori are more sensitive to local differences in labour demand. 
To test these hypotheses I utilise unit records from the 2001 New Zealand Census of 
Population and Dwellings.  These allow me to represent the composition and structure 
of households, as well as the geographic context of young women and their assumed 
influence on the supply and demand of labour in considerably more detail than previous 
studies have.   
Three statistical models are employed.  The first measures the effect that each 
explanatory variable has on the probability of a young women being employed.  My 
results suggest that young women are faced with substantial domestic responsibilities 
resulting from the care of children, ill and elderly household members, which in turn 
reduces their probability of working on the open or wage market.  While I have 
determined that they are correlated with each other, unfortunately I cannot determine 
whether domestic responsibilities cause lower employment levels, or whether young 
women undertake domestic responsibilities are a result of not working. 
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Not only do my results show that the number and age of a young women‟s children are 
important, as noted in previous research (Alexander & Genç, 2005; Ross, 1987), but 
also that other household members‟ children, resident elderly and household members 
with health issues are important in constraining a young women‟s chances of paid work. 
To my knowledge, these relationships have not been identified in previous New Zealand 
literature. 
Tabulations also show that Māori are more likely than their Pākehā counterparts to be 
exposed to domestic responsibilities associated with a decline in the likelihood of young 
women (regardless of ethnicity) working.  Given Māori are more exposed to adverse 
household compositions that lower the probability of employment, it is these contextual 
differences that can partially explain their lower employment rates. 
In terms of the geographical influences, I find that young women living in areas with 
higher female unemployment rates are less likely to be employed when other factors are 
controlled for.  This is entirely consistent with previous New Zealand research such as 
Brooks (1991) and Winkelmann and Winkelmann (1997) who found that the demand 
for labour is negatively correlated with labour force participation.  On the supply side, I 
find that young women living in smaller urban centres are slightly more likely to be 
employed than young women in the main urban areas when differences in other factors 
are controlled for.  Young women in rural areas are generally less likely to be 
employed.  Again, this is consistent with previous research such as Souness and 
Morrison (2006).   
What has not been examined in previous research is the influence of living in highly 
deprived areas.  When other factors are controlled for, young women living in more 
deprived areas are less likely to be employed.  Although I cannot rule out any migration 
bias (young women prone to being out of employment moving away from the main 
centres or into more deprived area to save on housing costs) the findings for settlement 
type and neighbourhood deprivation indicate that the propensity to supply labour is 
influenced by a number geographical characteristics.  These characteristics may include; 
a lack of childcare and government services, the time and monetary cost of commuting, 
the availability of public transport, as well as exposure to adverse social characteristics 
and social isolation.  As young Māori women are more likely to live in geographical 
areas that are negatively correlated with the probability of being employed, it is these 
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differences which help explain the ethnic dissimilarities in employment rates between 
young Māori and Pākehā women. 
As well as whether they undertake employment or not, young women have the 
additional option of participating in education.  This means they are faced with a four 
way choice.  In order to explore what decisions are made, I employed a second model 
with a four state dependent variable; employed only, employed and studying, studying 
only, and inactive (which represents neither employed nor studying). 
The results of applying this multinomial model provides further evidence that domestic 
responsibilities associated with certain household compositions affect the choice of 
activities.  The results are most clear for the inactive status than for the other three 
employment and education combinations.  Whereas the binary „employed versus not 
employed‟ model suggests that domestic duties reduce the probability of young women 
being employed, the multinomial model shows that domestic duties do not simply 
reduce the chances of employment, but actually increase the likelihood young women 
will be inactive.  Again, domestic duties include the care of young women‟s children, 
other household members‟ children, elderly residents and sick or disabled household 
members. 
To my knowledge only one other author has studied the choice of employment and 
education for young women.  While Maani (2000) found that the number of siblings 
was associated with an increase in the likelihood of being either employed or studying 
as opposed to not employed, my results relating to the number of other people‟s 
children suggests there is a positive effect on employment only, but a negative effect on 
studying with or without combining employment. 
Unfortunately, while the correlations are clear the direction of causation remains open 
to question.  I am unable to unequivocally conclude that domestic duties cause 
inactivity.  In some instances at least, it is possible that women may undertake an 
additional range of domestic duties as a result of not working (and studying).  This latter 
point means that if there is an inability or unwillingness to compete in the labour 
market, young women may either undertake a greater proportion of the domestic 
responsibilities within the household, or they may be encouraged to continue living in a 
domestic labour intensive household with their family instead of flatting or living with a 
partner.  Nonetheless, part of the ethnic difference in the inactivity rate of young women 
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can be explained by domestic responsibilities as Māori are significantly more likely to 
be exposed to these time constraints. 
I also find evidence to support the argument that the location of residence is also 
important in young women‟s choice of activity.  In particular, the chances that young 
women will be inactive are increased when living in less urban and more rural areas, 
more deprived areas, and areas with a higher female unemployment rates.  Furthermore, 
given that Māori are generally more likely to live in these areas, I conclude that 
geographical difference between Māori and Pākehā can partially explain the ethnic 
difference in the activity status of young women.   
Once more, there is an issue of causation in these results.  Either a young women‟s 
geographical context may cause her to be inactive, or inactive women may move into 
certain areas due to their labour market position.  Both possibilities are plausible.  
However, the latter argument may have less credence when examining older women 
given the age of subjects under consideration.  In particular, younger women living with 
their parents may have little input into their location of residence as they simply follow 
their parents‟ movement.  Whether young women are working or not may actually 
result from their parent‟s choice of location and not from their own choice of location.  
Furthermore, this age group may also have a reduced ability – for financial and family 
ties reasons – to migrate to other locations.  Again, this seems to reduce the possibility 
that location is a function of a young women‟s activity status as opposed to the 
alternative scenario. 
Although it is hard to compare results with previous research because dependent 
variables differ, my findings relating to local labour demand are contrary to that found 
by Maani (2000).  Perhaps due to her relatively small sample size, she found no 
statistically significant relationship between the local female unemployment rate and the 
likelihood of young women being either employed or studying as opposed to not 
working.  Although Winkelmann and Winkelmann (1997) specifically studied labour 
force participation, I find no evidence to support their findings that Māori are more 
sensitive to a higher local unemployment rate than Pākehā. 
In terms of settlement type, I build on findings established by Souness (2005) who also 
used the 2001 census.  I find that engagement in paid employment while studying is 
higher in non-main centre areas.  However, the results presented here also show that 
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young women in main centres are more likely to be studying, with or without 
combining employment.  This suggests there is a possible migration effect where more 
educationally able young women move into the main centres to undertake tertiary 
education.  Interestingly, while this perceived migration effect is significant for Pākehā 
women, the pattern for young Māori women is minimal.  Perhaps this indicates the 
relative inability (resource constraints) or unwillingness (family ties) of Māori to move 
away from their hometown. 
Finally, once I control for available demographic and socio-economic characteristics 
there is little evidence to suggest that domestic responsibilities significantly affect the 
employment and education choices of Māori more than Pākehā.  In fact if anything, in 
terms of the probability of being inactive, it seems that the negative effect of domestic 
duties is less severe for Māori than for Pākehā.  The positive effect on the probability of 
being inactive from having young children is actually less for Māori than Pākehā, a 
result similar to Harris‟ (1992) findings regarding labour force participation.  In terms 
of my original hypothesis, these results suggest there is no disproportionate response by 
Māori to their household composition accounting for their reduced labour supply.  
Rather it is the greater presence of those household composition factors constraining 
their participation in employment and education.  Pākehā and Māori do not noticeably 
differ in the nature of their response to domestic demand for young women‟s labour.  
However, Māori are more likely to have young children (their own and others‟), ill, 
disabled and elderly residents living in their household.   
For the first time, this research has established that various forms of household 
responsibilities, in addition to the presence of children, are negatively correlated with 
the likelihood of young women participating in employment and education, although 
cause and effect cannot be determined.  Namely, do domestic responsibilities cause 
inactivity, or is it the case that because a young woman is inactive she undertakes a 
greater proportion of the domestic responsibilities. 
These results have implications for the development of government policies aiming to 
raise the participation of young women in employment and education, as well as 
smoothing transitions from compulsory education to employment, training, or further 
study.  To be effective, these policies need to be sensitive to area specifics to account 
for the differences in the geographical context influencing the supply and demand for 
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labour, and also access to educational opportunities.  Policies focusing solely on 
reducing the burden a young woman‟s child places on her time are likely to 
underestimate the true nature of a young woman‟s domestic responsibilities.  In 
particular, policies will need to take a more holistic approach by developing initiatives 
to reduce the burden that elderly, ill or disabled household members, as well as other 
people‟s children, might place on young women‟s ability to devote time to other 
productive activities such as employment and education. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1 
Summary of Female Labour Supply Models 
This section presents an overview of past literature that develops an economic 
framework in which to study female labour supply decisions.  It accompanies Chapter 3 
which outlined past research examining determinants of female labour supply and 
ethnic differences in female labour supply outcomes. However, because of the technical 
nature of the section it has been relegated to the appendix for more advanced economic 
readers.  This appendix is broken into three main sections.  The first two sections 
empathise how previous academics have theorised labour supply in an individual and 
household context.  The third and final section summarises various theories relating to 
constraints faced by individuals when allocating their time between paid employment 
and other activities.  The purpose of this appendix is to provide a thorough outline as to 
how previous academics have developed economic models of labour supply.  In 
essence, by summarising their work, the development of a more comprehensive labour 
supply model pertaining to young women can be developed in Chapter 5. 
Individual Labour Supply 
The vast majority of labour supply research uses the basic neo-classical choice 
framework of leisure versus paid work, which has been adopted from Hicks‟ (1946) 
consumer behaviour model and replicated to fit the family (Killingsworth & Heckman, 
1986) or the individual (Berndt, 1991; Borjas, 2005; Killingsworth, 1983) as an 
economic unit.    
This basic model suggests an individual allocates their time in two ways; paid work or 
leisure.  An individual gains utility (satisfaction) either through the consumption of 
goods (C), or through non-work (leisure) activities (L).  To generate the income 
necessary to consume goods they can work H hours for a constant hourly wage, W.  
More formally; 
),( LCfU .         (A.1) 
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However, the level of utility attainable by individuals is limited by the amount of goods 
that can be purchased, which is in turn restricted by the income of the individual (Y) 
generated from labour and non-labour sources.  Non-labour income (V) is a fixed 
amount of income an individual receives irrespective of whether they work or not.  
Therefore the budget constraint is given by; 
VWHY .         (A.2) 
A second constraint exists whereby the sum of continuous hours spent on paid work and 
leisure together cannot exceed the number of hours in a week (i.e. T=168), so that;  
HLT .         (A.3) 
This implies, when an individual works more hours, then this must be at the expense of 
leisure hours, and vice versa.   
A rational female wanting to maximise her utility will choose the allocation of 
consumption and leisure where the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and 
consumption equals her real wage rate. 
This basic neoclassical model allows for both interior and corner solutions, so the 
analysis of labour force participation is simply whether a female maximises her utility at 
an interior position or not.  In Figure A.1 for example, panel (a) shows an individual 
choosing L* hours of leisure per week, and subsequently works 168-L* hours per week 
in paid employment.  Combining the number of hours worked in the week (H) with the 
wage rate (W) and the value of non-labour income (V) allows the individual to consume 
C* worth of market goods in this particular situation. 
Alternatively, panel (b) shows a corner solution where the individual spends all of their 
time, in a given week, on leisure.  The value of L* must equal 168 hours in this case and 
this indicates zero hours is dedicated to paid work.  The value of market goods 
consumed is now entirely dependent on any non-labour income this particular 
individual has as there is no wage income when they are at the corner solution. 
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Figure A.1:  
An Interior and Corner Solution to the Labour-Leisure Decision 
 
The movement from a corner to interior solution can be explained through the 
relationship between the market wage and the reservation wage of each individual.  The 
market wage is the wage each young woman will receive if she is employed, while the 
reservation wage is the minimum wage a young woman requires to accept an 
employment offer.  Therefore, a young woman will only be employed, and being at an 
interior solution, if her market wage is at least as great as her reservation wage.  
Alternatively, if the market wage is lower than the reservation wage then she will not 
work and will be at the corner solution.  Changes to either the reservation wage or the 
market wage will influence whether a young women chooses to work or not.  An 
increase in the market wage and/or a decrease in their reservation wage may entice 
women originally not working to seek employment.  While a decrease in the market 
wage, and/or an increase in their reservation wage, may result in working women 
dropping out of employment. 
In terms of the number of hours of paid employment undertaken, Heckman (1974b) 
proposes that hours worked is dependent on the proportionality between an individual‟s 
market and reservation wage.  Assuming that, a) there is entire freedom in the choice of 
hours worked by each worker, b) the market wages is un-reliant on hours worked, and 
c) that the reservation wage increases with hours worked, then hours worked depends 
on the difference between the reservation wage and market wage.  That is, the greater 
the difference the more hours that will be worked. 
C*, V V 
Hours of 
Leisure (L) 
L* L* 
Hours of 
Leisure (L) 
C* 
U 
Slope= -W 
Slope= -W 
(a) Interior Solution (b) Corner Solution 
Consumption 
(C) 
 Consumption 
(C) 
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While the above neoclassical model is frequently used in labour supply literature, it has 
often been extended or modified to better suit the requirements of a particular author.  
Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) for example, offer a slight adaptation by choosing to 
include a variable representing all observed and unobserved consumer attributes (δ) in 
the utility function so that; 
),,( LCfU .        (A.4) 
Both (A.1) and (A.4) propose that an individual devotes their entire time to either paid 
employment or leisure, where leisure is defined as any time not assigned to paid work.  
If an individual was located at a corner solution this would assume all of their time is 
spent on leisure, when actually there may be considerable time spent on other activities 
which are un-marketable but still productive and time consuming. 
Gronau (1977) relaxes this definition of leisure in a one person household to propose 
that leisure can instead be divided into two separate categories describing home 
production and home consumption time. Home production is work done at home in 
which it is possible to hire another person to undertake the task instead. Home 
consumption on the other hand, refers to leisure, or more precisely, time not spent in 
home production and market work.   
Goods in this one person household model can now be either produced in the market 
place (C), or in the home (P) through home production time (D).  Instead of focusing on 
maximising utility, Gronau (1977) states that a person will maximise the quantity of 
commodities (Z) as a function of goods and services (X) and leisure (L). Therefore; 
),( LXZZ  where,        (A.5) 
PCX .         (A.6) 
Maximising the quantity of goods is again subject to the budget constraint given in 
(A.3), however market consumption (C) has now replaces income (Y).  Furthermore, 
hours spent in paid work in (A.2) can now be divided into hours spent in paid work (H) 
and home production hours (D) in the time constraint, so that; 
HDLT .        (A.7) 
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If there is perfect substitutability between market and home production then all goods 
can be obtained through either producing goods themselves at home, or by an individual 
selling their time to the labour market at particular wage rate, and then purchasing 
goods on the basis of their labour and non-labour income.  The benefit of this type of 
analysis is that the effect of changes in the wage rate, non-labour income, the monetary 
and time cost of employment, production and consumption technology has on the 
allocation of time to different tasks can be considered. 
Home and market production is also addressed in Burda, Hamermesh and Weil‟s (2006) 
discussion paper.  Instead of modelling labour supply in the typically neoclassical 
fashion, a separable utility function of consumption and leisure is developed. Therefore; 
2)1(
2
1
)( LfPCfU ,      (A.8) 
where home (P) and market production (C) are assumed to be perfect substitutes, time is 
normalise to 1, and λ is greater than zero and represents the sensitivity of leisure to the 
wage rate.  Furthermore, if the net tax rate (Φ) is proportional then the consumption of 
market goods that can be purchased is defined by; 
VWHC )1( .        (A.9) 
Consumption of home production goods is dependent on the efficiency by which home 
goods can be produced using home hours (P).  The efficiency of home production (φ) is 
assumed to decline as home production hours increase to represent the unpleasantness 
of devoting a high number of hours to home production.  Therefore; 
1)(DInP .        (A.10) 
These models suggest labour supply in the market is positively affected by the net wage 
and the insensitivity of utility to work, and negatively affected by greater efficiency in 
home production.  Home production on the other hand is positively and negatively 
influenced by efficiency at home and the net wage rate respectively.  Therefore, if 
young Māori women have a lower earning potential or are more efficient in home 
production than their Pākehā counterpart, this may explain their lower participation in 
employment.  
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Hamermesh and Donald (2007) presents a similar analysis of labour supply 
distinguishing between market work and household production.  Instead of including 
consumption on market goods in the utility function as previous authors have done, 
their model incorporates wage (W) and non-wage (V) income into one utility function.  
What makes this model unique is the assumption that there are fixed costs of market 
work, so dedicating a number of hours worked (H) to be strictly greater than zero, 
results in reduced efficiency of time used in leisure (L) and home production (D).  It is 
essential to note that this fixed cost is not in monetary terms, but rather the choice to 
work reduces the optimal utilisation of remaining time available to the individual.   
In a formal model, there now stand two separate utility functions describing the two 
possible states; non-employment where hours worked equals zero, and employment 
when hours worked must be greater than zero.  Work causes a loss in efficiency in home 
production and leisure as people worry and agonise about work during non-market 
activities. Therefore; 
     LD   LDWHVf
                                          LDVf
U
LDLD
      
,1,0),,,,(
),,,(
 
0, if
0, if
H
H
 (A.11) 
where µD and µL represent the fraction of utility lost for home production and leisure 
respectively, by working even a small amount of hours. 
The fixed cost (F) of working in term of utility can therefore be expressed by; 
0),,(),,( LDVULDVUF LD .      (A.12) 
An individual will choose to participate in the labour force only if utility is maximised 
when hours worked are positive.  For this to be the case utility received from working 
must compensate the individual sufficiently to cover the fixed cost of employment.  
Hence; 
FLDVULDWHVU LD ),,(),,,( .     (A.13) 
While this model presents issues in measuring the fixed non-monetary cost of working, 
it provides a new insight into the allocation of time as individuals move from a corner 
solution to a small interior solution due to the psychological nature of employment. 
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Oi (1976) provided an alternative method of modelling the utility cost of employment.  
He suggests that including a variable in the utility function indicating the disutility 
acquired from commuting to work is appropriate since workers do not enjoy commuting 
to work.  The assumption is made that all jobs are located in the central business district 
(CBD) so all workers must travel some distance to work, which in turn suggests this 
utility cost is essentially a cost of employment.  Furthermore, assuming housing costs 
will be lower, and commuting time will be higher with increasing distance from the 
CBD, results in a trade off between consumption on housing and the utility cost of 
commuting until utility is maximised.  While this model helps explain the intra-city 
variations in people‟s choice of residential location and labour supply, it does not help 
to explain inter-city differences in labour supply or differences between urban and rural 
locations. 
Household Labour Supply 
The previous section looked at labour supply models in a one person household setting.  
However, most women do not live alone and the labour supply behaviour of partnered 
women depends on her household context.  For example, a women‟s decision to supply 
labour to the market may be influenced by her partner‟s choices.  Many of the previous 
models discussed can be extended to take into account other household members.   
Returning again to Killingsworth and Heckman‟s (1986) initial one person static model 
as depicted by (A.1), this initial framework for examining labour supply can be easily 
developed into a multiple person labour supply decision.  In Killingsworth and 
Heckman‟s (1986) family labour supply model, the family‟s utility (Uf) is determined 
by choosing the level of leisure for each family member (Lm) and the consumption of 
consumer goods (Cf) for the entire family so that; 
),,,( 1 fmf CLLfU  .       (A.14) 
Again the family acts as if it was a single economic unit by choosing the allocation 
maximising the family‟s utility subject to the budget constraint, which is determined by 
price of goods (ρ), and the exogenous total family non-labour income (R), and wages 
(W) and hours worked (H) of all family members (m).  Therefore; 
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m
mmff HWVC .       (A.15) 
Consequently, not only is each individual‟s entire income pooled into a family account 
but the amount of time spent on leisure by each individual may not necessarily be equal 
among all family members.  Instead, as a unit, the family will choose leisure time for 
each member based on each member‟s market wage and their marginal rate of 
substitution between market work and leisure. 
The main issue surrounding family labour supply models is the way in which 
households are influenced by the income of each other member.  Equation (A.15) 
assumed the family members pool their income and make decisions based on 
maximising the families‟ utility.  Leuthold (1968) instead presents a situation where a 
two-person family acts more like a classic duopoly market.  Income from the two family 
members are pooled together to form the budget constraint, as in (A.15), however each 
member (m) acts to maximise his or her own utility, so that; 
),( fmm CLfU .        (A.16) 
Like the duopoly goods market model, each person‟s actions affect the other person‟s 
utility through the resulting change in the level of family consumption and the value of 
their pooled income.  The subsequent action and reaction process by the women and her 
partner will continue until their unique equilibrium is reached.  That is, where both 
members have maximised their utility given the choice made by the other member.  In 
this model it is assumed all family consumption is spent on public goods that both 
member gain utility from, so by definition, there is no private consumption of goods for 
either member. 
McElroy and Horney (1981) however, propose there is consumption of private and 
public goods within a two person setting.  They use the Nash (1950) bargaining system 
to describe how married couples determine each member‟s leisure, and the consumption 
of private and public goods.  As usual, each member faces a budget constraint similar to 
(A.15) when income is entirely pooled.  An individual‟s (i) utility is assumed to be 
dependent not only on their own private consumption (C) and leisure, but also public 
consumption (x), and private consumption and leisure of their spouse‟s (j).  More 
formally; 
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),,,( , xLLCCfU jijii .       (A.17) 
This means there is no longer complete selfishness in their behaviour choices but rather 
there is altruistic behaviour occurring within the family. 
The idea behind the Nash model is that because each person‟s utility is dependent on 
other people‟s allocation of time and incomes are pooled, there needs to be bargaining 
between the two members to find the unique allocation of time for both members. 
Deciding on the overall choice of time allocation and consumption will depend on the 
relative size of each member‟s bargaining power.  In this instance, the member who has 
the least to lose, in utility terms, if the partnership is dissolved will have greater 
bargaining power, and subsequently will allocate their time in ways more favourable to 
them.  For example, if a woman had a low earnings capacity then she would be more 
likely to suffer substantially by separating from a higher earning partner.  Consequently, 
the current allocation will tend to favour the husband as they both recognise it is in the 
wife‟s best interest to keep the partnership going. 
A similar bargaining model was developed and discussed in Manser and Brown‟s 
(1980) paper on household decision-making.  Their Nash family labour supply model 
again uses the comparable outcome in the two marital statuses (partnered and single) to 
understand the allocation of time and resource within a family.  However, the utility 
function for each individual does not include the consumption and leisure choice of 
their partner.  Instead, a compassion and love variable (α), which is derived from the 
partner‟s personal characteristics, is included to predict the utility that an individual 
receives from being partnered.  Therefore, when combined with private and public 
consumption and leisure, an individual‟s utility function when partnered is now; 
),,,( jiiii xLCfU .       (A.18) 
Obviously, this inclusion is important because it suggests people form relationships not 
just based on the monetary rewards.  It is possible for α to be negative meaning there is 
disutility from being partnered or married.  The possible disutility of marriage may not 
in fact lead to divorce if the disutility is small enough to still keep utility when marriage 
greater than utility when single.  As in McElroy and Horney‟s (1981) model, the 
allocation of time and resources is dependent on the relative strengths of each 
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individual‟s threat points, and on the pooled income budget constraint as represented by 
equation (A.15). 
Alternate forms of bargaining are also produced in McElroy and Horney‟s (1981) 
publication to show the allocation of time and resources within a family context.  The 
first case is where one member acts as a dictator who rationally chooses to maximise 
their utility subject to the pooled income budget constraint, and must ensure that the 
other member‟s utility is at least as great as when they are single.  The second includes 
an interdependent utility function implying that each member‟s utility function includes 
the utility of the second member. 
While these family labour supply models each vary in some way, the general insight 
taken from all of them is that allocation of time by each spouse is dependent on their 
relative bargaining power within the family.  That is, the spouse that is set to lose the 
least from a separation or divorce will have a household time allocation that reflects 
their preferences more strongly.  This is examined empirical by Gray (1998) for 
example, who studied female labour supply in response to divorce law changes which 
shifted the relative bargaining power of females within a marriage. 
As illustrated above, many individual labour supply models can be extended into a 
household setting with relative ease.  This also happens to be the case for time 
allocation models, and in actual fact, many family time allocation were developed prior 
to their individual versions.  Most notably Becker‟s (1965) allocation of time model was 
one of the pioneering publications relaxing the assumption that leisure is simply 
classified as time not spent in paid employment.  The model proposes that neither time 
nor consumer goods are consumed by themselves, but rather individuals must combine 
time with a particular good or goods to receive utility.  For example, an individual 
might combine 30 minutes of time with a stereo to produce „entertainment‟ with the true 
cost of the activity being the cost of the good(s) as well as the amount of time spent on 
it.  Household utility is not determined by consumption and leisure, but by a function 
describing the utility (U) gained from each activity (ε), where each activity combines 
time (T) and a vector of consumer goods (χ).  Thus; 
),( TfU .        (A.19) 
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The household not only produces activities utilising time and goods, but also chooses 
the combination of activities maximising the following function, 
),( 1 UUfU f  .        (A.20) 
Time constraints are based on the sum of time spent on all activities in addition to any 
time spent in paid employment by the household.  Whereas the income constraint is 
reliant on non-labour income and labour income generated through the wages and hours 
worked by the household as a unit.   
Maximising the utility function with respect to the revised version of the budget 
constraint means the optimal allocation of production between two activities occurs 
when the ratio of the true cost of the two activities, including time, is equal to the 
marginal rate of substitution between them.  This type of model provides a way of 
examining non-paid activities and behaviour in more depth than the consumption-
leisure models, while also allowing for wages and consumer prices to influence the 
combination of consumption, leisure and hours worked.  Another advantage of the 
Becker model is that it allows us to observe how time saving devices and other factors 
affect labour supply of women. 
A slightly modified version of Becker‟s (1965) time allocation model is presented by 
Bowen and Finegan (1969).  Here, consumption is divided into three types; the quantity 
of d market goods (Cd), the hours of leisure (L) by family member m, and the quantity 
of q home goods (Pq), which typically involves work, but are produced and consumed 
within the home.  The utility function for the household is therefore defined by; 
),;,,;,;,,;,,( ,1111111 qmmdmqdf DDHHLLPPCCfU  , (A.21) 
where Hdm is the number of hours devoted to the d labour market occupation by the m 
family member, and Dqm is the number of hours devoted to the q home production 
operation by the m family member. 
Obviously a time constraint applies, so the sum of time devoted toward each market 
occupation, each home production activity, and the hours of leisure must be equal to 24 
hours in the day for each family member.  Assuming no saving occurs, the budget 
constraint for a family is equal to the family‟s income from market earnings plus any 
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other non-labour family income.  Therefore, family spending (given by the sum of price 
and quantity of each market good) cannot exceed the family‟s income as defined by 
(A.15). 
Gronau (1973) has also recognised that categorising time into „work‟ and „leisure‟ may 
neglect the importance of production undertaken within the household.  The author 
develops a two person intra-family time allocation model separating home production 
from the classic „leisure‟ time-use.  The two person family wishes to maximise their 
family‟s utility which is a function of family consumption of market goods (C) and 
home goods (P), as well as leisure (L) of each person (i).  More formally; 
),,,( 21 LLPCfU f .       (A.22) 
This differs from Bowen and Finegan‟s (1969) time allocation model by not assuming 
there is any direct utility gained from time spent in market work or home production, 
but rather only indirect utility gained through the consumption of those goods. 
Incidentally, Wales and Woodland (1977) provide a similar analysis but instead of using 
home production as the third time allocation category they use domestic housework and 
treat it as exogenously given. 
As usual, the family is restricted in maximising the family‟s utility by their time 
constraints that states time spent in market work (H), home production (D) and leisure 
for both individual cannot exceed the time available to them (T); 
iii LDHT  for i = 1,2.      (A.23) 
Furthermore, restrictions are also made on their spending ability, so in a one period 
situation with no borrowings or savings, expenditure on market goods and inputs into 
home production cannot exceed family income (Y).  Family income is gathered through 
the wage (W), hours worked in the labour market (H) of each family member, and any 
non-labour income (V); 
iiff HWVY .        (A.24) 
The final constraints placed on the family in this model relate to the production of home 
goods.  It states that the sum of home goods produced by each member is determined by 
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the time allocated to home production (D) and the market inputs (Q) used in the process 
by each member.  Therefore; 
),( iiii DQPP  for i = 1,2      (A.25) 
and; 
21 PPP .         (A.26) 
The wife‟s decision to enter the labour market can be determined by two potential 
situations.  Firstly, a female will trade leisure for market work when the potential wage 
received when working is greater than the value placed on her leisure time.  Secondly, a 
female will trade home production time for market work when her productivity in the 
household is less than her productively in the market place.  However, the final 
allocation of time within a family between the three states will ultimately depend on 
each household member‟s comparative advantage, which in turn is influenced by the 
efficiency of home production and the market wage for each member.  In instances 
where husbands have higher wages than their spouses, and where the wives are more 
efficient in home production, husbands tend to participate in market work while wives 
will utilise more of their time in home production.   
The aggregation of time into only two or three categories poses one key problem as 
Kooreman and Kapteyn (1987) point out.  They suggest that such stringent aggregation 
disguises shifts in time allocation occurring within each category.  This indicates that 
not only is there substitution of time between each category (say between home 
production and leisure) but also substitution of time between components within each 
category (say between voluntary community work and childcare within the home 
production category).  To help better understand and examine these two very different 
types of substitution of time, their two person household maximises the family‟s utility 
function depending on every single disaggregated activity undertaken by each family 
member. 
Many of the above multi-person models have typically examined household labour 
supply decisions undertaken by two people; the husband and wife.  However, the recent 
rise of teenagers‟ employment during their schooling years has not been accompanied 
by an expansion of household labour supply models incorporating a third member.  One 
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exception is Skoufias‟s (1993) study of rural based families consisting of a child, and a 
male and female adult, and their allocation of time between market work, schooling, 
home production and leisure.   Assuming that only the child can attend school, then the 
household utility function describes the household‟s preferences and technology, and is 
given by; 
),,,,,,,,,( §QILLLDDDfU aajiajif .      (A.27) 
Therefore, utility is dependent on time spent on home production (D) and leisure (L) of 
the first adult individual (i), their spouse (j), and their child or adolescent (a).  
Furthermore, the child can devote time to human capital investment (I), which is 
typically thought of as schooling.   
This model has been developed primarily in relation to rural families and economies 
where market inputs (Q) and fixed factors (§), such as capital, are needed in home 
production.  As such, both of these, along with individual and family observed and 
unobserved characteristics that influence time allocation (δ) are expressed within the 
utility function.  Including schooling as a further time allocation option alters slightly 
the time constraint in this model so that hours worked (H) in the formal labour market 
can be established by; 
ILDHT ,        (A.28) 
remembering that I=0 for both adults. 
Assuming that income is entirely pooled within the family then; 
VHWHWHWY aajjiif .      (A.29) 
The wage (W) and market hours worked for each of the three family members and any 
non-labour income represents their budget constraints. 
As per usual, the opportunity cost of allocating time to leisure, schooling or home 
production is equal to the wage for each family member.  While the allocation of time 
for each member alters in response to changes in the value of time through the 
substitution effect, it is also conceivable that time allocation for one member can adjust 
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to changes in the value of time for other family members through the comparative 
advantage theory. 
Rosenzweig (1981) has presented a similar model including child employment and 
schooling opportunities in the more neo-classical and developed economy context.  As 
there is less emphasis placed on home production in comparison to Skoufias (1993), 
time can only be allocated between work and leisure for the two adults and work, leisure 
and schooling for the child.  Although it can be easily altered to include multiple 
children, the utility function for a family that contains an individual (i), with their 
spouse (j) and one child (a) is given by; 
),,,,( aajif KLLLCfU .       (A.30) 
K is the level of human capital for the child, which is determined by the cost of 
education and the number of hours dedicated to schooling.  Again, the level of 
attainable utility is subject to the budget constraint presented in equation (A.29) above. 
A similar framework was also used by Rosenzweig in his earlier work (1978) on time 
allocation between family members in developing countries.  Although the theoretical 
model is not developed in this publication, he notes a rise in female‟s wage rate will 
likely result in greater labour supply to the market and less household production.  
Further, there may be a substitution of household time between the mother and child, as 
the child has to pick up the home production duties left behind by the mother‟s 
movement into greater paid work.  Assuming that the child‟s wage rate is lower than the 
mothers, the extra time pressure of household production may cause a decline in paid 
employment and school attendance for the child. 
Budget Constraint Variations 
Up until now the focus of female labour supply has been on models modifying or 
extending the basic neoclassical utility model subject to the budget and time constraint.  
There has been little variation in the budget or time constraints except for those models 
where it was required due to extensions made to the utility function.  This next section 
will focus on literature modifying the budget and/or time constraints in the neoclassical 
model. 
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Previous models have made the assumption that all received income (earned or 
unearned) is disposable income so an individual (or family) faces a linear budget 
constraint.  However, it may be more logical and realistic to incorporate taxes into the 
budget constraint to represent the disincentives taxation creates in the labour supply 
decision.  Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) encompasses all taxes on income into one 
variable that reduces the values of consumption spending available to an individual.  
Consequently, consumption (C) is now derived from gross wages (W), hours worked 
(H), non-labour income (V) and income tax; 
)(YVWHC .        (A.31) 
The term Ω(Y), therefore, represents the value of tax paid on income (Y) less deductions.   
The benefit of the inclusion of a tax function implies that the value of the tax paid can 
easily be modified depending on the structure of the tax system.  For example, a simple 
proportional labour income tax would simply shift the budget constraint inwards 
parallel to the pre-tax budget constraint.  However, this would create a discontinuation 
point between non-participation where non-labour income is not taxed, and participation 
where the first hour of work is taxed.  Other tax schedules may include such tax policies 
as local and central government tax on earned and unearned income, public assistance 
benefits from government and progressive or regression tax programs.  Introducing 
taxes on income causes the linear budget constraint to transform into a kinked line that 
is quasi-concave to the point of origin, with a greater number of progressive marginal 
tax rates resulting in a larger number of kinks in the budget constraint. 
While taxes may reduce consumption, welfare participation will cause consumption to 
increase.  Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) have again developed a model where an 
individual‟s budget constraints is adjusted to take into account the role that welfare 
plays in the labour supply decision.  In this case, an individual maximises the 
neoclassical utility function subject to the budget constraint now including the value of 
benefit receive, b(Y(H)) so that; 
))(( HYbVWHC .       (A.32) 
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The value of the benefit received relates to the structure of the welfare system in place, 
but in the simplest case where each individual receives a guaranteed income (G) from 
the government that is reduced at a rate of γ as earned income (WH) is increased then; 
otherwise.                   0
,0 if         ,
))((
WHGWHG
HYb     (A.33) 
This will again produce a kinked budget line where the government benefit reaches 
zero, assuming there is not a one-for-one reduction in the benefit as earned income 
increases. 
 The authors have also extended the tax and benefit adjusted budget constraint to 
complement the family utility function.  In the two person household model, family 
consumption (C) is reliant on paid work (WH), non-labour income (V), and net transfers 
through the taxes function (Ω) and welfare program benefits (ζ). More formally; 
),,( 22112211 HWHWYVHWHWC .    (A.34) 
Including welfare benefits in the budget constraint led the authors to include a variable 
in the family utility function representing the non-monetary disutility, or stigma, 
attached with receiving a welfare payment.  
Whether it is a one-person or multi-person household labour supply model, 
incorporating taxes and benefits into a female‟s budget constraint can provide an 
important insight into how the subsequent (dis)incentives shape labour supply decisions.  
Other non-government policies, such as the monetary and time cost of employment, can 
also play an important role in the labour supply decision through alternations to the 
budget constraint and hence employment incentives.  For example, Berndt (1991) 
proposes that there may be three types of costs incurred when an individual takes up 
employment.  More specifically, there may be monetary costs of employment, such as 
the cost of commuting, time cost of holding a job, which includes the physical time it 
takes to reach the place of work, and non-monetary costs, such as the frustration of 
traffic congestion or riding on a crowded public transport system.  These costs of 
employment are likely to be fixed over any combination of hours of worked creating a 
greater wedge between an individual‟s market and reservation wage, since higher 
income must be received to cover the cost of holding that particular job. 
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The wedge created will tend to shift the incentive to work in two opposite directions.  
Firstly, a high fixed cost of working will shift an individual to choose not to work at all 
if the payoff from working is not substantial enough.  Secondly, a high cost may cause 
those people who have a taste for work to supply more hours of work, as the cost to be 
paid is fixed no matter how much work done. 
Cogan‟s (1981) work develops a more formal model describing how the fixed cost of 
employment alters the labour supply decisions of individuals.  Instead of employing the 
usual standard utility function and budget constraint to show the optimal position given 
fixed cost of employment, the author applies an expenditure function (E) to show the 
amount of income required to achieve a level of utility when working.  For an 
individual to be in the labour force, this level of utility needs to greater than the utility 
when not working.  The expenditure function is reliant on utility (U) and wage (W), and 
can be written by; 
MVNHWUWE )(),( ,      (A.35) 
where N and M represent the time and monetary fixed cost of employment respectively. 
Not only will a fixed financial cost of employment push the reservation wage of an 
individual upwards, but it will also create a reservation hours of work, showing that the 
number of hours an individual must work to entice them into the labour force.  The 
reservation hour (HS) function can be written by; 
),,( VNMfH S .        (A.36) 
As with the reservation wage, the reservation hours also increase with greater fixed 
monetary cost of employment since a higher number of paid hours is required to 
sufficiently cover the higher monetary cost of that work.  Consider an example where an 
individual moves further away from their place of work.  There is now a higher fixed 
cost of working more than zero hours as a result of having to consume more petrol to 
drive to work.  This in turn causes an individual to raise the minimum number of hours 
enticing them into the labour force as they have to cover the greater fixed cost. 
While greater fixed monetary cost unambiguously increases the reservation hours, the 
effect of an increase in time cost is uncertain.  Higher time cost raises the reservation 
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wage, however it also reduces the amount of leisure demanded at that reservation wage 
because of the substitution effect.  The positive substitution effect on work may be 
partially or fully offset by the decline in available time for work or leisure due to the 
restriction incurred by the time cost of work.  As such, labour supply in term of hours 
worked is given by; 
))(,( NHWMVWfH .      (A.37) 
A similar assessment of the reservation hours and hours worked function can determine 
whether an individual participates in the labour force or not.  More specifically, if the 
labour supply, as given by (A.37), is greater than the reservation hours then the 
individual will choose to work H hours.  Whereas if the reservation hours exceeds the 
labour supply function then hours worked will equal zero, and they will not be part of 
the labour force. 
Cogan (1980) also develops a labour supply model with market entry costs where there 
still exists a monetary and time cost of working.  These costs are still constant no matter 
the level of hours worked but there is now the potential to trade the cost between the 
two types.  Consequently, there exists an exogenous combination of time and monetary 
cost of work representing the minimum cost to an individual of participating in paid 
employment.  For example, an individual may choose to walk to work, which has a high 
time cost but minimal (or zero) monetary cost, or instead they may chose to drive to 
work, which has a lower time cost but much greater monetary cost. 
The formal model suggests income is now reduced by the monetary cost of work (M*); 
*MVWHY ,        (A.38) 
and the time constraints now also includes the time cost of employment (N*) so that; 
*NHLT .        (A.39) 
Because these costs are not fixed and are able to be traded between one and another, 
then there must exist a rate of exchange (z).  Therefore, the overall monetary cost of 
employment is a function of the time cost and the substitutability between the two;  
)*,(* zNfM .        (A.40) 
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Substitution between the time and money cost will continue to occur until the wage rate 
of an individual is equal to the marginal time cost of work. 
In this model, not only can the total cost of employment vary but also the marginal cost 
of employment.  This helps to predicts the allocation of time when total or marginal cost 
of employment changes.  Furthermore, it suggests that when an individual is faced with 
a wage rate increase, they encounter a greater return to reducing the time cost of 
employment.  As such they will substitute away from time intensive activities by 
purchasing relevant substitutes. 
Walter Oi (1976) provides a similar analysis for the cost of employment, however he 
includes a residential location dimension to the model.  Previous models above have 
assumed a fixed residential location so the only way to reduce the time cost of 
employment was to increase the monetary cost of employment by finding a faster but 
more expensive alternative for transportation.  However, Oi‟s model suggests there can 
be a trade-off between the time cost of employment and the residential location of the 
individual.  Specifically, assuming that, a) all jobs are located in the CBD, b) 
commuting time increases with greater distance from the CBD, and c) housing costs are 
lower when further away from the CBD, then the time cost of employment can be 
reduced by moving closer to the CBD thereby increasing spending on housing. 
Again, this model helps to explain the intra-city variations in people‟s choice of 
residential location and labour supply.  However, it does not help explain differences in 
labour supply between two urban areas or differences between urban and rural 
locations.  Here stands an obvious gap in neo-classical labour supply modelling that 
seems not to have been addressed previously. 
Past models pertaining to the cost of employment highlight a potential theoretical 
reason for young Māori women‟s lower participation in paid employment than their 
Pākehā counterparts.  That is, Māori may be more likely to live further away from the 
main labour markets than Pākehā and it is the associated time and monetary cost of 
employment that generates their lower participation.  Overall, from the above models it 
seems geographical location is important in influencing individual labour supply 
outcomes. 
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Summary 
The review of labour supply models started with the basic one period individual neo-
classical labour supply model as represented by (A.1).  Discussions around the degree 
of division of time into aggregated categories, the substitutability of home production 
with market work, the utility cost of employment, and the relationship between market 
wages, reservation wages and hours worked are all presented in a one person setting.  I 
then addressed varying opinions on how resources are (re)distributed within a 
household context, the relative bargaining power of each family member, the allocation 
of time on aggregated and disaggregated activities for each member.  Towards the end 
of this section I looked at the disincentive wage/salary tax and welfare benefits have on 
female labour, as well as time and monetary cost of employment, and how residential 
location can affect the cost of employment and therefore labour supply. 
While this section has raised many issues for researchers replicating or developing 
labour supply models, there seems to two main gaps in labour supply models pertaining 
to the study of ethnic differences in young women‟s labour supply.  Firstly, although 
there has been an attempt to model young people‟s labour supply by including a 
schooling option when they are the child in a family nucleus, there has not been (to my 
knowledge) any research attempting to model young people‟s labour supply when living 
in more complicated household structures.  While there is a growing prevalence in many 
western nations of teenage mothers who live with her own parents, it is somewhat 
surprising that there has not been a single model examining household labour supply 
when there is a three generational family present.  Further still, there is an increasing 
trend towards young couples living with one of the couple‟s parents, yet this has not 
been modelled. 
Secondly, neo-classical labour supply models have also apparently failed to adequately 
address an individual‟s (or family‟s) place of residence in determining labour supply.  
Although, intra-urban residence has been addressed via the cost of employment and 
commuting, neo-classical modelling of urban/rural differences and inter-city differences 
in labour supply appear absent. 
The purpose of including various labour supply models was to provide a basis for 
developing and replicating a labour supply model for young women.  Although the 
review of labour supply models found there has been an attempt to model young 
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people‟s labour supply by including a schooling option when they are the child in a 
family nucleus, this seems to be an overly simplistic summary of young people‟s labour 
supply decision.  As discussed previously, there seems to be little modelling of more 
complicated household living arrangements, such as multiple related family nucleuses 
or three generational family households, in which young women are likely to be located.  
Moreover, apart from the cost of employment and commuting little attempt has been 
made to include an individual‟s spatial environment into their labour supply decision.  
Again, these results present two areas where there is a need for more attention so gaps 
in the literature can be filled.  
These two gaps in labour supply modelling also represent two possible issues that may 
arise when developing a framework for studying labour supply differences in young 
Māori and Pākehā women.  Coincidently, the lack of attention paid to modelling 
complicated household compositions and geographical influences by academics are the 
precise areas which this thesis focuses upon by examining ethnic differences in 
employment rates of young women. 
 
 
 186
Appendix 2 
Individual 2001 Census of Population and Dwellings Questionnaire 
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Source: Statistics New Zealand 
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Appendix 3 
Dwelling 2001 Census of Population and Dwellings Questionnaire 
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Source: Statistics New Zealand 
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Appendix 4 
 
Table A.1: 
Data Variables and Descriptions 
 Variable Name  Definition Pākehā Māori 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES   
 empstat 1 If a young woman is employed either full-time or part-time 
0 Otherwise 
63.5% 
36.5% 
41.5% 
58.5% 
 actstat 1 If a young woman is employed and does not study 
2 If a young woman is employed and also studies 
3 If a young woman is studying and does not work 
4 If a young woman is not employed and not studying 
37.8% 
25.8% 
21.0% 
15.4% 
29.1% 
12.4% 
20.4% 
38.1% 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES    
Ethnicity    
 maori 1 If a young woman identified themselves as of Māori ethnicity 
0 Otherwise 
0.0% 
100.0% 
100.0% 
0.0% 
Age    
 age15 1 If a young woman is aged 15 
0 Otherwise 
11.2% 
88.8% 
11.9% 
88.1% 
 age16 1 If a young woman is aged 16 
0 Otherwise 
10.7% 
89.3% 
11.2% 
88.8% 
 age17 1 If a young woman is aged 17 
0 Otherwise 
10.2% 
89.8% 
10.3% 
89.7% 
 age18 1 If a young woman is aged 18 
0 Otherwise 
9.1% 
90.9% 
9.4% 
90.6% 
 age19 1 If a young woman is aged 19 
0 Otherwise 
9.9% 
90.1% 
9.7% 
90.3% 
 age20 1 If a young woman is aged 20 
0 Otherwise 
10.2% 
89.8% 
9.8% 
90.2% 
 age21 1 If a young woman is aged 21 
0 Otherwise 
9.9% 
90.1% 
9.7% 
90.3% 
 age22 1 If a young woman is aged 22 
0 Otherwise 
9.7% 
90.3% 
9.6% 
90.4% 
 age23 1 If a young woman is aged 23 
0 Otherwise 
9.6% 
90.4% 
9.3% 
90.7% 
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 age24 1 If a young woman is aged 24 
0 Otherwise 
9.6% 
90.4% 
9.1% 
90.9% 
Individual Characteristics    
 school_edu 1 If a young woman has at least year 11 school qualification 
0 Otherwise 
79.8% 
20.2% 
59.1% 
40.9% 
 immigrant 1 If a young woman was born overseas 
0 Otherwise 
9.6% 
90.4% 
2.8% 
97.2% 
 iwi 1 If a young woman identifies as having an iwi affiliation 
0 Otherwise  
2.7% 
97.3% 
81.7% 
18.3% 
 mancestry 1 If a young woman identifies as being a descendent of Māori 
0 Otherwise 
5.7% 
94.3% 
94.1% 
5.9% 
Household Composition    
 kidu5own 1 If there is at least one child aged under 5 belonging to a young woman 
0 Otherwise 
8.0% 
92.0% 
22.2% 
77.8% 
 ownkidu5 Number of children aged under 5 belonging to a young woman if kidu5own = 1  = 1.24 
σ = 0.28 
 = 1.37 
σ = 0.37 
 kid516own 1 If there is at least one child aged between 5 and 16 belonging to a young woman 
0 Otherwise 
1.3% 
98.7% 
5.4% 
94.6% 
 ownkid5_16 Number of children aged between 5 and 16 belonging to a young woman if kid516own = 1  = 1.13 
σ = 0.15 
 = 1.21 
σ = 0.28 
 elderly 1 If there is at least one person aged over 65 living in the same household as a young woman 
0 Otherwise 
1.9% 
98.1% 
3.8% 
96.2% 
 numelderly Number of people aged over 65 living in the same household as a young woman if elderly = 1  = 1.14 
σ = 0.15 
 = 1.12 
σ = 0.11 
 dacc 1 If there is at least one person living in the same household as a young woman (excluding the young woman 
herself) receiving Accident Compensation as a source of income 
0 Otherwise 
3.3% 
 
96.7% 
3.6% 
 
96.4% 
 nacc Number of people living in the same household as a young woman (excluding the young woman herself) 
receiving Accident Compensation as a source of income if dacc = 1 
 = 1.04 
σ = 0.05 
 = 1.06 
σ = 0.08 
 ddpb 1 If there is at least one person living in the same household as a young woman (excluding the young woman 
herself) receiving domestic purposes benefit as a source of income 
0 Otherwise 
5.0% 
 
95.0% 
17.2% 
 
82.8% 
 ndpb Number of people living in the same household as a young woman (excluding the young woman herself) 
receiving domestic purposes benefit as a source of income if ddpb = 1 
 = 1.03 
σ = 0.03 
 = 1.08 
σ = 0.08 
 dinvsick 1 If there is at least one person living in the same household as a young woman (excluding the young woman 
herself) receiving invalids or sickness benefit as a source of income 
0 Otherwise 
4.2% 
 
95.8% 
9.1% 
 
90.9% 
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 ninvsick Number of people living in the same household as a young woman (excluding the young woman herself) 
receiving invalids or sickness benefit as a source of income if ninvsick = 1 
 = 1.21  
σ = 0.26 
 = 1.24 
σ = 0.25 
 dunemp 1 If there is at least one person living in the same household as a young woman (excluding the young woman 
herself) receiving an unemployment benefit as a source of income 
0 Otherwise 
15.0% 
 
85.0% 
22.2% 
 
77.8% 
 nunemp Number of people living in the same household as a young woman (excluding the young woman herself) 
receiving an unemployment benefit as a source of income if dunemp = 1 
 = 1.24  
σ = 0.28 
 = 1.29  
σ = 0.34 
 kidu5oth 1 If there is at least one child aged under 5 living in the same household as a young woman, but who is not the 
child of that young woman 
0 Otherwise 
3.9% 
 
96.1% 
16.4% 
 
83.6% 
 othkidu5 Number of children aged under 5 living in the same household as a young woman, but who is not the child of that 
young woman if kidu5oth = 1 
 = 1.21 
σ = 0.24 
 = 1.37 
σ = 0.50 
 kid516oth 1 If there is at least one child aged between 5 and 16 living in the same household as a young woman, but who is 
not the child of that young woman 
0 Otherwise 
36.8% 
 
63.2% 
52.9% 
 
47.1% 
 othkid5_16 Number of children aged between 5 and 16 living in the same household as a young woman, but who is not the 
child of that young woman if kid516oth = 1 
 = 1.74 
σ = 0.84 
 = 2.01 
σ = 1.40 
 nperson Number of people living in a young woman‟s household  = 3.64 
σ = 1.39 
 = 4.29 
σ = 2.02 
 bth_prnt 1 If a young woman lives with both her parents but without her spouse 
0 Otherwise 
42.3% 
57.7% 
32.3% 
67.7% 
 no_spse_no_prnt 1 If a young woman does not live with either parent or a spouse 
0 Otherwise 
25.5% 
74.5% 
25.8% 
74.2% 
 spse_only 1 If a young woman lives with her spouse but not either of her parents 
0 Otherwise 
17.1% 
82.9% 
14.4% 
85.6% 
 one_prnt 1 If a young woman lives with one of her parents but without a spouse 
0 Otherwise 
13.1% 
86.9% 
23.0% 
77.0% 
 oneprnt_spse 1 If a young woman lives with one of her parents and her spouse 
0 Otherwise 
0.9% 
99.1% 
2.3% 
97.7% 
 two_prnt_spse 1 If a young woman lives with both of her parents and her spouse 
0 Otherwise 
1.2% 
98.8% 
2.3% 
97.7% 
Socioeconomic Status    
 own_house 1 If a young woman‟s dwelling is owned by a member of that household 
0 Otherwise 
54.0% 
46.0% 
37.5% 
62.5% 
 hhincome Equivalised Household income  = 29,544  
σ = 18,568  
 = 20,493  
σ = 15,641  
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 investment 1 If a young woman receives interest, dividends, rent or other investment as a source of income 
0 Otherwise 
9.7% 
90.3% 
2.1% 
97.9% 
 stud_allow 1 If a young woman receives a student allowance as a source of income 
0 Otherwise 
10.2% 
89.8% 
8.2% 
91.8% 
 oth_govt_benefit 1 If a young woman receives other government benefits or income support excluding ACC, superannuation, 
unemployment benefit, sickness benefit, DPB, invalids benefit or student allowance 
0 Otherwise 
2.9% 
 
97.1% 
5.3% 
 
94.7% 
 oth_source 1 If a young woman receives other sources of income, including support payment from non-household  
members, but excluding wages, salary, investments and government benefits and income support 
0 Otherwise 
4.3% 
 
95.7% 
2.7% 
 
97.3% 
Geography    
 main_urban 1 If a young woman lives in a main urban area 
0 Otherwise 
76.8% 
23.2% 
69.9% 
30.1% 
 satellite_urban 1 If a young woman lives in a satellite urban community 
0 Otherwise 
2.6% 
97.4% 
3.7% 
96.3% 
 independ_urban 1 If a young woman lives in an independent urban community 
0 Otherwise 
9.6% 
90.4% 
15.2% 
84.8% 
 rural_high_influ 1 If a young woman lives in a rural area with high urban influence 
0 Otherwise 
2.5% 
97.5% 
1.6% 
98.4% 
 rural_mod_influ 1 If a young woman lives in a rural area with moderate urban influence 
0 Otherwise 
2.7% 
97.3% 
2.2% 
97.8% 
 rural_low_influ 1 If a young woman lives in a rural area with low urban influence 
0 Otherwise 
4.9% 
95.1% 
6.2% 
93.8% 
 high_high 1 If a young woman lives in a highly rural or remote area 
0 Otherwise 
1.0% 
99.0% 
1.2% 
98.8% 
 loc_ns 1 If a young woman‟s location is not stated 
0 Otherwise 
0.0% 
100.0% 
0.1% 
99.9% 
 fem_une58 Female unemployment rate in a young woman‟s local labour market area  = 7.71 
σ = 1.72 
 = 8.72 
σ = 2.11 
 male_une58 Male unemployment rate in a young woman‟s local labour market area  = 6.86 
σ = 1.52 
 = 7.62  
σ = 2.08 
 maoripct Percent of a young woman‟s area unit population that identify as being Māori  = 11.14 
σ = 9.12  
 = 23.49  
σ = 17.15 
 depone 1 If a young woman lives in a deprivation one area 
0 Otherwise 
11.4% 
88.6% 
2.6% 
97.4% 
 deptwo 1 If a young woman lives in a deprivation two area 
0 Otherwise 
11.2% 
88.8% 
3.7% 
96.3% 
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 depthree 1 If a young woman lives in a deprivation three area 
0 Otherwise 
11.2% 
88.8% 
4.5% 
95.5% 
 depfour 1 If a young woman lives in a deprivation four area 
0 Otherwise 
10.7% 
89.3% 
5.4% 
94.6% 
 depfive 1 If a young woman lives in a deprivation five area 
0 Otherwise 
10.6% 
89.4% 
6.8% 
93.2% 
 depsix 1 If a young woman lives in a deprivation six area 
0 Otherwise 
10.5% 
89.5% 
8.9% 
91.1% 
 depseven 1 If a young woman lives in a deprivation seven area 
0 Otherwise 
10.1% 
89.9% 
10.6% 
89.4% 
 depeight 1 If a young woman lives in a deprivation eight area 
0 Otherwise 
10.1% 
89.9% 
13.6% 
86.4% 
 depnine 1 If a young woman lives in a deprivation nine area 
0 Otherwise 
9.4% 
90.6% 
18.7% 
81.3% 
 depten 1 If a young woman lives in a deprivation ten area 
0 Otherwise 
4.9% 
95.1% 
25.1% 
74.9% 
Studying Status    
 ftstudy 1 If a young woman attends or studies for 20 hours or more per week at school or any other place 
0 Otherwise 
37.8% 
62.2% 
26.3% 
73.7% 
 ptstudy 1 If a young woman attends or studies for less than 20 hours per week at school or any other place 
0 Otherwise 
9.1% 
90.9% 
6.5% 
93.5% 
Unpaid Work Activities    
 housework 1 If a young woman undertakes unpaid household work, cooking, repairs, gardening etc in her household 
0 Otherwise 
82.9% 
17.1% 
81.1% 
18.9% 
 volunteer 1 If a young woman does other help or volunteer work for or through an organisation, group or Marae for no pay 
0 Otherwise 
9.3% 
90.7% 
14.0% 
86.9% 
 chldcare_mem 1 If a young woman looks after a child who also lives in the same household as the young woman 
0 Otherwise 
21.5% 
78.5% 
44.4% 
55.6% 
 chldcare_nonmem 1 If a young woman looks after a child who does not live in the same household as the young woman 
0 Otherwise 
18.9% 
81.1% 
28.7% 
71.3% 
 sick_mem 1 If a young woman looks after someone who is ill or has a disability, and also lives in the same household as the 
young woman 
0 Otherwise 
4.3% 
 
95.7% 
9.4% 
 
90.6% 
 sick_nonmem 1 If a young woman helps someone who is ill or has a disability and who does not live in the same household as 
the young woman 
0 Otherwise 
4.8% 
 
95.2% 
7.5% 
 
92.5% 
Source: New Zealand Census of Population and Dwellings 2001 
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Appendix 5 
Choice of Employment Rate over Labour Force Participation Rate 
Employment is used as the dependent variable instead of labour force participation 
because the definition of unemployed in the census is considerably different from that 
typically used by governmental organisations, such as Work and Income New Zealand 
(WINZ).  The census uses the responses from questions 27, 38, 39 and 40 in the 
individual questionnaire of the census (see Appendix 2) to establish whether an 
individual is unemployed.  Yet this conflicts with the criteria established by WINZ in 
determining eligibility for the unemployment benefit.  More precisely, to receive the 
unemployment benefit an individual must be; 
 actively seeking full-time employment through methods such as searching 
newspapers, contacting employers and making job applications, and  
 available and able to undertake suitable full-time work. 
However there is a considerable variation in the way these criteria are applied within the 
census. Firstly, question 38 in the individual questionnaire asks if an individual 
searched for work regardless of whether it was full-time or part-time work, whereas in 
the criteria above an individual must be specifically looking for full-time work.  This 
may cause particular problems for young women as some women may be seeking part-
time work while they study.  Therefore, while they would not be able to receive the 
unemployment benefit the census would define them as being unemployed instead of 
being out of the labour force.  If this is the case, then the number of women unemployed 
is overstated and the number of women out of the labour force is understated.   
The second point of difference relates to the method of job searching.  While an 
individual may receive the unemployment benefit if she searches for a job using the 
newspaper, an individual in the census is not considered to be actively searching for a 
job if her only response to question 39 was „looked at job advertisement‟.  As such there 
may be young women who were actually unemployed, but have been coded as „out of 
the labour force‟ due to the nature of the census unemployment criteria.  The number of 
women affected by this dissimilarity may be significant as the newspaper is one of the 
primary methods of job searching.  This contradiction works in the opposite direction 
from the previous issue, in the sense that the number of women out of the labour force 
is overstated and the number of women unemployed is understated. 
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Finally, there are dissimilarities in terms of the availability to work.  Point ii) above 
states that to receive an unemployment benefit an individual must be able to take a full-
time job if it is offered to them.  However, question 40 in the individual census form 
asks respondents whether they would start a job if one was available to them, regardless 
of whether it was full-time or part-time work.  This again can potentially cause young 
women to be miscategorised into the unemployment group if they were just seeking 
part-time work to support themselves through their studies.  As with the first issues 
discussed above, this will overstate the number of women unemployed and understate 
the number of women out of the labour force. 
The labour force participation rate (LFPR) is defined as the number of females aged 15-
24 either employed and unemployed as a percentage of the total number of females aged 
15-24.  The misallocation of young women between unemployment and not in the 
labour force will cause the numerator in the measure to increase or decrease, depending 
on the relative strength of each mixing.  Therefore, there will significant adjustments to 
the LFPR away from the true value. 
As the employment rate is defined as the number of females aged 15-24 employed as a 
percentage of the total number of females aged 15-24 then this mixing does not affect 
the numerator.  As such the employment rate should remain stable and unaffected by 
these misclassifications.  Unquestionably the employment rate is far less susceptible to 
measurements error when using census data, and especially when focusing on young 
people.  It is for these reasons that the employment rate is utilised instead of the far 
more commonly used labour force participation rate. 
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Appendix 6 
Understatement of Education Participation Rates 
Figure A.2 below shows the education participation rates of young women (all 
ethnicities) from two different data sources.  The first is calculated from individual 
responses to the census questionnaire on 6 March 2001, while the second is provided by 
the Ministry of Education‟s official participation rates in formal education for the 2001 
calendar year.  The two participation rates show that the census undercounts the true 
number of young women in education by between 8 and 28 percentage points, 
depending on age. 
Figure A.2: 
Education Participation Rates of Women by Age, 2001 
 
Source: Statistic New Zealand (2002) Census of Population and Dwellings 2001; Ministry of Education 
(2002) Education Counts – Unpublished data. 
The cause of this undercount is not known, however examining the actual question 
asked in the census questionnaire may provide some insight.  In particular, there is no 
census question devoted purely to asking individuals about their involvement in 
education.  Rather, information on education status is collected within a broader 
question relating to unpaid work activities.  The forty-first and final question of the 
individual census question (see Appendix 2) asks: “Mark as many spaces as you need to 
answer this question. In the last 4 weeks, which of these have you done, without pay?” 
Of the nine spaces to mark, the seventh and eighth spaces are “attending or studying for 
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20 hours or more per week at school or any other place” and “attending or studying for 
less than 20 hours per week at school or any other place”. 
The wording of the question and possible answers do not clarify as to why a young 
person who is in education, would not mark one of two spaces provided.  Having said 
that, the time frame provided in the question (four weeks) may potentially exclude some 
tertiary students who have not yet started back at their institute by census night.  This 
however, would not explain why the biggest undercounting occurs at younger ages.  
The undercounting of educational activity by the census is most likely due to a high 
non-response rate for that question.  As Stillman (2006) points outs, by asking 
individual‟s educational status within an unpaid activities question, many students may 
have simply ignored the question and responses altogether, therefore lowering the 
education participation rate below its true value.   
If the undercount is due to a high non-response rate, then there is likely to be an 
undercount in the proportion of young women who undertake each of the six unpaid 
work activities, since the incidence of unpaid work activities is generated from the same 
census question.  Unfortunately there is no means to counteract the undercount in 
education status and the potential undercount in the incidence of unpaid work activities.  
Consequently, it is one of the major disadvantages of using the 2001 census for my 
analysis. 
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Appendix 7 
New Zealand Local Labour Market Areas Map 
 
Source: Motu Economic and Public Policy Research  
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Appendix 8 
North Island Settlement Type Map 
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Appendix 9 
South Island Settlement Type Map 
 
 206
Appendix 10 
Auckland Region Settlement Type Map 
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Appendix 11 
Hamilton Region Settlement Type Map 
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Appendix 12 
Wellington Region Settlement Type Map 
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Appendix 13 
Christchurch Region Settlement Type Map 
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Appendix 14 
Dunedin Region Settlement Type Map 
 
 
 2
1
1
 
Appendix 15 
 
Table A.2: 
Estimated Binary Logistic Marginal Effects on Probability of being Employed 
   Māori Age Individual 
Characteristics 
Geography Household 
Composition 
Time Use Socioeconomic 
Status 
Ethnicity 
 maori  -0.220 -0.229 -0.168 -0.126 -0.085 -0.088 -0.073 
   (0.014)** (0.016)** (0.012)** (0.007)** (0.007)** (0.007)** (0.008)** 
Age 
 age15 M  
Base Base Base Base Base Base 
    
 age16 M  0.142 0.005 0.019 0.053 0.039 0.044 
    (0.005)** (0.007) (0.006)** (0.006)** (0.006)** (0.006)** 
 age17 M  0.237 0.114 0.132 0.170 0.142 0.175 
    (0.011)** (0.011)** (0.011)** (0.015)** (0.012)** (0.011)** 
 age18 M  0.253 0.135 0.161 0.212 0.151 0.193 
    (0.022)** (0.021)** (0.019)** (0.019)** (0.018)** (0.018)** 
 age19   0.256 0.136 0.167 0.234 0.172 0.213 
    (0.031)** (0.030)** (0.024)** (0.019)** (0.020)** (0.021)** 
 age20   0.272 0.157 0.187 0.263 0.203 0.233 
    (0.031)** (0.030)** (0.025)** (0.018)** (0.020)** (0.021)** 
 age21   0.290 0.181 0.207 0.290 0.228 0.247 
    (0.025)** (0.024)** (0.022)** (0.020)** (0.019)** (0.020)** 
 age22   0.303 0.198 0.221 0.311 0.247 0.256 
    (0.023)** (0.022)** (0.023)** (0.023)** (0.020)** (0.020)** 
 age23   0.314 0.215 0.236 0.332 0.271 0.266 
    (0.026)** (0.025)** (0.026)** (0.027)** (0.022)** (0.021)** 
 age24   0.320 0.227 0.249 0.345 0.286 0.275 
    (0.022)** (0.020)** (0.022)** (0.022)** (0.017)** (0.015)** 
Individual Characteristics 
 school_edu    0.259 0.241 0.184 0.209 0.193 
     (0.008)** (0.006)** (0.004)** (0.005)** (0.004)** 
 immigrant    -0.050 -0.055 -0.070 -0.063 -0.053 
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     (0.004)** (0.006)** (0.006)** (0.005)** (0.005)** 
 iwi M   -0.018 -0.013 -0.011 -0.010 -0.011 
     (0.008)* (0.006)* (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
 mancestry M   -0.006 0.000 0.015 0.007 0.006 
     (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) 
Geography 
 depone     0.034 0.003 0.009 -0.016 
      (0.015)* (0.013) (0.012) (0.010) 
 deptwo     0.042 0.019 0.021 0.003 
      (0.007)** (0.007)** (0.007)** (0.007) 
 depthree     0.039 0.021 0.021 0.007 
      (0.008)** (0.007)** (0.006)** (0.006) 
 depfour     0.025 0.015 0.016 0.010 
      (0.008)** (0.007)* (0.007)* (0.008) 
 depfive     
Base Base Base Base 
      
 depsix     -0.026 -0.021 -0.022 -0.016 
      (0.007)** (0.008)* (0.008)** (0.007)* 
 depseven M    -0.050 -0.036 -0.037 -0.022 
      (0.007)** (0.008)** (0.007)** (0.007)** 
 depeight M    -0.079 -0.057 -0.055 -0.032 
      (0.013)** (0.014)** (0.011)** (0.010)** 
 depnine M    -0.144 -0.111 -0.107 -0.074 
      (0.028)** (0.028)** (0.022)** (0.016)** 
 depten M    -0.199 -0.157 -0.154 -0.111 
      (0.016)** (0.016)** (0.013)** (0.009)** 
 main_urban     
Base Base Base Base 
      
 satellite_urban M    0.003 0.011 0.003 0.007 
      (0.012) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) 
 independ_urban M    0.048 0.061 0.052 0.055 
      (0.012)** (0.012)** (0.011)** (0.011)** 
 rural_high_influ     -0.040 -0.038 -0.043 -0.029 
      (0.011)** (0.010)** (0.009)** (0.009)** 
 rural_mod_influ     -0.038 -0.036 -0.042 -0.026 
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      (0.010)** (0.010)** (0.011)** (0.011)* 
 rural_low_influ M    -0.028 -0.025 -0.036 -0.020 
      (0.012)* (0.012)* (0.011)** (0.011) 
 high_rural M    -0.005 -0.011 -0.024 -0.001 
      (0.026) (0.027) (0.025) (0.025) 
 loc_ns M    0.038 -0.016 -0.029 -0.012 
      (0.033) (0.036) (0.031) (0.026) 
 male_une58 M    0.003 -0.001 0.001 -0.000 
      (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) 
 fem_une58 M    -0.016 -0.014 -0.013 -0.013 
      (0.011) (0.010) (0.008) (0.006)* 
 maoripct M    0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 
      (0.001) (0.001)* (0.001) (0.000)* 
Household Composition 
 kidu5own M     -0.423 -0.408 -0.371 
       (0.013)** (0.012)** (0.012)** 
 ownkidu5 M     -0.127 -0.122 -0.082 
       (0.010)** (0.009)** (0.009)** 
 kid516own M     -0.127 -0.098 -0.050 
       (0.017)** (0.015)** (0.014)** 
 ownkid5_16 M     0.013 0.019 0.049 
       (0.021) (0.021) (0.019)* 
 elderly M     -0.057 -0.056 -0.036 
       (0.013)** (0.011)** (0.012)** 
 numelderly      0.021 0.022 0.005 
       (0.027) (0.028) (0.027) 
 dacc M     0.030 0.025 0.018 
       (0.012)* (0.012)* (0.012) 
 nacc M     -0.034 -0.032 -0.041 
       (0.034) (0.034) (0.030) 
 ddpb M     -0.028 -0.031 -0.003 
       (0.007)** (0.006)** (0.006) 
 ndpb M     -0.032 -0.044 -0.043 
       (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
 dinvsick M     -0.058 -0.063 -0.034 
       (0.007)** (0.007)** (0.007)** 
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 ninvsick M     -0.073 -0.073 -0.038 
       (0.010)** (0.010)** (0.011)** 
 dunemp M     -0.084 -0.087 -0.048 
       (0.010)** (0.010)** (0.008)** 
 nunemp M     -0.019 -0.021 -0.004 
       (0.010) (0.009)* (0.007) 
 kidu5oth M     -0.067 -0.062 -0.030 
       (0.014)** (0.011)** (0.010)** 
 othkidu5 M     -0.018 -0.022 0.001 
       (0.012) (0.010)* (0.009) 
 kid516oth M     0.003 0.012 0.043 
       (0.011) (0.010) (0.008)** 
 othkid5_16 M     0.007 0.010 0.043 
       (0.009) (0.007) (0.007)** 
 bth_prnt      
Base Base Base 
       
 no_spse_no_prnt M     -0.090 -0.099 0.018 
       (0.025)** (0.020)** (0.012) 
 spse_only      0.086 0.052 0.121 
       (0.014)** (0.013)** (0.009)** 
 one_prnt M     -0.055 -0.063 -0.006 
       (0.013)** (0.011)** (0.007) 
 oneprnt_spse M     0.057 0.022 0.059 
       (0.013)** (0.015) (0.014)** 
 two_prnt_spse M     0.076 0.038 0.034 
       (0.020)** (0.021) (0.021) 
 nperson M     -0.007 -0.004 -0.020 
       (0.009) (0.007) (0.005)** 
Education Status 
 ptstudy       -0.045 -0.031 
        (0.014)** (0.012)** 
 ftstudy       -0.183 -0.155 
        (0.013)** (0.010)** 
Unpaid Work Activities 
 housework       0.121 0.105 
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        (0.005)** (0.005)** 
 volunteer M      -0.000 0.002 
        (0.005) (0.005) 
 chldcare_mem M      -0.056 -0.049 
        (0.004)** (0.004)** 
 chldcare_nonmem M      -0.008 -0.007 
        (0.004)* (0.004) 
 sick_mem M      -0.015 -0.007 
        (0.005)** (0.005) 
 sick_nonmem M      0.027 0.029 
        (0.008)** (0.007)** 
Socioeconomic Status 
 own_house        0.035 
         (0.005)** 
 hhincome        0.057 
         (0.003)** 
 investment        0.085 
         (0.014)** 
 oth_govt_benefit M       -0.117 
         (0.007)** 
 oth_source        -0.079 
         (0.009)** 
 stud_allow        -0.120 
         (0.009)** 
Observations 178776 178776 178776 178776 178776 178776 178776 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 5% 
** significant at 1% 
Notes: Sequential introduction of groups of independent variables.  ‘M’ indicates if Māori have a higher incidence for dummy variable or higher average for continuous variables. 
Source:  New Zealand Census of Population and Dwellings 2001 
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Appendix 16 
 
Table A.3: 
Estimated Multinomial Logistic Marginal Effects on Probability of Activity Status Outcome 
1) EMPLOYMENT ONLY 
  Ethnicity Age Individual 
Characteristics 
Geography Household 
Composition 
Time Use Socioeconomic 
Status 
Ethnicity 
 maori -0.086 -0.078 -0.062 -0.048 -0.024 -0.014 -0.003 
  (0.012)** (0.016)** (0.008)** (0.007)** (0.008)** (0.008) (0.009) 
Age 
 age15  
Base Base Base Base Base Base 
   
 age16  0.128 0.160 0.169 0.191 0.191 0.201 
   (0.009)** (0.012)** (0.012)** (0.011)** (0.011)** (0.011)** 
 age17  0.329 0.350 0.365 0.383 0.393 0.435 
   (0.014)** (0.016)** (0.014)** (0.017)** (0.017)** (0.017)** 
 age18  0.471 0.445 0.469 0.492 0.496 0.531 
   (0.019)** (0.014)** (0.009)** (0.014)** (0.014)** (0.015)** 
 age19  0.479 0.451 0.479 0.510 0.512 0.544 
   (0.027)** (0.021)** (0.011)** (0.014)** (0.014)** (0.015)** 
 age20  0.491 0.463 0.491 0.529 0.531 0.555 
   (0.030)** (0.024)** (0.012)** (0.011)** (0.011)** (0.012)** 
 age21  0.536 0.497 0.520 0.564 0.566 0.581 
   (0.028)** (0.022)** (0.013)** (0.011)** (0.011)** (0.011)** 
 age22  0.567 0.517 0.538 0.588 0.589 0.596 
   (0.024)** (0.019)** (0.013)** (0.014)** (0.014)** (0.014)** 
 age23  0.585 0.534 0.553 0.606 0.608 0.606 
   (0.022)** (0.021)** (0.017)** (0.018)** (0.018)** (0.016)** 
 age24  0.597 0.548 0.566 0.618 0.619 0.613 
   (0.020)** (0.017)** (0.014)** (0.016)** (0.015)** (0.014)** 
Individual Characteristics 
 school_edu   0.037 0.027 -0.019 -0.025 -0.049 
    (0.018)* (0.013)* (0.010)* (0.010)* (0.009)** 
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 immigrant   -0.049 -0.045 -0.060 -0.058 -0.050 
    (0.007)** (0.008)** (0.009)** (0.009)** (0.009)** 
 iwi   -0.033 -0.034 -0.029 -0.025 -0.028 
    (0.006)** (0.006)** (0.006)** (0.006)** (0.006)** 
 mancestry   0.030 0.031 0.037 0.034 0.029 
    (0.007)** (0.006)** (0.006)** (0.006)** (0.005)** 
Geography 
 depone    0.006 -0.006 -0.007 -0.027 
     (0.014) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008)** 
 deptwo    0.017 0.007 0.006 -0.010 
     (0.007)* (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
 depthree    0.026 0.017 0.016 0.005 
     (0.009)** (0.007)* (0.007)* (0.006) 
 depfour    0.018 0.013 0.012 0.006 
     (0.006)** (0.005)** (0.004)** (0.004) 
 depfive    
Base Base Base Base 
     
 depsix    -0.014 -0.013 -0.013 -0.007 
     (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) 
 depseven    -0.033 -0.027 -0.028 -0.015 
     (0.008)** (0.007)** (0.007)** (0.006)* 
 depeight    -0.058 -0.048 -0.048 -0.027 
     (0.017)** (0.015)** (0.015)** (0.012)* 
 depnine    -0.095 -0.077 -0.077 -0.047 
     (0.037)* (0.032)* (0.033)* (0.025) 
 depten    -0.118 -0.097 -0.096 -0.058 
     (0.022)** (0.020)** (0.020)** (0.015)** 
 main_urban    
Base Base Base Base 
     
 satellite_urban    0.052 0.059 0.062 0.071 
     (0.013)** (0.013)** (0.012)** (0.013)** 
 independ_urban    0.087 0.098 0.101 0.110 
     (0.015)** (0.014)** (0.014)** (0.013)** 
 rural_high_influ    0.007 0.010 0.011 0.029 
     (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014)* 
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 rural_mod_influ    0.023 0.025 0.027 0.048 
     (0.009)* (0.009)** (0.010)** (0.011)** 
 rural_low_influ    0.033 0.036 0.039 0.062 
     (0.015)* (0.015)* (0.015)** (0.013)** 
 high_rural    0.076 0.070 0.076 0.106 
     (0.025)** (0.025)** (0.025)** (0.024)** 
 loc_ns    0.152 0.108 0.107 0.141 
     (0.066)* (0.071) (0.064) (0.060)* 
 male_une58    -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.011 
     (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) 
 fem_une58    -0.010 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 
     (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.010) 
 maoripct    0.003 0.003 0.004 0.003 
     (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.001)** 
Household Composition 
 kidu5own     -0.234 -0.195 -0.139 
      (0.019)** (0.019)** (0.018)** 
 ownkidu5     -0.091 -0.083 -0.037 
      (0.012)** (0.012)** (0.013)** 
 kid516own     -0.110 -0.080 -0.026 
      (0.018)** (0.018)** (0.018) 
 ownkid5_16     0.003 0.008 0.048 
      (0.023) (0.023) (0.024)* 
 elderly     -0.025 -0.018 0.013 
      (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
 numelderly     0.026 0.026 0.020 
      (0.023) (0.024) (0.026) 
 dacc     0.029 0.030 0.020 
      (0.010)** (0.010)** (0.009)* 
 nacc     -0.031 -0.030 -0.035 
      (0.037) (0.036) (0.035) 
 ddpb     0.012 0.016 0.037 
      (0.008) (0.008)* (0.008)** 
 ndpb     0.019 0.007 0.011 
      (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) 
 dinvsick     -0.019 -0.015 0.014 
 2
1
9
 
      (0.008)* (0.008) (0.008) 
 ninvsick     -0.041 -0.038 -0.006 
      (0.012)** (0.012)** (0.013) 
 dunemp     -0.056 -0.055 -0.019 
      (0.006)** (0.006)** (0.005)** 
 nunemp     -0.013 -0.011 0.006 
      (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) 
 kidu5oth     -0.008 0.023 0.062 
      (0.015) (0.015) (0.014)** 
 othkidu5     -0.010 -0.007 0.024 
      (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) 
 kid516oth     -0.014 0.003 0.042 
      (0.009) (0.009) (0.008)** 
 othkid5_16     0.012 0.023 0.059 
      (0.009) (0.009)* (0.009)** 
 bth_prnt     
Base Base Base 
      
 no_spse_no_prnt     -0.045 -0.053 0.027 
      (0.025) (0.026)* (0.015) 
 spse_only     0.139 0.126 0.169 
      (0.016)** (0.016)** (0.011)** 
 one_prnt     -0.021 -0.025 0.020 
      (0.013) (0.013) (0.008)* 
 oneprnt_spse     0.146 0.136 0.162 
      (0.015)** (0.015)** (0.015)** 
 two_prnt_spse     0.172 0.163 0.151 
      (0.013)** (0.013)** (0.012)** 
 nperson     -0.012 -0.014 -0.035 
      (0.009) (0.009) (0.007)** 
Unpaid Work Activities 
 housework      0.056 0.042 
       (0.005)** (0.004)** 
 volunteer      -0.115 -0.108 
       (0.005)** (0.005)** 
 chldcare_mem      -0.075 -0.066 
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       (0.006)** (0.006)** 
 chldcare_nonmem      -0.004 -0.005 
       (0.005) (0.004) 
 sick_mem      -0.028 -0.019 
       (0.008)** (0.009)* 
 sick_nonmem      -0.037 -0.034 
       (0.006)** (0.006)** 
Socioeconomic Status 
 own_house       -0.002 
        (0.005) 
 hhincome       0.061 
        (0.003)** 
 investment       -0.033 
        (0.008)** 
 oth_govt_benefit       -0.073 
        (0.007)** 
 oth_source       -0.157 
        (0.009)** 
2) EMPLOYMENT AND STUDY 
  Ethnicity Age Individual 
Characteristics 
Geography Household 
Composition 
Time Use Socioeconomic 
Status 
Ethnicity 
 maori -0.134 -0.151 -0.100 -0.071 -0.059 -0.061 -0.056 
  (0.008)** (0.009)** (0.011)** (0.009)** (0.009)** (0.009)** (0.009)** 
Age 
 age15  
Base Base Base Base Base Base 
   
 age16  0.037 -0.097 -0.090 -0.083 -0.083 -0.084 
   (0.005)** (0.008)** (0.007)** (0.006)** (0.006)** (0.006)** 
 age17  -0.039 -0.149 -0.145 -0.140 -0.145 -0.151 
   (0.008)** (0.011)** (0.008)** (0.008)** (0.008)** (0.009)** 
 age18  -0.148 -0.211 -0.210 -0.202 -0.205 -0.211 
   (0.016)** (0.014)** (0.017)** (0.018)** (0.018)** (0.020)** 
 age19  -0.152 -0.215 -0.215 -0.202 -0.206 -0.213 
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   (0.018)** (0.016)** (0.020)** (0.021)** (0.022)** (0.023)** 
 age20  -0.153 -0.215 -0.215 -0.199 -0.203 -0.211 
   (0.016)** (0.014)** (0.017)** (0.019)** (0.019)** (0.020)** 
 age21  -0.180 -0.230 -0.230 -0.213 -0.216 -0.224 
   (0.016)** (0.014)** (0.015)** (0.016)** (0.016)** (0.018)** 
 age22  -0.202 -0.241 -0.240 -0.222 -0.226 -0.233 
   (0.014)** (0.013)** (0.013)** (0.014)** (0.015)** (0.016)** 
 age23  -0.211 -0.245 -0.245 -0.225 -0.229 -0.235 
   (0.011)** (0.010)** (0.011)** (0.013)** (0.013)** (0.015)** 
 age24  -0.218 -0.249 -0.248 -0.227 -0.230 -0.236 
   (0.011)** (0.010)** (0.010)** (0.011)** (0.011)** (0.013)** 
Individual Characteristics 
 school_edu   0.216 0.205 0.189 0.182 0.180 
    (0.009)** (0.007)** (0.006)** (0.006)** (0.006)** 
 immigrant   -0.002 -0.011 -0.014 -0.011 -0.007 
    (0.005) (0.004)** (0.004)** (0.004)** (0.005) 
 iwi   0.010 0.016 0.013 0.008 0.008 
    (0.007) (0.006)** (0.006)* (0.006) (0.007) 
 mancestry   -0.035 -0.029 -0.020 -0.020 -0.017 
    (0.005)** (0.005)** (0.005)** (0.004)** (0.005)** 
Geography 
 depone    0.037 0.015 0.015 0.010 
     (0.004)** (0.004)** (0.004)** (0.004)* 
 deptwo    0.029 0.014 0.014 0.012 
     (0.005)** (0.005)** (0.005)** (0.005)* 
 depthree    0.015 0.005 0.005 0.003 
     (0.003)** (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
 depfour    0.008 0.003 0.003 0.003 
     (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
 depfive    
Base Base Base Base 
     
 depsix    -0.013 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 
     (0.004)** (0.003)* (0.003)** (0.003)* 
 depseven    -0.017 -0.009 -0.009 -0.007 
     (0.005)** (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
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 depeight    -0.021 -0.008 -0.008 -0.005 
     (0.007)** (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
 depnine    -0.049 -0.032 -0.031 -0.028 
     (0.010)** (0.008)** (0.008)** (0.008)** 
 depten    -0.077 -0.056 -0.056 -0.049 
     (0.009)** (0.008)** (0.008)** (0.008)** 
 main_urban    
Base Base Base Base 
     
 satellite_urban    -0.047 -0.043 -0.045 -0.046 
     (0.006)** (0.006)** (0.006)** (0.006)** 
 independ_urban    -0.035 -0.029 -0.031 -0.033 
     (0.008)** (0.008)** (0.008)** (0.008)** 
 rural_high_influ    -0.046 -0.043 -0.044 -0.044 
     (0.008)** (0.008)** (0.008)** (0.009)** 
 rural_mod_influ    -0.058 -0.054 -0.055 -0.056 
     (0.007)** (0.006)** (0.007)** (0.007)** 
 rural_low_influ    -0.059 -0.054 -0.057 -0.059 
     (0.009)** (0.009)** (0.009)** (0.008)** 
 high_rural    -0.075 -0.070 -0.073 -0.076 
     (0.013)** (0.013)** (0.013)** (0.013)** 
 loc_ns    -0.080 -0.092 -0.098 -0.101 
     (0.097) (0.086) (0.077) (0.079) 
 male_une58    0.011 0.008 0.008 0.009 
     (0.004)* (0.004)* (0.004)* (0.004)* 
 fem_une58    -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
     (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
 maoripct    -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
     (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** 
Household Composition 
 kidu5own     -0.185 -0.183 -0.177 
      (0.009)** (0.008)** (0.009)** 
 ownkidu5     -0.018 -0.021 -0.018 
      (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) 
 kid516own     -0.028 -0.033 -0.025 
      (0.012)* (0.012)** (0.012)* 
 ownkid5_16     -0.007 -0.009 -0.010 
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      (0.033) (0.033) (0.032) 
 elderly     -0.037 -0.036 -0.040 
      (0.008)** (0.008)** (0.008)** 
 numelderly     -0.010 -0.004 -0.010 
      (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) 
 dacc     0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
      (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
 nacc     -0.006 -0.009 -0.011 
      (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
 ddpb     -0.036 -0.034 -0.027 
      (0.004)** (0.004)** (0.004)** 
 ndpb     -0.047 -0.041 -0.040 
      (0.021)* (0.021) (0.022) 
 dinvsick     -0.040 -0.041 -0.036 
      (0.004)** (0.004)** (0.004)** 
 ninvsick     -0.031 -0.029 -0.023 
      (0.013)* (0.013)* (0.013) 
 dunemp     -0.029 -0.030 -0.026 
      (0.005)** (0.005)** (0.004)** 
 nunemp     -0.009 -0.009 -0.008 
      (0.004)* (0.004)* (0.005) 
 kidu5oth     -0.069 -0.071 -0.066 
      (0.007)** (0.007)** (0.008)** 
 othkidu5     -0.009 -0.010 -0.008 
      (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
 kid516oth     0.008 0.006 0.008 
      (0.002)** (0.002)* (0.003)** 
 othkid5_16     -0.010 -0.011 -0.008 
      (0.002)** (0.002)** (0.003)** 
 bth_prnt     
Base Base Base 
      
 no_spse_no_prnt     -0.040 -0.045 -0.022 
      (0.009)** (0.009)** (0.008)** 
 spse_only     -0.045 -0.050 -0.036 
      (0.008)** (0.008)** (0.006)** 
 one_prnt     -0.025 -0.027 -0.019 
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      (0.003)** (0.003)** (0.003)** 
 oneprnt_spse     -0.078 -0.082 -0.077 
      (0.014)** (0.014)** (0.015)** 
 two_prnt_spse     -0.096 -0.097 -0.096 
      (0.019)** (0.019)** (0.020)** 
 nperson     0.012 0.011 0.010 
      (0.002)** (0.002)** (0.003)** 
Unpaid Work Activities 
 housework      0.062 0.057 
       (0.003)** (0.004)** 
 volunteer      0.091 0.087 
       (0.005)** (0.005)** 
 chldcare_mem      0.002 0.003 
       (0.003) (0.003) 
 chldcare_nonmem      -0.004 -0.003 
       (0.002)* (0.002) 
 sick_mem      0.009 0.008 
       (0.005) (0.005) 
 sick_nonmem      0.054 0.054 
       (0.004)** (0.004)** 
Socioeconomic Status 
 own_house       0.028 
        (0.004)** 
 hhincome       0.005 
        (0.001)** 
 investment       0.114 
        (0.006)** 
 oth_govt_benefit       -0.038 
        (0.008)** 
 oth_source       0.068 
        (0.005)** 
3) STUDYING ONLY 
  Ethnicity Age Individual 
Characteristics 
Geography Household 
Composition 
Time Use Socioeconomic 
Status 
Ethnicity 
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 maori -0.006 -0.018 0.002 0.006 0.003 0.001 -0.000 
  (0.010) (0.011) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Age 
 age15  
Base Base Base Base Base Base 
   
 age16  -0.069 -0.093 -0.092 -0.096 -0.096 -0.098 
   (0.005)** (0.009)** (0.008)** (0.007)** (0.007)** (0.006)** 
 age17  -0.149 -0.172 -0.174 -0.189 -0.193 -0.202 
   (0.008)** (0.014)** (0.013)** (0.018)** (0.018)** (0.017)** 
 age18  -0.188 -0.209 -0.214 -0.227 -0.230 -0.234 
   (0.011)** (0.011)** (0.010)** (0.018)** (0.017)** (0.016)** 
 age19  -0.190 -0.212 -0.218 -0.235 -0.238 -0.242 
   (0.024)** (0.020)** (0.011)** (0.014)** (0.013)** (0.013)** 
 age20  -0.199 -0.220 -0.225 -0.241 -0.244 -0.247 
   (0.026)** (0.021)** (0.012)** (0.011)** (0.010)** (0.010)** 
 age21  -0.212 -0.231 -0.235 -0.249 -0.252 -0.253 
   (0.015)** (0.012)** (0.008)** (0.016)** (0.015)** (0.014)** 
 age22  -0.223 -0.241 -0.244 -0.256 -0.259 -0.258 
   (0.009)** (0.011)** (0.011)** (0.019)** (0.019)** (0.017)** 
 age23  -0.229 -0.246 -0.248 -0.260 -0.263 -0.260 
   (0.012)** (0.017)** (0.017)** (0.024)** (0.023)** (0.020)** 
 age24  -0.233 -0.249 -0.251 -0.262 -0.265 -0.261 
   (0.009)** (0.015)** (0.015)** (0.021)** (0.020)** (0.016)** 
Individual Characteristics 
 school_edu   0.079 0.073 0.069 0.064 0.063 
    (0.013)** (0.011)** (0.008)** (0.008)** (0.007)** 
 immigrant   0.037 0.030 0.034 0.036 0.032 
    (0.004)** (0.004)** (0.004)** (0.003)** (0.003)** 
 iwi   0.026 0.029 0.028 0.024 0.025 
    (0.006)** (0.005)** (0.005)** (0.005)** (0.005)** 
 mancestry   -0.020 -0.020 -0.019 -0.020 -0.018 
    (0.009)* (0.008)* (0.007)* (0.007)** (0.007)** 
Geography 
 depone    0.012 0.024 0.025 0.034 
     (0.015) (0.012)* (0.012)* (0.010)** 
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 deptwo    -0.005 0.004 0.005 0.012 
     (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)* 
 depthree    -0.013 -0.006 -0.006 -0.001 
     (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) 
 depfour    -0.006 -0.001 -0.000 0.002 
     (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
 depfive    
Base Base Base Base 
     
 depsix    0.008 0.008 0.008 0.005 
     (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
 depseven    0.016 0.012 0.012 0.006 
     (0.008)* (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) 
 depeight    0.036 0.026 0.026 0.015 
     (0.019) (0.015) (0.015) (0.013) 
 depnine    0.080 0.062 0.063 0.046 
     (0.040)* (0.030)* (0.030)* (0.025) 
 depten    0.087 0.073 0.074 0.054 
     (0.024)** (0.018)** (0.018)** (0.014)** 
 main_urban    
Base Base Base Base 
     
 satellite_urban    -0.044 -0.037 -0.039 -0.041 
     (0.011)** (0.009)** (0.009)** (0.009)** 
 independ_urban    -0.070 -0.067 -0.069 -0.073 
     (0.013)** (0.011)** (0.011)** (0.011)** 
 rural_high_influ    -0.005 0.005 0.004 -0.003 
     (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
 rural_mod_influ    -0.017 -0.006 -0.008 -0.015 
     (0.009)* (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
 rural_low_influ    -0.034 -0.025 -0.028 -0.036 
     (0.013)** (0.012)* (0.012)* (0.010)** 
 high_rural    -0.041 -0.032 -0.036 -0.049 
     (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022)* 
 loc_ns    -0.133 -0.133 -0.135 -0.141 
     (0.059)* (0.047)** (0.047)** (0.044)** 
 male_une58    0.009 0.007 0.007 0.007 
     (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) 
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 fem_une58    0.004 0.006 0.006 0.006 
     (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) 
 maoripct    -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
     (0.001)* (0.001)* (0.001)* (0.001)** 
Household Composition 
 kidu5own     0.014 -0.006 -0.011 
      (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
 ownkidu5     0.033 0.029 0.009 
      (0.011)** (0.011)** (0.011) 
 kid516own     0.091 0.068 0.036 
      (0.015)** (0.015)** (0.016)* 
 ownkid5_16     0.006 0.004 -0.014 
      (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) 
 elderly     -0.002 -0.004 -0.015 
      (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
 numelderly     -0.044 -0.043 -0.037 
      (0.022)* (0.021)* (0.021) 
 dacc     -0.025 -0.027 -0.023 
      (0.010)* (0.009)** (0.009)** 
 nacc     0.031 0.030 0.035 
      (0.022) (0.021) (0.020) 
 ddpb     -0.007 -0.008 -0.019 
      (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)** 
 ndpb     -0.010 -0.006 -0.003 
      (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
 dinvsick     -0.007 -0.010 -0.019 
      (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)** 
 ninvsick     0.019 0.019 0.004 
      (0.010) (0.010)* (0.011) 
 dunemp     0.021 0.020 0.006 
      (0.007)** (0.007)** (0.006) 
 nunemp     -0.000 -0.001 -0.007 
      (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) 
 kidu5oth     -0.034 -0.048 -0.057 
      (0.013)* (0.013)** (0.012)** 
 othkidu5     -0.023 -0.023 -0.034 
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      (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)** 
 kid516oth     -0.024 -0.033 -0.049 
      (0.010)* (0.010)** (0.010)** 
 othkid5_16     -0.023 -0.030 -0.046 
      (0.008)** (0.008)** (0.009)** 
 bth_prnt     
Base Base Base 
      
 no_spse_no_prnt     0.103 0.105 0.047 
      (0.026)** (0.026)** (0.016)** 
 spse_only     -0.068 -0.066 -0.092 
      (0.018)** (0.018)** (0.013)** 
 one_prnt     0.026 0.027 0.001 
      (0.013)* (0.013)* (0.009) 
 oneprnt_spse     -0.085 -0.085 -0.095 
      (0.013)** (0.013)** (0.013)** 
 two_prnt_spse     -0.111 -0.110 -0.106 
      (0.023)** (0.024)** (0.023)** 
 nperson     0.021 0.022 0.029 
      (0.009)* (0.009)* (0.008)** 
Unpaid Work Activities 
 housework      0.003 0.004 
       (0.004) (0.004) 
 volunteer      0.073 0.069 
       (0.004)** (0.004)** 
 chldcare_mem      0.043 0.040 
       (0.003)** (0.003)** 
 chldcare_nonmem      0.001 0.002 
       (0.005) (0.004) 
 sick_mem      0.023 0.017 
       (0.005)** (0.005)** 
 sick_nonmem      0.005 0.002 
       (0.005) (0.005) 
Socioeconomic Status 
 own_house       0.001 
        (0.004) 
 2
2
9
 
 hhincome       -0.030 
        (0.004)** 
 investment       0.021 
        (0.011) 
 oth_govt_benefit       0.054 
        (0.005)** 
 oth_source       0.138 
        (0.008)** 
4) INACTIVE 
  Ethnicity Age Individual 
Characteristics 
Geography Household 
Composition 
Time Use Socioeconomic 
Status 
Ethnicity         
 maori 0.226 0.247 0.161 0.113 0.080 0.074 0.059 
  (0.011)** (0.012)** (0.013)** (0.010)** (0.009)** (0.009)** (0.008)** 
Age         
 age15  
Base Base Base Base Base Base 
   
 age16  -0.097 0.031 0.013 -0.012 -0.011 -0.019 
   (0.005)** (0.007)** (0.006)* (0.005)* (0.005)* (0.005)** 
 age17  -0.141 -0.029 -0.045 -0.054 -0.055 -0.082 
   (0.009)** (0.011)** (0.012)** (0.010)** (0.010)** (0.010)** 
 age18  -0.135 -0.025 -0.045 -0.063 -0.061 -0.086 
   (0.012)** (0.013) (0.015)** (0.015)** (0.015)** (0.015)** 
 age19  -0.137 -0.024 -0.046 -0.073 -0.068 -0.089 
   (0.013)** (0.012) (0.016)** (0.016)** (0.016)** (0.015)** 
 age20  -0.140 -0.028 -0.050 -0.088 -0.084 -0.098 
   (0.013)** (0.012)* (0.016)** (0.017)** (0.017)** (0.016)** 
 age21  -0.143 -0.036 -0.055 -0.102 -0.097 -0.104 
   (0.012)** (0.012)** (0.016)** (0.016)** (0.016)** (0.016)** 
 age22  -0.142 -0.035 -0.054 -0.109 -0.104 -0.105 
   (0.013)** (0.014)* (0.018)** (0.017)** (0.018)** (0.016)** 
 age23  -0.145 -0.043 -0.060 -0.120 -0.116 -0.111 
   (0.013)** (0.014)** (0.017)** (0.017)** (0.017)** (0.015)** 
 age24  -0.147 -0.050 -0.067 -0.128 -0.123 -0.115 
 2
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   (0.011)** (0.013)** (0.015)** (0.015)** (0.015)** (0.013)** 
Individual Characteristics 
 school_edu   -0.332 -0.305 -0.239 -0.222 -0.194 
    (0.005)** (0.007)** (0.004)** (0.004)** (0.005)** 
 immigrant   0.014 0.026 0.040 0.033 0.025 
    (0.004)** (0.006)** (0.005)** (0.005)** (0.004)** 
 iwi   -0.004 -0.011 -0.013 -0.008 -0.006 
    (0.005) (0.004)** (0.004)** (0.004) (0.004) 
 mancestry   0.025 0.019 0.002 0.006 0.006 
    (0.007)** (0.007)** (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) 
Geography 
 depone    -0.055 -0.033 -0.033 -0.017 
     (0.006)** (0.006)** (0.006)** (0.006)** 
 deptwo    -0.042 -0.025 -0.024 -0.013 
     (0.005)** (0.005)** (0.005)** (0.005)* 
 depthree    -0.028 -0.016 -0.015 -0.007 
     (0.006)** (0.005)** (0.005)** (0.005) 
 depfour    -0.021 -0.016 -0.015 -0.012 
     (0.006)** (0.005)** (0.005)** (0.004)** 
 depfive    
Base Base Base Base 
     
 depsix    0.018 0.013 0.013 0.009 
     (0.005)** (0.004)** (0.004)** (0.004)* 
 depseven    0.034 0.024 0.024 0.016 
     (0.005)** (0.004)** (0.004)** (0.004)** 
 depeight    0.044 0.030 0.030 0.017 
     (0.009)** (0.006)** (0.005)** (0.005)** 
 depnine    0.064 0.046 0.046 0.029 
     (0.013)** (0.006)** (0.006)** (0.007)** 
 depten    0.109 0.080 0.078 0.052 
     (0.010)** (0.006)** (0.006)** (0.006)** 
 main_urban    
Base Base Base Base 
     
 satellite_urban    0.039 0.021 0.022 0.017 
     (0.006)** (0.005)** (0.005)** (0.006)** 
 2
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 independ_urban    0.018 -0.001 -0.000 -0.005 
     (0.007)* (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
 rural_high_influ    0.043 0.028 0.029 0.019 
     (0.007)** (0.007)** (0.007)** (0.007)** 
 rural_mod_influ    0.052 0.035 0.036 0.023 
     (0.008)** (0.008)** (0.008)** (0.008)** 
 rural_low_influ    0.060 0.043 0.046 0.033 
     (0.006)** (0.006)** (0.006)** (0.007)** 
 high_rural    0.040 0.031 0.034 0.018 
     (0.013)** (0.012)* (0.012)** (0.012) 
 loc_ns    0.061 0.117 0.126 0.101 
     (0.015)** (0.009)** (0.010)** (0.012)** 
 male_une58    -0.011 -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 
     (0.003)** (0.003)* (0.003)* (0.003) 
 fem_une58    0.011 0.008 0.008 0.008 
     (0.003)** (0.003)** (0.003)** (0.003)* 
 maoripct    0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
     (0.000)** (0.000)* (0.000)* (0.000)* 
Household Composition 
 kidu5own     0.404 0.385 0.327 
      (0.007)** (0.008)** (0.009)** 
 ownkidu5     0.076 0.075 0.047 
      (0.007)** (0.007)** (0.007)** 
 kid516own     0.048 0.045 0.015 
      (0.007)** (0.007)** (0.007)* 
 ownkid5_16     -0.002 -0.003 -0.024 
      (0.016) (0.015) (0.014) 
 elderly     0.065 0.058 0.042 
      (0.006)** (0.006)** (0.007)** 
 numelderly     0.027 0.021 0.028 
      (0.023) (0.022) (0.019) 
 dacc     -0.005 -0.002 0.004 
      (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) 
 nacc     0.006 0.009 0.011 
      (0.022) (0.022) (0.020) 
 ddpb     0.031 0.027 0.009 
 2
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      (0.003)** (0.004)** (0.003)* 
 ndpb     0.038 0.039 0.032 
      (0.016)* (0.015)* (0.015)* 
 dinvsick     0.066 0.065 0.041 
      (0.004)** (0.004)** (0.005)** 
 ninvsick     0.053 0.048 0.026 
      (0.008)** (0.008)** (0.008)** 
 dunemp     0.063 0.064 0.039 
      (0.004)** (0.004)** (0.003)** 
 nunemp     0.022 0.022 0.009 
      (0.004)** (0.004)** (0.004)* 
 kidu5oth     0.111 0.095 0.061 
      (0.004)** (0.005)** (0.005)** 
 othkidu5     0.042 0.040 0.018 
      (0.006)** (0.006)** (0.006)** 
 kid516oth     0.029 0.025 -0.001 
      (0.004)** (0.004)** (0.005) 
 othkid5_16     0.022 0.019 -0.005 
      (0.003)** (0.003)** (0.003) 
 bth_prnt     
Base Base Base 
      
 no_spse_no_prnt     -0.018 -0.007 -0.052 
      (0.010) (0.010) (0.009)** 
 spse_only     -0.026 -0.010 -0.041 
      (0.007)** (0.007) (0.007)** 
 one_prnt     0.020 0.024 -0.003 
      (0.004)** (0.004)** (0.004) 
 oneprnt_spse     0.017 0.030 0.010 
      (0.010) (0.010)** (0.010) 
 two_prnt_spse     0.036 0.044 0.052 
      (0.016)* (0.016)** (0.015)** 
 nperson     -0.021 -0.019 -0.004 
      (0.003)** (0.003)** (0.003) 
Unpaid Work Activities 
 housework      -0.121 -0.103 
       (0.002)** (0.003)** 
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 volunteer      -0.050 -0.047 
       (0.005)** (0.005)** 
 chldcare_mem      0.031 0.024 
       (0.004)** (0.004)** 
 chldcare_nonmem      0.007 0.006 
       (0.003)* (0.003)* 
 sick_mem      -0.003 -0.006 
       (0.004) (0.004) 
 sick_nonmem      -0.022 -0.022 
       (0.005)** (0.005)** 
Socioeconomic Status 
 own_house       -0.027 
        (0.003)** 
 hhincome       -0.035 
        (0.002)** 
 investment       -0.101 
        (0.009)** 
 oth_govt_benefit       0.057 
        (0.005)** 
 oth_source       -0.049 
        (0.007)** 
Observations 178776 178776 178776 178776 178776 178776 178776 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 5% 
** significant at 1% 
Notes: Sequential introduction of groups of independent variables.  
Source:  New Zealand Census of Population and Dwellings 2001 
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Appendix 17 
 
Table A.4: 
Estimated Multinomial Logistic Marginal Effects on Probability of Activity Status Outcome with Māori Interaction Terms 
1) EMPLOYMENT ONLY 
  Age Individual 
Characteristics 
Geography Household 
Composition 
Unpaid Work 
Activities 
Socioeconomic 
Status 
Ethnicity       
 maori 0.013 0.054 0.111 0.083 0.113 0.191 
  (0.018) (0.017)** (0.042)** (0.043) (0.044)* (0.039)** 
Age        
 age15 
Base Base Base Base Base Base 
  
 age16 0.126 0.155 0.161 0.192 0.193 0.203 
  (0.009)** (0.014)** (0.013)** (0.012)** (0.012)** (0.012)** 
 age17 0.340 0.357 0.370 0.402 0.412 0.454 
  (0.016)** (0.016)** (0.015)** (0.016)** (0.016)** (0.016)** 
 age18 0.486 0.449 0.474 0.511 0.515 0.550 
  (0.021)** (0.015)** (0.010)** (0.013)** (0.013)** (0.013)** 
 age19 0.495 0.459 0.489 0.530 0.532 0.563 
  (0.029)** (0.022)** (0.011)** (0.014)** (0.014)** (0.014)** 
 age20 0.507 0.473 0.502 0.550 0.552 0.575 
  (0.032)** (0.025)** (0.012)** (0.012)** (0.012)** (0.012)** 
 age21 0.554 0.506 0.531 0.582 0.584 0.599 
  (0.031)** (0.024)** (0.013)** (0.010)** (0.009)** (0.009)** 
 age22 0.585 0.523 0.544 0.602 0.603 0.610 
  (0.027)** (0.020)** (0.013)** (0.013)** (0.013)** (0.013)** 
 age23 0.606 0.543 0.562 0.622 0.624 0.622 
  (0.025)** (0.021)** (0.016)** (0.015)** (0.015)** (0.013)** 
 age24 0.616 0.555 0.573 0.634 0.635 0.628 
  (0.021)** (0.016)** (0.012)** (0.014)** (0.014)** (0.013)** 
Age Interaction       
 age15Mao 
Base Base Base Base Base Base 
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 age16Mao 0.004 -0.021 -0.012 -0.018 -0.016 -0.016 
  (0.017) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
 age17Mao -0.041 -0.062 -0.059 -0.091 -0.088 -0.094 
  (0.017)* (0.017)** (0.018)** (0.021)** (0.021)** (0.023)** 
 age18Mao -0.060 -0.079 -0.093 -0.131 -0.121 -0.131 
  (0.016)** (0.015)** (0.016)** (0.016)** (0.016)** (0.017)** 
 age19Mao -0.055 -0.067 -0.090 -0.127 -0.116 -0.129 
  (0.022)* (0.019)** (0.018)** (0.020)** (0.020)** (0.021)** 
 age20Mao -0.056 -0.067 -0.089 -0.126 -0.115 -0.125 
  (0.020)** (0.015)** (0.018)** (0.022)** (0.021)** (0.022)** 
 age21Mao -0.095 -0.115 -0.133 -0.158 -0.146 -0.153 
  (0.023)** (0.018)** (0.018)** (0.023)** (0.023)** (0.024)** 
 age22Mao -0.118 -0.144 -0.157 -0.174 -0.160 -0.161 
  (0.017)** (0.014)** (0.015)** (0.018)** (0.019)** (0.019)** 
 age23Mao -0.161 -0.191 -0.202 -0.212 -0.198 -0.190 
  (0.019)** (0.017)** (0.017)** (0.019)** (0.019)** (0.019)** 
 age24Mao -0.165 -0.197 -0.208 -0.214 -0.197 -0.183 
  (0.016)** (0.014)** (0.017)** (0.023)** (0.023)** (0.023)** 
Individual Characteristics       
 school_edu  0.039 0.033 -0.021 -0.030 -0.053 
   (0.020)* (0.014)* (0.010)* (0.010)** (0.010)** 
 immigrant  -0.057 -0.050 -0.067 -0.064 -0.055 
   (0.006)** (0.007)** (0.008)** (0.008)** (0.009)** 
 iwi  -0.000 0.000 0.003 0.004 0.001 
   (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
 mancestry  0.024 0.023 0.030 0.029 0.028 
   (0.007)** (0.007)** (0.007)** (0.007)** (0.006)** 
Individual Characteristic Interactions       
 school_eduMao  0.023 0.014 0.023 0.034 0.034 
   (0.010)* (0.009) (0.008)** (0.007)** (0.008)** 
 immigrantMao  0.076 0.067 0.076 0.072 0.062 
   (0.015)** (0.014)** (0.015)** (0.015)** (0.014)** 
 iwiMao  -0.046 -0.045 -0.044 -0.037 -0.036 
   (0.011)** (0.011)** (0.013)** (0.013)** (0.013)** 
 mancestryMao  -0.089 -0.084 -0.084 -0.076 -0.085 
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   (0.012)** (0.014)** (0.015)** (0.015)** (0.016)** 
Geography       
 depone   0.011 -0.002 -0.002 -0.023 
    (0.014) (0.010) (0.009) (0.007)** 
 deptwo   0.018 0.007 0.006 -0.010 
    (0.008)* (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) 
 depthree   0.025 0.016 0.015 0.004 
    (0.009)** (0.006)* (0.007)* (0.006) 
 depfour   0.017 0.011 0.010 0.004 
    (0.006)** (0.005)* (0.004)* (0.004) 
 depfive   
Base Base Base Base 
    
 depsix   -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 -0.012 
    (0.009)* (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) 
 depseven   -0.042 -0.037 -0.037 -0.024 
    (0.009)** (0.008)** (0.008)** (0.007)** 
 depeight   -0.066 -0.055 -0.055 -0.033 
    (0.019)** (0.018)** (0.018)** (0.015)* 
 depnine   -0.114 -0.094 -0.096 -0.063 
    (0.042)** (0.037)* (0.037)* (0.029)* 
 depten   -0.133 -0.115 -0.115 -0.076 
    (0.024)** (0.020)** (0.020)** (0.015)** 
 main_urban   
Base Base Base Base 
    
 satellite_urban   0.058 0.067 0.069 0.075 
    (0.013)** (0.012)** (0.012)** (0.013)** 
 independ_urban   0.094 0.105 0.107 0.116 
    (0.017)** (0.016)** (0.016)** (0.015)** 
 rural_high_influ   0.013 0.017 0.017 0.036 
    (0.015) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013)** 
 rural_mod_influ   0.028 0.030 0.030 0.051 
    (0.010)** (0.010)** (0.011)** (0.012)** 
 rural_low_influ   0.037 0.042 0.042 0.064 
    (0.018)* (0.017)* (0.017)* (0.015)** 
 high_rural   0.087 0.091 0.093 0.125 
 2
3
7
 
    (0.029)** (0.029)** (0.029)** (0.027)** 
 loc_ns   -0.047 -0.130 -0.120 -0.103 
    (0.103) (0.128) (0.111) (0.109) 
 male_une58   -0.007 -0.007 -0.008 -0.010 
    (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) 
 fem_une58   -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 -0.011 
    (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.010) 
 maoripct   0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 
    (0.002)** (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.001)** 
Geography Interaction       
 deponeMao   0.010 0.001 -0.002 0.001 
    (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) 
 deptwoMao   0.023 0.018 0.014 0.014 
    (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
 depthreeMao   0.024 0.019 0.018 0.020 
    (0.011)* (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
 depfourMao   0.013 0.011 0.011 0.015 
    (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
 depfiveMao   
Base Base Base Base 
    
 depsixMao   0.019 0.026 0.026 0.024 
    (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) 
 depsevenMao   0.035 0.038 0.038 0.037 
    (0.018) (0.017)* (0.017)* (0.017)* 
 depeightMao   0.031 0.033 0.036 0.029 
    (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) 
 depnineMao   0.083 0.081 0.086 0.070 
    (0.036)* (0.031)** (0.030)** (0.026)** 
 deptenMao   0.082 0.090 0.093 0.077 
    (0.024)** (0.020)** (0.020)** (0.018)** 
 main_urbanMao   
Base Base Base Base 
    
 satellite_urbanMao   -0.036 -0.036 -0.029 -0.024 
    (0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.025) 
 independ_urbanMao   -0.037 -0.033 -0.030 -0.031 
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    (0.017)* (0.017)* (0.017) (0.015)* 
 rural_high_influMao   -0.045 -0.039 -0.035 -0.042 
    (0.034) (0.033) (0.033) (0.036) 
 rural_mod_influMao   -0.000 0.003 0.010 0.008 
    (0.022) (0.024) (0.023) (0.025) 
 rural_low_influMao   -0.023 -0.018 -0.006 -0.007 
    (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) 
 high_ruralMao   -0.035 -0.048 -0.038 -0.049 
    (0.034) (0.034) (0.035) (0.034) 
 loc_nsMao   -0.359 -0.367 -0.370 -0.372 
    (0.154)* (0.181)* (0.163)* (0.166)* 
 male_une58Mao   0.002 0.000 0.001 0.001 
    (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
 fem_une58Mao   0.002 0.004 0.004 0.003 
    (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
 maoripctMao   -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 
    (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.001)** 
Household Composition       
 kidu5own    -0.253 -0.224 -0.165 
     (0.022)** (0.022)** (0.021)** 
 ownkidu5    -0.096 -0.089 -0.040 
     (0.016)** (0.016)** (0.016)* 
 kid516own    -0.117 -0.089 -0.027 
     (0.026)** (0.025)** (0.024) 
 ownkid5_16    -0.014 -0.008 0.037 
     (0.047) (0.047) (0.045) 
 elderly    -0.021 -0.014 0.022 
     (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) 
 numelderly    0.025 0.027 0.013 
     (0.028) (0.028) (0.030) 
 dacc    0.038 0.037 0.028 
     (0.011)** (0.011)** (0.011)* 
 nacc    -0.033 -0.032 -0.040 
     (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) 
 ddpb    0.017 0.023 0.047 
     (0.008)* (0.009)** (0.009)** 
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 ndpb    0.057 0.050 0.058 
     (0.054) (0.052) (0.048) 
 dinvsick    -0.025 -0.022 0.006 
     (0.012)* (0.012) (0.012) 
 ninvsick    -0.036 -0.030 0.007 
     (0.015)* (0.016) (0.017) 
 dunemp    -0.056 -0.055 -0.018 
     (0.006)** (0.006)** (0.005)** 
 nunemp    -0.015 -0.012 0.007 
     (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) 
 kidu5oth    -0.004 0.022 0.062 
     (0.015) (0.015) (0.014)** 
 othkidu5    0.003 0.009 0.044 
     (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)* 
 kid516oth    -0.005 0.009 0.048 
     (0.009) (0.009) (0.008)** 
 othkid5_16    0.020 0.032 0.069 
     (0.009)* (0.009)** (0.009)** 
 bth_prnt    
Base Base Base 
     
 no_spse_no_prnt    -0.039 -0.049 0.038 
     (0.026) (0.027) (0.016)* 
 spse_only    0.132 0.118 0.165 
     (0.016)** (0.016)** (0.011)** 
 one_prnt    -0.017 -0.022 0.025 
     (0.014) (0.014) (0.009)** 
 oneprnt_spse    0.157 0.144 0.166 
     (0.015)** (0.015)** (0.016)** 
 two_prnt_spse    0.180 0.167 0.157 
     (0.012)** (0.012)** (0.013)** 
 nperson    -0.017 -0.018 -0.038 
     (0.008)* (0.008)* (0.007)** 
Household Composition Interaction       
 kidu5ownMao    0.019 0.020 -0.006 
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     (0.018) (0.020) (0.020) 
 ownkidu5Mao    0.003 0.005 -0.003 
     (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
 kid516ownMao    0.016 0.012 -0.010 
     (0.026) (0.025) (0.022) 
 ownkid5_16Mao    0.010 0.008 -0.002 
     (0.050) (0.049) (0.048) 
 elderlyMao    -0.012 -0.007 -0.022 
     (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
 numelderlyMao    -0.018 -0.024 -0.003 
     (0.059) (0.058) (0.056) 
 daccMao    -0.040 -0.035 -0.039 
     (0.019)* (0.019) (0.019)* 
 naccMao    -0.006 -0.004 0.004 
     (0.063) (0.063) (0.063) 
 ddpbMao    -0.020 -0.023 -0.033 
     (0.013) (0.014) (0.015)* 
 ndpbMao    -0.068 -0.070 -0.073 
     (0.059) (0.056) (0.054) 
 dinvsickMao    0.007 0.010 0.007 
     (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) 
 ninvsickMao    -0.034 -0.038 -0.055 
     (0.024) (0.024) (0.025)* 
 dunempMao    -0.003 0.001 -0.010 
     (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) 
 nunempMao    -0.001 -0.005 -0.010 
     (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
 kidu5othMao    -0.037 -0.033 -0.036 
     (0.014)** (0.015)* (0.015)* 
 othkidu5Mao    -0.039 -0.043 -0.049 
     (0.028) (0.027) (0.026) 
 kid516othMao    -0.020 -0.017 -0.021 
     (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) 
 othkid5_16Mao    -0.037 -0.040 -0.047 
     (0.006)** (0.006)** (0.007)** 
 bth_prntMao    Base Base Base 
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 no_spse_no_prntMao    -0.006 0.002 -0.033 
     (0.019) (0.019) (0.017)* 
 spse_onlyMao    0.031 0.039 0.018 
     (0.013)* (0.014)** (0.012) 
 one_prntMao    -0.004 0.001 -0.016 
     (0.011) (0.011) (0.009) 
 oneprnt_spseMao    -0.030 -0.020 -0.019 
     (0.018) (0.018) (0.020) 
 two_prnt_spseMao    -0.076 -0.071 -0.070 
     (0.017)** (0.019)** (0.019)** 
 npersonMao    0.027 0.027 0.026 
     (0.005)** (0.005)** (0.006)** 
Unpaid Work Activities       
 housework     0.065 0.052 
      (0.005)** (0.005)** 
 volunteer     -0.111 -0.104 
      (0.005)** (0.005)** 
 chldcare_mem     -0.062 -0.055 
      (0.006)** (0.006)** 
 chldcare_nonmem     -0.001 -0.001 
      (0.005) (0.004) 
 sick_mem     -0.016 -0.007 
      (0.009) (0.009) 
 sick_nonmem     -0.034 -0.030 
      (0.007)** (0.006)** 
Unpaid Work Activities Interactions       
 houseworkMao     -0.053 -0.054 
      (0.010)** (0.011)** 
 volunteerMao     -0.007 -0.009 
      (0.010) (0.011) 
 chldcare_memMao     -0.015 -0.018 
      (0.009) (0.009) 
 chldcare_nonmemMao     -0.010 -0.011 
      (0.008) (0.008) 
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 sick_memMao     -0.028 -0.031 
      (0.014)* (0.014)* 
 sick_nonmemMao     -0.005 -0.006 
      (0.011) (0.011) 
Socioeconomic Status       
 own_house      0.004 
       (0.006) 
 hhincome      0.061 
       (0.003)** 
 investment      -0.038 
       (0.007)** 
 oth_govt_benefit      -0.076 
       (0.007)** 
 oth_source      -0.165 
       (0.009)** 
Socioeconomic Status Interactions       
 own_houseMao      -0.023 
       (0.010)* 
 hhincomeMao      -0.007 
       (0.004) 
 investmentMao      0.046 
       (0.016)** 
 oth_govt_benefitMao      0.012 
       (0.014) 
 oth_sourceMao      0.058 
       (0.021)** 
2) EMPLOYMENT AND STUDYING 
  Age Individual 
Characteristics 
Geography Household 
Composition 
Unpaid Work 
Activities 
Socioeconomic 
Status 
Ethnicity        
 maori -0.150 -0.206 -0.172 -0.112 -0.110 -0.136 
  (0.012)** (0.019)** (0.031)** (0.035)** (0.033)** (0.031)** 
Age        
 age15 Base Base Base Base Base Base 
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 age16 0.041 -0.109 -0.101 -0.092 -0.092 -0.092 
  (0.005)** (0.008)** (0.007)** (0.007)** (0.006)** (0.007)** 
 age17 -0.041 -0.160 -0.156 -0.150 -0.153 -0.160 
  (0.008)** (0.011)** (0.008)** (0.009)** (0.009)** (0.009)** 
 age18 -0.149 -0.218 -0.217 -0.208 -0.210 -0.216 
  (0.016)** (0.016)** (0.019)** (0.019)** (0.019)** (0.020)** 
 age19 -0.154 -0.222 -0.222 -0.209 -0.211 -0.218 
  (0.017)** (0.017)** (0.022)** (0.022)** (0.022)** (0.024)** 
 age20 -0.154 -0.222 -0.222 -0.206 -0.209 -0.216 
  (0.016)** (0.015)** (0.020)** (0.020)** (0.021)** (0.022)** 
 age21 -0.184 -0.237 -0.236 -0.219 -0.222 -0.228 
  (0.016)** (0.014)** (0.016)** (0.017)** (0.017)** (0.018)** 
 age22 -0.207 -0.248 -0.247 -0.229 -0.232 -0.238 
  (0.014)** (0.013)** (0.014)** (0.015)** (0.015)** (0.016)** 
 age23 -0.217 -0.252 -0.251 -0.232 -0.234 -0.240 
  (0.011)** (0.010)** (0.012)** (0.013)** (0.013)** (0.014)** 
 age24 -0.223 -0.255 -0.254 -0.233 -0.235 -0.240 
  (0.011)** (0.010)** (0.011)** (0.012)** (0.012)** (0.013)** 
Age Interactions       
 age15Mao 
Base Base Base Base Base Base 
  
 age16Mao -0.020 0.044 0.042 0.040 0.034 0.033 
  (0.013) (0.012)** (0.013)** (0.013)** (0.013)** (0.013)* 
 age17Mao -0.022 0.035 0.034 0.027 0.022 0.030 
  (0.009)* (0.010)** (0.010)** (0.010)** (0.010)* (0.011)** 
 age18Mao -0.045 0.007 0.006 -0.009 -0.017 -0.009 
  (0.013)** (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) 
 age19Mao -0.028 0.033 0.028 0.010 0.001 0.009 
  (0.012)* (0.013)* (0.013)* (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
 age20Mao -0.035 0.024 0.021 0.000 -0.008 -0.002 
  (0.016)* (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) 
 age21Mao -0.018 0.037 0.031 0.012 0.005 0.014 
  (0.016) (0.016)* (0.016) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
 age22Mao 0.027 0.082 0.077 0.059 0.052 0.064 
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  (0.012)* (0.013)** (0.013)** (0.012)** (0.013)** (0.013)** 
 age23Mao 0.033 0.078 0.071 0.050 0.045 0.061 
  (0.013)* (0.011)** (0.011)** (0.015)** (0.015)** (0.015)** 
 age24Mao 0.028 0.071 0.066 0.037 0.031 0.045 
  (0.015) (0.017)** (0.018)** (0.020) (0.020) (0.019)* 
Individual Characteristics       
 school_edu  0.226 0.214 0.197 0.190 0.187 
   (0.008)** (0.007)** (0.006)** (0.006)** (0.007)** 
 immigrant  -0.003 -0.012 -0.016 -0.012 -0.008 
   (0.004) (0.004)** (0.004)** (0.004)** (0.004) 
 iwi  0.006 0.008 0.002 0.001 0.001 
   (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
 mancestry  -0.054 -0.043 -0.032 -0.032 -0.028 
   (0.007)** (0.007)** (0.007)** (0.007)** (0.008)** 
Individual Characteristics Interaction       
 school_eduMao  -0.039 -0.039 -0.033 -0.034 -0.036 
   (0.008)** (0.008)** (0.008)** (0.009)** (0.009)** 
 immigrantMao  0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.004 -0.008 
   (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) 
 iwiMao  0.009 0.016 0.021 0.015 0.014 
   (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)* (0.011) (0.012) 
 mancestryMao  0.136 0.114 0.100 0.090 0.083 
   (0.018)** (0.017)** (0.017)** (0.018)** (0.019)** 
Geography        
 depone   0.033 0.011 0.011 0.007 
    (0.004)** (0.006) (0.005)* (0.006) 
 deptwo   0.026 0.010 0.010 0.008 
    (0.006)** (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
 depthree   0.015 0.004 0.004 0.003 
    (0.003)** (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
 depfour   0.007 0.002 0.002 0.001 
    (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
 depfive   
Base Base Base Base 
    
 depsix   -0.013 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 
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    (0.003)** (0.003)* (0.003)* (0.004)* 
 depseven   -0.017 -0.007 -0.008 -0.006 
    (0.006)** (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
 depeight   -0.019 -0.005 -0.005 -0.002 
    (0.007)** (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
 depnine   -0.044 -0.024 -0.023 -0.020 
    (0.011)** (0.008)** (0.008)** (0.008)* 
 depten   -0.069 -0.045 -0.044 -0.037 
    (0.009)** (0.008)** (0.008)** (0.008)** 
 main_urban   
Base Base Base Base 
    
 satellite_urban   -0.052 -0.047 -0.048 -0.049 
    (0.006)** (0.006)** (0.006)** (0.006)** 
 independ_urban   -0.045 -0.039 -0.040 -0.041 
    (0.009)** (0.009)** (0.009)** (0.009)** 
 rural_high_influ   -0.050 -0.047 -0.047 -0.047 
    (0.008)** (0.009)** (0.009)** (0.009)** 
 rural_mod_influ   -0.057 -0.053 -0.054 -0.054 
    (0.008)** (0.008)** (0.008)** (0.008)** 
 rural_low_influ   -0.065 -0.060 -0.061 -0.063 
    (0.010)** (0.010)** (0.010)** (0.010)** 
 high_rural   -0.080 -0.074 -0.077 -0.079 
    (0.012)** (0.011)** (0.011)** (0.012)** 
 loc_ns   0.080 0.033 -0.008 0.000 
    (0.078) (0.080) (0.066) (0.064) 
 male_une58   0.010 0.007 0.007 0.008 
    (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
 fem_une58   -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 
    (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
 maoripct   -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
    (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** 
Geography Interactions       
 deponeMao   0.045 0.045 0.047 0.039 
    (0.018)* (0.019)* (0.019)* (0.019)* 
 deptwoMao   0.033 0.036 0.040 0.035 
    (0.022) (0.023) (0.021) (0.021) 
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 depthreeMao   0.003 0.006 0.007 0.003 
    (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) 
 depfourMao   0.014 0.016 0.017 0.018 
    (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) 
 depfiveMao   
Base Base Base Base 
    
 depsixMao   -0.002 -0.000 -0.001 0.001 
    (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) 
 depsevenMao   -0.006 -0.008 -0.007 -0.006 
    (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) 
 depeightMao   -0.012 -0.014 -0.016 -0.013 
    (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) 
 depnineMao   -0.037 -0.038 -0.041 -0.036 
    (0.015)* (0.013)** (0.013)** (0.014)** 
 deptenMao   -0.038 -0.041 -0.042 -0.034 
    (0.015)* (0.015)** (0.015)** (0.015)* 
 main_urbanMao   
Base Base Base Base 
    
 satellite_urbanMao   0.019 0.018 0.014 0.015 
    (0.017) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
 independ_urbanMao   0.040 0.037 0.035 0.035 
    (0.013)** (0.012)** (0.012)** (0.012)** 
 rural_high_influMao   0.036 0.032 0.029 0.025 
    (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027) 
 rural_mod_influMao   -0.017 -0.017 -0.022 -0.022 
    (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021) 
 rural_low_influMao   0.034 0.030 0.022 0.023 
    (0.017)* (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) 
 high_ruralMao   0.005 0.000 -0.004 -0.003 
    (0.034) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) 
 loc_nsMao   -0.229 -0.226 -0.225 -0.230 
    (0.204) (0.221) (0.211) (0.212) 
 male_une58Mao   -0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.000 
    (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
 fem_une58Mao   -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
    (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
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     (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
 kid516oth    0.012 0.009 0.011 
 maoripctMao   0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Household Composition       
 kidu5own    -0.202 -0.200 -0.194 
     (0.008)** (0.008)** (0.009)** 
 ownkidu5    -0.029 -0.031 -0.029 
     (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
 kid516own    -0.064 -0.067 -0.059 
     (0.016)** (0.016)** (0.017)** 
 ownkid5_16    0.016 0.015 0.010 
     (0.041) (0.041) (0.038) 
 elderly    -0.031 -0.029 -0.032 
     (0.011)** (0.011)* (0.011)** 
 numelderly    -0.014 -0.008 -0.015 
     (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) 
 dacc    -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 
     (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
 nacc    -0.012 -0.015 -0.015 
     (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
 ddpb    -0.035 -0.033 -0.027 
     (0.006)** (0.006)** (0.006)** 
 ndpb    -0.065 -0.056 -0.057 
     (0.041) (0.040) (0.040) 
 dinvsick    -0.042 -0.043 -0.038 
     (0.005)** (0.006)** (0.006)** 
 ninvsick    -0.050 -0.047 -0.041 
     (0.015)** (0.015)** (0.015)** 
 dunemp    -0.028 -0.029 -0.026 
     (0.006)** (0.006)** (0.005)** 
 nunemp    -0.009 -0.009 -0.008 
     (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
 kidu5oth    -0.075 -0.074 -0.070 
     (0.009)** (0.009)** (0.009)** 
 othkidu5    -0.016 -0.020 -0.018 
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     (0.003)** (0.003)** (0.003)** 
 othkid5_16    -0.010 -0.011 -0.009 
     (0.002)** (0.002)** (0.003)** 
 bth_prnt    
Base Base Base 
     
 no_spse_no_prnt    -0.041 -0.046 -0.026 
     (0.009)** (0.010)** (0.008)** 
 spse_only    -0.045 -0.050 -0.038 
     (0.008)** (0.008)** (0.006)** 
 one_prnt    -0.021 -0.023 -0.017 
     (0.004)** (0.004)** (0.004)** 
 oneprnt_spse    -0.080 -0.082 -0.078 
     (0.019)** (0.019)** (0.019)** 
 two_prnt_spse    -0.106 -0.106 -0.105 
     (0.014)** (0.014)** (0.015)** 
 nperson    0.015 0.014 0.013 
     (0.002)** (0.002)** (0.002)** 
Household Composition Interaction       
 kidu5ownMao    0.085 0.079 0.088 
     (0.021)** (0.023)** (0.025)** 
 ownkidu5Mao    0.010 0.007 0.015 
     (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) 
 kid516ownMao    0.063 0.062 0.070 
     (0.024)** (0.025)* (0.025)** 
 ownkid5_16Mao    -0.045 -0.045 -0.033 
     (0.044) (0.043) (0.044) 
 elderlyMao    -0.039 -0.042 -0.042 
     (0.028) (0.027) (0.028) 
 numelderlyMao    0.040 0.040 0.036 
     (0.054) (0.055) (0.054) 
 daccMao    0.013 0.011 0.006 
     (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
 naccMao    0.027 0.028 0.025 
     (0.051) (0.051) (0.053) 
 ddpbMao    0.001 0.001 0.005 
     (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
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 ndpbMao    0.048 0.043 0.049 
     (0.051) (0.049) (0.050) 
 dinvsickMao    0.015 0.013 0.017 
     (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
 ninvsickMao    0.066 0.062 0.066 
     (0.020)** (0.021)** (0.021)** 
 dunempMao    -0.007 -0.009 -0.003 
     (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) 
 nunempMao    0.002 0.003 0.008 
     (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) 
 kidu5othMao    0.033 0.028 0.034 
     (0.012)** (0.012)* (0.013)** 
 othkidu5Mao    0.027 0.031 0.037 
     (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) 
 kid516othMao    -0.012 -0.013 -0.005 
     (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) 
 othkid5_16Mao    0.009 0.010 0.018 
     (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)** 
 bth_prnt    
Base Base Base 
     
 no_spse_no_prntMao    -0.002 -0.001 0.013 
     (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) 
 spse_onlyMao    0.012 0.015 0.024 
     (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) 
 one_prntMao    -0.011 -0.010 -0.003 
     (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
 oneprnt_spseMao    0.010 0.007 0.010 
     (0.029) (0.028) (0.029) 
 two_prnt_spseMao    0.063 0.061 0.057 
     (0.025)* (0.025)* (0.026)* 
 npersonMao    -0.016 -0.016 -0.021 
     (0.005)** (0.004)** (0.005)** 
Unpaid Work Activities       
 housework     0.059 0.054 
      (0.004)** (0.005)** 
 volunteer     0.089 0.083 
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      (0.006)** (0.006)** 
 chldcare_mem     0.001 0.002 
      (0.003) (0.003) 
 chldcare_nonmem     -0.004 -0.003 
      (0.002) (0.002) 
 sick_mem     0.003 0.002 
      (0.006) (0.006) 
 sick_nonmem     0.053 0.052 
      (0.005)** (0.005)** 
Unpaid Work Activities Interactions       
 houseworkMao     0.027 0.029 
      (0.011)* (0.011)** 
 volunteerMao     0.000 0.005 
      (0.009) (0.010) 
 chldcare_memMao     0.003 0.004 
      (0.008) (0.008) 
 chldcare_nonmemMao     -0.005 -0.005 
      (0.008) (0.008) 
 sick_memMao     0.021 0.026 
      (0.010)* (0.010)** 
 sick_nonmemMao     0.001 0.001 
      (0.011) (0.012) 
Socioeconomic Status       
 own_house      0.024 
       (0.005)** 
 hhincome      0.003 
       (0.001)** 
 investment      0.112 
       (0.006)** 
 oth_govt_benefit      -0.034 
       (0.008)** 
 oth_source      0.061 
       (0.006)** 
Socioeconomic Status Interaction       
 own_houseMao      0.018 
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       (0.008)* 
 hhincomeMao      0.009 
       (0.003)** 
 investmentMao      0.023 
       (0.012)* 
 oth_govt_benefitMao      -0.018 
       (0.014) 
 oth_sourceMao      0.023 
       (0.017) 
3) STUDYING ONLY 
  Age Individual 
Characteristics 
Geography Household 
Composition 
Unpaid Work 
Activities 
Socioeconomic 
Status 
Ethnicity        
 maori -0.039 -0.103 -0.110 -0.068 -0.075 -0.110 
  (0.006)** (0.017)** (0.044)* (0.042) (0.042) (0.038)** 
Age        
 age15 
Base Base Base Base Base Base 
  
 age16 -0.066 -0.107 -0.103 -0.104 -0.104 -0.105 
  (0.005)** (0.010)** (0.008)** (0.007)** (0.007)** (0.006)** 
 age17 -0.151 -0.183 -0.183 -0.198 -0.201 -0.209 
  (0.008)** (0.014)** (0.012)** (0.016)** (0.016)** (0.015)** 
 age18 -0.191 -0.218 -0.222 -0.235 -0.237 -0.241 
  (0.013)** (0.011)** (0.010)** (0.015)** (0.015)** (0.014)** 
 age19 -0.190 -0.219 -0.225 -0.242 -0.244 -0.248 
  (0.028)** (0.022)** (0.010)** (0.011)** (0.011)** (0.010)** 
 age20 -0.199 -0.226 -0.232 -0.248 -0.250 -0.252 
  (0.031)** (0.024)** (0.012)** (0.008)** (0.008)** (0.008)** 
 age21 -0.214 -0.239 -0.243 -0.256 -0.258 -0.259 
  (0.019)** (0.013)** (0.007)** (0.013)** (0.013)** (0.012)** 
 age22 -0.226 -0.248 -0.250 -0.263 -0.265 -0.263 
  (0.011)** (0.008)** (0.008)** (0.014)** (0.014)** (0.013)** 
 age23 -0.234 -0.255 -0.257 -0.268 -0.270 -0.266 
  (0.010)** (0.012)** (0.011)** (0.017)** (0.017)** (0.015)** 
 age24 -0.238 -0.258 -0.259 -0.270 -0.272 -0.267 
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  (0.009)** (0.009)** (0.009)** (0.014)** (0.014)** (0.012)** 
Age Interaction       
 age15Mao Base Base Base Base Base Base 
        
 age16Mao -0.009 0.040 0.031 0.023 0.021 0.017 
  (0.008) (0.012)** (0.012)** (0.010)* (0.010)* (0.010) 
 age17Mao 0.011 0.072 0.068 0.090 0.083 0.079 
  (0.011) (0.015)** (0.015)** (0.017)** (0.017)** (0.017)** 
 age18Mao 0.042 0.116 0.131 0.169 0.154 0.154 
  (0.015)** (0.013)** (0.015)** (0.018)** (0.017)** (0.017)** 
 age19Mao -0.007 0.057 0.084 0.133 0.118 0.122 
  (0.026) (0.019)** (0.013)** (0.016)** (0.015)** (0.015)** 
 age20Mao -0.008 0.058 0.083 0.130 0.113 0.113 
  (0.028) (0.022)** (0.013)** (0.016)** (0.016)** (0.015)** 
 age21Mao 0.044 0.119 0.141 0.176 0.158 0.154 
  (0.017)* (0.011)** (0.014)** (0.020)** (0.019)** (0.019)** 
 age22Mao 0.059 0.131 0.148 0.172 0.154 0.140 
  (0.015)** (0.010)** (0.012)** (0.019)** (0.018)** (0.017)** 
 age23Mao 0.125 0.200 0.217 0.230 0.207 0.180 
  (0.016)** (0.014)** (0.017)** (0.020)** (0.019)** (0.019)** 
 age24Mao 0.146 0.222 0.237 0.244 0.219 0.186 
  (0.010)** (0.010)** (0.014)** (0.017)** (0.016)** (0.015)** 
Individual Characteristics       
 school_edu  0.103 0.094 0.083 0.080 0.078 
   (0.014)** (0.012)** (0.008)** (0.007)** (0.007)** 
 immigrant  0.040 0.029 0.034 0.035 0.031 
   (0.004)** (0.004)** (0.004)** (0.004)** (0.003)** 
 iwi  -0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003 
   (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
 mancestry  -0.036 -0.029 -0.027 -0.027 -0.026 
   (0.010)** (0.009)** (0.009)** (0.009)** (0.008)** 
Individual Characteristics Interactions      
 school_eduMao  -0.068 -0.058 -0.044 -0.048 -0.044 
   (0.011)** (0.010)** (0.008)** (0.007)** (0.007)** 
 immigrantMao  -0.039 -0.027 -0.031 -0.029 -0.024 
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   (0.013)** (0.013)* (0.013)* (0.013)* (0.013) 
 iwiMao  0.041 0.037 0.035 0.028 0.026 
   (0.014)** (0.013)** (0.014)** (0.014)* (0.014) 
 mancestryMao  0.075 0.073 0.073 0.065 0.068 
   (0.015)** (0.015)** (0.014)** (0.014)** (0.015)** 
Geography        
 depone   0.001 0.014 0.015 0.024 
    (0.016) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010)* 
 deptwo   -0.012 -0.003 -0.002 0.005 
    (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) 
 depthree   -0.017 -0.009 -0.009 -0.003 
    (0.011) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) 
 depfour   -0.007 -0.001 -0.001 0.003 
    (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
 depfive   
Base Base Base Base 
    
 depsix   0.015 0.015 0.015 0.011 
    (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) 
 depseven   0.027 0.021 0.021 0.015 
    (0.008)** (0.007)** (0.007)** (0.006)* 
 depeight   0.049 0.036 0.036 0.023 
    (0.022)* (0.017)* (0.017)* (0.015) 
 depnine   0.107 0.080 0.081 0.060 
    (0.045)* (0.033)* (0.033)* (0.027)* 
 depten   0.106 0.088 0.089 0.066 
    (0.023)** (0.017)** (0.016)** (0.013)** 
 main_urban   
Base Base Base Base 
    
 satellite_urban   -0.050 -0.041 -0.041 -0.043 
    (0.010)** (0.009)** (0.009)** (0.008)** 
 independ_urban   -0.081 -0.076 -0.078 -0.081 
    (0.014)** (0.013)** (0.013)** (0.011)** 
 rural_high_influ   -0.011 0.000 0.000 -0.008 
    (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
 rural_mod_influ   -0.023 -0.010 -0.011 -0.019 
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    (0.009)* (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)* 
 rural_low_influ   -0.038 -0.029 -0.030 -0.038 
    (0.016)* (0.014)* (0.014)* (0.012)** 
 high_rural   -0.063 -0.056 -0.058 -0.069 
    (0.027)* (0.025)* (0.026)* (0.025)** 
 loc_ns   -0.211 -0.214 -0.215 -0.215 
    (0.030)** (0.036)** (0.036)** (0.034)** 
 male_une58   0.008 0.004 0.004 0.005 
    (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) 
 fem_une58   0.008 0.010 0.010 0.010 
    (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010) 
 maoripct   -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 
    (0.002)** (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.001)** 
Geography Interaction       
 deponeMao   -0.011 -0.010 -0.008 -0.009 
    (0.016) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) 
 deptwoMao   -0.008 -0.010 -0.007 -0.008 
    (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) 
 depthreeMao   -0.010 -0.011 -0.011 -0.014 
    (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
 depfourMao   -0.014 -0.016 -0.015 -0.018 
    (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
 depfiveMao   
Base Base Base Base 
    
 depsixMao   -0.019 -0.022 -0.022 -0.021 
    (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) 
 depsevenMao   -0.027 -0.026 -0.026 -0.025 
    (0.012)* (0.012)* (0.012)* (0.012)* 
 depeightMao   -0.031 -0.027 -0.028 -0.023 
    (0.021) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) 
 depnineMao   -0.060 -0.048 -0.050 -0.041 
    (0.036) (0.026) (0.025)* (0.022) 
 deptenMao   -0.056 -0.053 -0.053 -0.044 
    (0.019)** (0.014)** (0.014)** (0.012)** 
 main_urbanMao   
Base Base Base Base 
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 satellite_urbanMao   0.036 0.025 0.018 0.016 
    (0.020) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
 independ_urbanMao   0.037 0.027 0.024 0.023 
    (0.014)** (0.013)* (0.013) (0.012) 
 rural_high_influMao   0.032 0.021 0.018 0.022 
    (0.032) (0.032) (0.031) (0.031) 
 rural_mod_influMao   0.020 0.010 0.007 0.008 
    (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) 
 rural_low_influMao   0.014 0.005 -0.002 -0.002 
    (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) 
 high_ruralMao   0.069 0.070 0.062 0.068 
    (0.027)* (0.026)** (0.026)* (0.026)** 
 loc_nsMao   0.790 0.787 0.786 0.786 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 male_une58Mao   -0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001 
    (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
 fem_une58Mao   -0.004 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 
    (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) 
 maoripctMao   0.005 0.004 0.004 0.004 
    (0.002)** (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.001)** 
Household Composition       
 kidu5own    -0.009 -0.027 -0.031 
     (0.016) (0.016) (0.015)* 
 ownkidu5    0.032 0.030 0.007 
     (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) 
 kid516own    0.105 0.082 0.044 
     (0.024)** (0.023)** (0.024) 
 ownkid5_16    0.001 -0.003 -0.023 
     (0.030) (0.030) (0.032) 
 elderly    -0.021 -0.021 -0.033 
     (0.012) (0.011) (0.012)** 
 numelderly    -0.034 -0.034 -0.024 
     (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) 
 dacc    -0.034 -0.035 -0.031 
     (0.009)** (0.009)** (0.009)** 
 nacc    0.013 0.012 0.021 
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     (0.031) (0.030) (0.030) 
 ddpb    -0.016 -0.018 -0.030 
     (0.006)** (0.006)** (0.006)** 
 ndpb    -0.048 -0.045 -0.042 
     (0.036) (0.036) (0.035) 
 dinvsick    -0.006 -0.007 -0.016 
     (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)* 
 ninvsick    0.023 0.023 0.004 
     (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) 
 dunemp    0.015 0.015 0.000 
     (0.006)* (0.007)* (0.006) 
 nunemp    -0.004 -0.004 -0.011 
     (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
 kidu5oth    -0.041 -0.053 -0.062 
     (0.014)** (0.013)** (0.013)** 
 othkidu5    -0.033 -0.034 -0.048 
     (0.016)* (0.017)* (0.016)** 
 kid516oth    -0.028 -0.036 -0.052 
     (0.009)** (0.008)** (0.008)** 
 othkid5_16    -0.026 -0.034 -0.050 
     (0.008)** (0.008)** (0.008)** 
 bth_prnt    
Base Base Base 
     
 no_spse_no_prnt    0.113 0.115 0.049 
     (0.025)** (0.025)** (0.017)** 
 spse_only    -0.055 -0.053 -0.083 
     (0.018)** (0.018)** (0.014)** 
 one_prnt    0.027 0.028 -0.001 
     (0.014) (0.014)* (0.010) 
 oneprnt_spse    -0.090 -0.089 -0.098 
     (0.017)** (0.018)** (0.019)** 
 two_prnt_spse    -0.120 -0.120 -0.116 
     (0.025)** (0.025)** (0.024)** 
 nperson    0.026 0.026 0.032 
     (0.008)** (0.008)** (0.007)** 
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Household Composition Interaction       
 kidu5ownMao    -0.007 -0.004 0.005 
     (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) 
 ownkidu5Mao    0.008 0.005 0.009 
     (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) 
 kid516ownMao    -0.045 -0.042 -0.029 
     (0.026) (0.025) (0.025) 
 ownkid5_16Mao    0.029 0.032 0.035 
     (0.038) (0.039) (0.040) 
 elderlyMao    0.069 0.064 0.070 
     (0.015)** (0.015)** (0.015)** 
 numelderlyMao    -0.011 -0.011 -0.020 
     (0.035) (0.033) (0.033) 
 daccMao    0.042 0.038 0.039 
     (0.014)** (0.014)** (0.014)** 
 naccMao    0.040 0.036 0.026 
     (0.047) (0.048) (0.047) 
 ddpbMao    0.029 0.030 0.035 
     (0.010)** (0.010)** (0.010)** 
 ndpbMao    0.052 0.050 0.045 
     (0.042) (0.043) (0.041) 
 dinvsickMao    -0.001 -0.003 -0.004 
     (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
 ninvsickMao    -0.002 -0.002 0.006 
     (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) 
 dunempMao    0.021 0.019 0.022 
     (0.007)** (0.007)** (0.006)** 
 nunempMao    0.014 0.015 0.015 
     (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
 kidu5othMao    0.036 0.034 0.033 
     (0.013)** (0.015)* (0.016)* 
 othkidu5Mao    0.030 0.030 0.032 
     (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) 
 kid516othMao    0.024 0.020 0.022 
     (0.008)** (0.007)** (0.007)** 
 othkid5_16Mao    0.026 0.028 0.031 
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     (0.006)** (0.006)** (0.005)** 
 bth_prntMao    
Base Base Base 
     
 no_spse_no_prntMao    -0.044 -0.044 -0.019 
     (0.014)** (0.014)** (0.013) 
 spse_onlyMao    -0.045 -0.045 -0.031 
     (0.014)** (0.014)** (0.013)* 
 one_prntMao    -0.005 -0.005 0.007 
     (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) 
 oneprnt_spseMao    0.011 0.009 0.010 
     (0.033) (0.034) (0.035) 
 two_prnt_spseMao    0.051 0.052 0.048 
     (0.036) (0.037) (0.038) 
 npersonMao    -0.024 -0.023 -0.021 
     (0.005)** (0.005)** (0.004)** 
Unpaid Work Activities       
 housework     -0.001 -0.001 
      (0.004) (0.004) 
 volunteer     0.058 0.053 
      (0.004)** (0.004)** 
 chldcare_mem     0.038 0.036 
      (0.004)** (0.004)** 
 chldcare_nonmem     -0.006 -0.006 
      (0.005) (0.004) 
 sick_mem     0.013 0.008 
      (0.007) (0.007) 
 sick_nonmem     -0.002 -0.004 
      (0.007) (0.007) 
Unpaid Work Activities Interaction       
 houseworkMao     0.017 0.018 
      (0.007)* (0.006)** 
 volunteerMao     0.028 0.029 
      (0.008)** (0.008)** 
 chldcare_memMao     0.008 0.008 
      (0.010) (0.010) 
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 chldcare_nonmemMao     0.026 0.025 
      (0.005)** (0.005)** 
 sick_memMao     0.010 0.011 
      (0.010) (0.009) 
 sick_nonmemMao     0.011 0.011 
      (0.012) (0.012) 
Socioeconomic Status       
 own_house      -0.000 
       (0.005) 
 hhincome      -0.032 
       (0.004)** 
 investment      0.022 
       (0.010)* 
 oth_govt_benefit      0.053 
       (0.008)** 
 oth_source      0.149 
       (0.007)** 
Socioeconomic Status Interactions       
 own_houseMao      0.005 
       (0.007) 
 hhincomeMao      0.008 
       (0.002)** 
 investmentMao      -0.036 
       (0.018)* 
 oth_govt_benefitMao      0.008 
       (0.013) 
 oth_sourceMao      -0.056 
       (0.010)** 
4) INACTIVE 
  Age Individual 
Characteristics 
Geography Household 
Composition 
Unpaid Work 
Activities 
Socioeconomic 
Status 
Ethnicity        
 maori 0.176 0.255 0.171 0.097 0.071 0.055 
  (0.013)** (0.017)** (0.022)** (0.024)** (0.024)** (0.025)* 
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Age        
 age15 
Base Base Base Base Base Base 
  
 age16 -0.101 0.062 0.043 0.005 0.003 -0.007 
  (0.006)** (0.006)** (0.006)** (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
 age17 -0.149 -0.014 -0.031 -0.054 -0.058 -0.086 
  (0.012)** (0.012) (0.013)* (0.012)** (0.011)** (0.012)** 
 age18 -0.146 -0.013 -0.034 -0.067 -0.068 -0.092 
  (0.014)** (0.015) (0.018) (0.016)** (0.016)** (0.016)** 
 age19 -0.151 -0.018 -0.042 -0.078 -0.077 -0.097 
  (0.014)** (0.015) (0.019)* (0.017)** (0.017)** (0.017)** 
 age20 -0.154 -0.025 -0.048 -0.096 -0.094 -0.107 
  (0.014)** (0.013) (0.018)** (0.017)** (0.017)** (0.017)** 
 age21 -0.156 -0.030 -0.052 -0.106 -0.104 -0.111 
  (0.014)** (0.015)* (0.020)** (0.017)** (0.017)** (0.017)** 
 age22 -0.152 -0.026 -0.046 -0.110 -0.107 -0.109 
  (0.014)** (0.015) (0.020)* (0.018)** (0.018)** (0.017)** 
 age23 -0.155 -0.036 -0.054 -0.122 -0.120 -0.116 
  (0.015)** (0.016)* (0.020)** (0.016)** (0.016)** (0.015)** 
 age24 -0.155 -0.041 -0.060 -0.130 -0.128 -0.121 
  (0.011)** (0.012)** (0.017)** (0.015)** (0.015)** (0.013)** 
Age Interaction       
 age15Mao 
Base Base Base Base Base Base 
  
 age16Mao 0.024 -0.062 -0.061 -0.045 -0.039 -0.034 
  (0.009)** (0.009)** (0.009)** (0.009)** (0.008)** (0.008)** 
 age17Mao 0.052 -0.045 -0.043 -0.026 -0.017 -0.015 
  (0.014)** (0.014)** (0.015)** (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) 
 age18Mao 0.063 -0.044 -0.044 -0.029 -0.016 -0.014 
  (0.014)** (0.015)** (0.015)** (0.013)* (0.012) (0.012) 
 age19Mao 0.090 -0.023 -0.022 -0.016 -0.003 -0.002 
  (0.012)** (0.013) (0.014) (0.012) (0.011) (0.010) 
 age20Mao 0.099 -0.015 -0.014 -0.004 0.010 0.013 
  (0.012)** (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) 
 age21Mao 0.069 -0.041 -0.040 -0.030 -0.017 -0.015 
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  (0.013)** (0.015)** (0.016)* (0.012)* (0.012) (0.011) 
 age22Mao 0.032 -0.069 -0.068 -0.057 -0.046 -0.044 
  (0.014)* (0.019)** (0.018)** (0.016)** (0.015)** (0.015)** 
 age23Mao 0.003 -0.087 -0.086 -0.068 -0.055 -0.051 
  (0.012) (0.015)** (0.015)** (0.012)** (0.011)** (0.011)** 
 age24Mao -0.009 -0.096 -0.095 -0.068 -0.052 -0.047 
  (0.011) (0.015)** (0.015)** (0.015)** (0.013)** (0.013)** 
Individual Characteristics        
 school_edu  -0.368 -0.341 -0.259 -0.239 -0.212 
   (0.008)** (0.006)** (0.004)** (0.004)** (0.004)** 
 immigrant  0.019 0.033 0.049 0.041 0.032 
   (0.005)** (0.007)** (0.006)** (0.005)** (0.004)** 
 iwi  -0.005 -0.009 -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 
   (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) 
 mancestry  0.065 0.050 0.029 0.030 0.027 
   (0.008)** (0.007)** (0.007)** (0.007)** (0.006)** 
Individual Characteristics Interaction       
 school_eduMao  0.084 0.083 0.054 0.048 0.046 
   (0.008)** (0.007)** (0.005)** (0.005)** (0.005)** 
 immigrantMao  -0.040 -0.039 -0.042 -0.039 -0.030 
   (0.014)** (0.015)** (0.013)** (0.012)** (0.011)** 
 iwiMao  -0.004 -0.008 -0.013 -0.006 -0.004 
   (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
 mancestryMao  -0.122 -0.104 -0.089 -0.078 -0.065 
   (0.011)** (0.010)** (0.010)** (0.011)** (0.011)** 
Geography       
 depone   -0.045 -0.023 -0.023 -0.008 
    (0.006)** (0.007)** (0.006)** (0.007) 
 deptwo   -0.032 -0.015 -0.014 -0.004 
    (0.005)** (0.005)** (0.005)* (0.006) 
 depthree   -0.023 -0.011 -0.010 -0.003 
    (0.006)** (0.005)* (0.006) (0.006) 
 depfour   -0.017 -0.012 -0.011 -0.007 
    (0.007)** (0.006)* (0.005)* (0.005) 
 depfive   Base Base Base Base 
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 depsix   0.016 0.012 0.013 0.009 
    (0.005)** (0.005)** (0.005)** (0.005) 
 depseven   0.032 0.023 0.024 0.016 
    (0.006)** (0.005)** (0.005)** (0.005)** 
 depeight   0.035 0.024 0.023 0.012 
    (0.009)** (0.006)** (0.006)** (0.006)* 
 depnine   0.051 0.038 0.038 0.023 
    (0.014)** (0.006)** (0.006)** (0.006)** 
 depten   0.097 0.071 0.070 0.047 
    (0.008)** (0.007)** (0.006)** (0.006)** 
 main_urban   
Base Base Base Base 
    
 satellite_urban   0.044 0.021 0.020 0.017 
    (0.007)** (0.007)** (0.007)** (0.007)* 
 independ_urban   0.032 0.010 0.010 0.005 
    (0.009)** (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
 rural_high_influ   0.049 0.030 0.030 0.019 
    (0.008)** (0.006)** (0.007)** (0.007)** 
 rural_mod_influ   0.053 0.034 0.035 0.022 
    (0.009)** (0.008)** (0.008)** (0.008)** 
 rural_low_influ   0.066 0.048 0.049 0.037 
    (0.010)** (0.009)** (0.009)** (0.009)** 
 high_rural   0.056 0.039 0.042 0.024 
    (0.012)** (0.013)** (0.013)** (0.013) 
 loc_ns   0.178 0.311 0.343 0.317 
    (0.032)** (0.041)** (0.035)** (0.036)** 
 male_une58   -0.010 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 
    (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
 fem_une58   0.009 0.006 0.006 0.005 
    (0.004)* (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
 maoripct   0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 
    (0.001)** (0.000)* (0.000)* (0.000)* 
Geography Interactions       
 deponeMao   -0.045 -0.036 -0.037 -0.031 
    (0.012)** (0.013)** (0.013)** (0.013)* 
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 deptwoMao   -0.048 -0.044 -0.047 -0.041 
    (0.015)** (0.013)** (0.013)** (0.012)** 
 depthreeMao   -0.017 -0.015 -0.014 -0.010 
    (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
 depfourMao   -0.013 -0.012 -0.013 -0.015 
    (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
 depfiveMao   
Base Base Base Base 
    
 depsixMao   0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 
    (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
 depsevenMao   -0.002 -0.004 -0.006 -0.007 
    (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
 depeightMao   0.012 0.008 0.008 0.007 
    (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) 
 depnineMao   0.013 0.005 0.006 0.006 
    (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
 deptenMao   0.012 0.003 0.002 0.001 
    (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) 
 main_urbanMao   
Base Base Base Base 
    
 satellite_urbanMao   -0.019 -0.007 -0.003 -0.007 
    (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) 
 independ_urbanMao   -0.039 -0.030 -0.028 -0.027 
    (0.010)** (0.008)** (0.008)** (0.008)** 
 rural_high_influMao   -0.023 -0.014 -0.012 -0.005 
    (0.016) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) 
 rural_mod_influMao   -0.003 0.004 0.005 0.005 
    (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) 
 rural_low_influMao   -0.025 -0.018 -0.013 -0.014 
    (0.012)* (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) 
 high_ruralMao   -0.039 -0.023 -0.020 -0.016 
    (0.025) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
 loc_nsMao   -0.202 -0.194 -0.191 -0.184 
    (0.038)** (0.040)** (0.042)** (0.039)** 
 male_une58Mao   0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 
    (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
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 fem_une58Mao   0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004 
    (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
 maoripctMao   -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
    (0.000)** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Household Composition       
 kidu5own    0.465 0.451 0.390 
     (0.006)** (0.009)** (0.010)** 
 ownkidu5    0.093 0.090 0.062 
     (0.010)** (0.010)** (0.010)** 
 kid516own    0.077 0.074 0.041 
     (0.012)** (0.012)** (0.011)** 
 ownkid5_16    -0.002 -0.004 -0.024 
     (0.041) (0.039) (0.035) 
 elderly    0.073 0.064 0.042 
     (0.007)** (0.008)** (0.007)** 
 numelderly    0.023 0.015 0.026 
     (0.034) (0.032) (0.026) 
 dacc    -0.001 0.002 0.006 
     (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
 nacc    0.033 0.035 0.035 
     (0.031) (0.030) (0.027) 
 ddpb    0.033 0.029 0.009 
     (0.005)** (0.005)** (0.005) 
 ndpb    0.057 0.051 0.041 
     (0.034) (0.033) (0.030) 
 dinvsick    0.073 0.071 0.047 
     (0.005)** (0.005)** (0.005)** 
 ninvsick    0.062 0.054 0.030 
     (0.010)** (0.010)** (0.010)** 
 dunemp    0.068 0.070 0.043 
     (0.006)** (0.006)** (0.005)** 
 nunemp    0.028 0.026 0.012 
     (0.006)** (0.006)** (0.006)* 
 kidu5oth    0.120 0.106 0.071 
     (0.006)** (0.006)** (0.006)** 
 othkidu5    0.046 0.044 0.021 
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     (0.011)** (0.010)** (0.010)* 
 kid516oth    0.022 0.018 -0.006 
     (0.005)** (0.005)** (0.005) 
 othkid5_16    0.017 0.013 -0.009 
     (0.003)** (0.004)** (0.004)* 
 bth_prnt    
Base Base Base 
     
 no_spse_no_prnt    -0.033 -0.019 -0.062 
     (0.010)** (0.010) (0.008)** 
 spse_only    -0.032 -0.014 -0.043 
     (0.008)** (0.008) (0.008)** 
 one_prnt    0.011 0.017 -0.008 
     (0.004)** (0.004)** (0.005) 
 oneprnt_spse    0.012 0.027 0.011 
     (0.011) (0.011)* (0.010) 
 two_prnt_spse    0.046 0.058 0.063 
     (0.019)* (0.019)** (0.018)** 
 nperson    -0.024 -0.022 -0.008 
     (0.003)** (0.003)** (0.004)* 
Household Composition Interactions       
 kidu5ownMao    -0.097 -0.095 -0.087 
     (0.007)** (0.008)** (0.009)** 
 ownkidu5Mao    -0.021 -0.016 -0.021 
     (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) 
 kid516ownMao    -0.034 -0.032 -0.032 
     (0.014)* (0.015)* (0.015)* 
 ownkid5_16Mao    0.006 0.006 -0.000 
     (0.042) (0.040) (0.037) 
 elderlyMao    -0.018 -0.014 -0.006 
     (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) 
 numelderlyMao    -0.011 -0.005 -0.014 
     (0.042) (0.040) (0.035) 
 daccMao    -0.015 -0.014 -0.007 
     (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) 
 naccMao    -0.060 -0.061 -0.055 
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     (0.053) (0.053) (0.047) 
 ddpbMao    -0.010 -0.008 -0.008 
     (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) 
 ndpbMao    -0.032 -0.024 -0.021 
     (0.034) (0.033) (0.031) 
 dinvsickMao    -0.020 -0.020 -0.020 
     (0.008)* (0.008)** (0.007)** 
 ninvsickMao    -0.029 -0.022 -0.017 
     (0.013)* (0.013) (0.013) 
 dunempMao    -0.011 -0.011 -0.009 
     (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
 unempMao    -0.015 -0.013 -0.013 
     (0.007)* (0.007) (0.007) 
 kidu5othMao    -0.032 -0.029 -0.031 
     (0.011)** (0.010)** (0.010)** 
 othkidu5Mao    -0.018 -0.019 -0.020 
     (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) 
 kid516othMao    0.008 0.010 0.004 
     (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
 othkid5_16Mao    0.001 0.002 -0.002 
     (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
 bth_prntMao    
Base Base Base 
     
 no_spse_no_prntMao    0.052 0.042 0.040 
     (0.009)** (0.009)** (0.009)** 
 spse_onlyMao    0.002 -0.009 -0.010 
     (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
 one_prntMao    0.020 0.014 0.012 
     (0.006)** (0.006)* (0.006) 
 oneprnt_spseMao    0.009 0.004 -0.002 
     (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) 
 two_prnt_spseMao    -0.038 -0.042 -0.035 
     (0.013)** (0.014)** (0.013)** 
 npersonMao    0.013 0.013 0.015 
     (0.004)** (0.004)** (0.004)** 
Unpaid Work Activities       
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 housework     -0.122 -0.105 
      (0.003)** (0.004)** 
 volunteer     -0.036 -0.032 
      (0.005)** (0.005)** 
 chldcare_mem     0.023 0.017 
      (0.006)** (0.006)** 
 chldcare_nonmem     0.011 0.010 
      (0.003)** (0.003)** 
 sick_mem     -0.000 -0.002 
      (0.005) (0.005) 
 sick_nonmem     -0.017 -0.018 
      (0.006)** (0.006)** 
Unpaid Work Activities Interactions       
 houseworkMao     0.009 0.007 
      (0.007) (0.006) 
 volunteerMao     -0.021 -0.025 
      (0.006)** (0.007)** 
 chldcare_memMao     0.004 0.006 
      (0.006) (0.006) 
 chldcare_nonmemMao     -0.011 -0.009 
      (0.006) (0.005) 
 sick_memMao     -0.003 -0.006 
      (0.009) (0.008) 
 sick_nonmemMao     -0.006 -0.006 
      (0.011) (0.010) 
Socioeconomic Status       
 own_house      -0.027 
       (0.004)** 
 hhincome      -0.032 
       (0.002)** 
 investment      -0.096 
       (0.009)** 
 oth_govt_benefit      0.057 
       (0.006)** 
 oth_source      -0.045 
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       (0.008)** 
Socioeconomic Status Interactions       
 own_houseMao      -0.000 
       (0.006) 
 hhincomeMao      -0.010 
       (0.002)** 
 investmentMao      -0.033 
       (0.018) 
 oth_govt_benefitMao      -0.003 
       (0.009) 
 oth_sourceMao      -0.024 
       (0.014) 
Observations 178776 178776 178776 178776 178776 178776 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 5% 
** significant at 1% 
Notes: Sequential introduction of groups of independent variables 
Source: New Zealand Census of Population and Dwellings 2001 
  
 
 
 
 
